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In this dissertation I analyse the concepts of pleasure
and unpleasantness and outline an approach whereby the insights
gained about pleasure and unpleasantness are applied to the
analysis of a number of feeling and emotion concepts. In
trying to understand what pleasure is and hew it is related to
pain and unpleasantness, I tackle various basic questions
about the role of pleasure, pain, and unpleasantness in
motivation and about the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and
the intrinsic badness of pain and unpleasantness. In
pleasure's nature of being good, wanted, and sought and
pairfs nature of being bad, unwanted, and avoided we locate
the way in which pleasure and pain are opposites and the
central defining properties of the 'pleasant' and the
'unpleasant'.
Within my analysis of pleasure and unpleasantness I reach
the conclusion that pleasure and unpleasantness are 'special
experiences' : I explain what is involved in this claim and
defend it against the objections which Ludwig Wittgenstein
raised in his Private Language Argument. The view of the
emotions which I outline and defend is the view which
Aristotle, Spinoza, and many other philosophers have held.
According to this view, emotions or 'feelings' such as con¬
fidence or fear, delight or misery, and pride or shame, are
'modes' of pleasure or unpleasantness. Given my views on
pleasure and unpleasantness, it would follow that a number of
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In this dissertation I analyze the concepts of pleasure and
unpleasantness and outline an approach whereby the insists gained
about pleasure and unpleasantness are applied to the analysis of
a number of feeling and emotion concepts. In trying to understand
what pleasure is and how it is related to pain and unpleasantness,
I tackle various basic questions about the role of pleasure, pain,
and unpleasantness in motivation and about the intrinsic goodness
of pleasure and the intrinsic badness of pain and unpleasantness.
In pleasure's nature of being good, wanted, and sought and pain's
nature of being bad, unwanted, and avoided we locate the way in
which pleasure and pain are opposites and the central defining
properties of the 'pleasant* and the 'unpleasant*.
Within my analysis of pleasure and unpleasantness I reach the
conclusion that pleasure and unpleasantness are 'special experiences':
I explain what is involved in this claim and defend it against the
objections which Ludwig Wittgenstein raised in his Private Language
Argument. The view of the emotions which I outline and defend is
the view which Aristotle, Spinoza, and many other philosophers have
held. According to this view, emotions or 'feelings' such as
confidence or fear, delight or misery, and pride or shame are
'modes' of pleasure and unpleasantness. Given my views on pleasure
and unpleasantness, it would follow that a number of emotions are,
in part, the 'special experiences' of pleasure and unpleasantness.
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Chapter I: Pleasure as a Form of Attention
In recent years, there has been much interest in the philos¬
ophical analysis of pleasure, and this interest was stimulated in
large part by some of the early post-war work of Gilbert Ifyle.
Influenced by Wittgenstein's general denial that psychological
words are names of special sensations or experiences, Ryle, with
vigour and persuasive power, attacked the widely accepted assumption
that pleasure is a kind of sensation or experience comparable to a
pain sensation. Ryle reasoned as follows: 'pain' in the sense in
which the word names such things as headaches or toothaches is a
localized sensation; to walk while having a headache is to walk
while experiencing a certain sensation felt at a certain bodily
location. Pleasure, however, is a very different sort of thing.
When a person walks while enjoying the walk (or, experiencing
'pleasure' from walking) he does not necessarily experience some
localized agreeable sensation. Pain consists in the having of a
certain localized sensation; pleasure does not. Pain is something
that attracts our attention to itself. Pleasure does not attract
our attention to itself; when a person enjoys a conversation his
attention is on his conversation not on his pleasure. If he
experiences pain when engaged in conversation his pain attracts
some of his attention; pleasure is no t the sort of thing that
could do this. The widespread assumption that pleasure and pain
are opposites is mistaken, Ryle concluded, for they are not even
parallel types of phenomena.
According to Ryle's positive account of pleasure, pleasure is
a form of attention or heed, more specifically it is a form of
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absorption in seme present activity. The child enjoying himself is
the child absorbed in doing something. The enjoyment, or absor¬
ption, Ryle pictures as follows:
V/hen the blotting-paper absorbs the ink, we picture the
ink as unresisting and the blotting-paper as having the
power. It thirstily imbibes every drop of the docile
ink and will not give it up again. Somewhat similarly,
when a child is absorbed in his game, he - every drop of
him - is sucked up into the business of manipulating his
clock-work trains, All his thoughts, all his talk, all
his controllable muscular actions are those of his
engine-drivers, signalmen and station-masters. His game
is, for the moment, his whole world. He does not coerce
or marshal himself into playing, as maybe, his conscripted
father does.
Ryle's analysis of pleasure as a form of attention has been very
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influential. W.B. Gallie , B.A.O. Williams , Alan White , and
other philosophers have been convinced that pleasure is in same
important sense a form of 'attention'. In this chapter, I examine
this view and evaluate the arguments which led Ryle to concentrate
on the concept of 'attention', or 'heed', in his analysis of
pleasure.
What is important to notice from the outset of our discussion is
that a reference to someone 'attending' to something or being
'absorbed' in something does not in itself provide a sufficient
condition for pleasure. Ryle himself acknowledges this. For
after linking pleasure to attention which is given spontaneously
he notes: "This is, of course, not enough. Alarming, disgusting
and surprising things can capture my attention without my having
5to fix my attention on them. So do pains and tickles."




5. Ryle (1954a, p 202)
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B.A.O. Willaims, who holds that pleasure is, 'one mode or species
of attention'^ also notes that the linking of pleasure to attention
fails to provide a sufficient condition for pleasure, far he writes:
"This is not to say, of course, that being pleased by something
just is attending to it . . . attention can just as well be directed
7
to or held by the unpleasant." As someone can 'attend' to the
unpleasant as well as the pleasant, so he can be 'absorbed' in the
unpleasant as well as in the pleasant. As Alisdair Maclntyre
notes, "My attention may be absorbed by the thumbscrew's increasing
Q
pressure" without my gaining pleasure from the torture.
Not all of the followers of Ryle have noticed that attention or
absorption does not provide a sufficient condition for pleasure.
C.C.W. Taylor wrote: "The analysis of pleasure as attention seems
substantially correct for pleasure in activities which themselves
require the direction of attention; enjoying gardening is just
giving one's whole mind to it, being unwilling to be distracted
Q
from it and so on." But to say that enjoying gardening 'just is*
giving one's whole mind to it, etc., is at least to say that giving
one's whole mind to gardening, etc., provides a sufficient condition
for 'enjoyment'. J.C. Gosling, like Taylor, thinks that the
attention analysis is correct for some pleasures: "But with
tragedies and canoeing it looks as though absorption and attention
are the relevant constituents" of one's pleasure. By saying
that absorption and attention are 'the constituents' of someone's
6. Williams (1959, P 240)
7. Williams (1959, p 240)
8. MacIntyre (1965, n 223)
9. Taylor (1963, p 4)
10. Gosling (1969, p 135)
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pleasure when he enjoys a tragedy or the activity of canoeing,
Gosling seems to be committed to holding either that when we say
that someone is 'enjoying' or 'taking pleasure in' such events we
mean that he is attending and absorbed, or, at least, that attention
and absorption provide sufficient conditions for pleasure or enjoy¬
ment (in at least one sense of the words 'pleasure' or 'enjoyment').
But Taylor and Gosling are mistaken. Enjoyment in gardening, in
watching tragedies, or in canoeing cannot be simply attending to
these things or being absorbed in them, because a person can attend
to these things or be absorbed without enjoying them. For instance,
a person who is canoeing in very dangerous waters might be fully
absorbed in his canoeing and be unwilling to be distracted, yet
instead of enjoying himself he could be terrified and not enjoying
it in the least. There is no established meaning or sense of the
word 'pleasure' or 'enjoyment' where 'pleasure' is entailed by
attention and absorption. So, there is no occasion when enjoyment
'just is' being absorbed or where attention and absorption are the
sole 'constituents' of pleasure.
Are attention and absorption necessary conditions for pleasure?
Is pleasure in -part attending to things or being absorbed? The
remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of this
position.
The view that pleasure is partly attention, or 'a form of
attention', is not obvious - it is not as obvious as the view that
searching or listening is 'a form of attention' or the view that
pain, in one sense of the word, is a sensation. The view may even
appear counter-intuitive. The 'attention' involved in enjoying
philosophizing seems to be that of thought - thinking about a
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philosophical subject. Is it not strange to say that our pleasure
is a special way of thinking about the subject? The 'attention' in
enjoying music is that of listening. Is it not odd to say that
our pleasure here is a special way of listening to the music? What¬
ever persuasive power people have seen in the Rylian view must be
due to the arguments that have been given in its support. Crucial
in trying to establish 'attention' as a key concept in the analysis
are Rylian arguments like the following:
Sometimes I enjoy a smell; sometimes I dislike it and very
often I am quite indifferent to it. But I could not enjoy
it, dislike it or be indifferent to it if I were totally
oblivious or unaware of it. I cannot say in retrospect
that I liked the smell but did not notice it.
To say that a person had enjoyed the music, though too
preoccupied to listen to it even as a background noise, would
be to say sane thing silly.
Thinking of distress as being parallel to pleasure, Ryle writes:
When a person temporarily forgets his headache or tickle,
he must cease, for that period, to be distressed by it.
Being distressed by it entails not being oblivious of it.
Unnoticed things, like ozone in the air, may certainly
cause us to feel vigorous or cheerful . . . But then we
do not enjoy the ozone, but (for instance) the food and
the music; and of these we cannot be both oblivious and
11
appreciative.
1») The form of these arguments is that the enjoyment of such
and such entails attention to such and such, therefore enjoyment always
requires attention to something and is 'a form of attention' to some¬
thing. But the idea of 'enjoying something' or 'being pleased by
something' is a complex idea - a complex of pleasure and another
something. 'Enjoying music' is a complex idea, a complex of the
idea of pleasure and the idea of music. And what is entailed by, or
11 o All of these passages are from Ryle's paper entitled "Pleasure"
(Ryle, 1954a, pp 198 - 199).
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required for, a certain complex cannot automatically be attributed
to a specific part, the pleasure. The attention requirement of the
complex might be due to the thing enjoyed.
Now, in many of the cases Ryle has in mind, the attention
requirement of the complez is attributable to the non-pleasure
element in the complez. Ryle compares pleasure to distress, noting
that a person cannot be distressed by a headache or a tickle which
he has 'forgotten'. This is intended to show that distress, like
pleasure, is part attention, or 'a form of attention'. But Ryle
is here talking about the distress of sensations, and the parallel
with pleasure is enjoyment of certain sensations or feelings, e.g.
enjoyment of a tickle or a tingle. But sensations and feelings are
of such a nature that it is a condition of their very ezistence that
one must be aware of them. A 'forgotten' sensation is a ceased-to-
ezist sensation; it is not a sensation at all and so not a distressing
sensation. 'Attention' to sensations is required independently of
their pleasurableness or distressfulness. Therefore, the fact that
enjoying or being distressed by a sensation entails 'attention' to
the sensation does not permit the inference that pleasure and
distress are part attention. Having a strange sensation also
entails being aware of the sensation; but it does not follow that
12
strangeness is a species of attention.
2.) Apart from the enjoyment in sensations or feeling there are
12. There is perhaps a sense in which we can talk of a person's
'pain existing though forgotten'; here we would mean that the person
is disposed to feel pain (sensation). But this does not affect the
present point. For it is the sensation, not the disposition, that is
distressing; the disposition to feel pain sensation, whether or not
we are, or could be aware of it is not itself distressing. And the
fact that the sensation is distressing only when we are aware of it
cannot be attributed to distress being a form of attention. The
fact that the sensation exists or is felt in itself entails that we
are aware of it.
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other pleasures that seem to require attention. For instance, it
hardly seems possible to enjoy playing with one's train, riding
one's bike, or having sex without being aware of what we are doing.
Indeed, it may look like a contradiction in terms to talk of a
person enjoying foreplay though oblivious to what is going on.
But, is the attention requirement due to the pleasure or to the
doing of the activity?
Biking and foreplay as normally imagined require attention to
what one is doing. Could a person bike though totally oblivious to
what he is doing? This is hard to imagine. A lover who succeeded
in going through all the right motions while totally oblivious to
what was going on would not comfortably be describable as 'engaging
in foreplay', though he may win our amazement for his capacity for
transcendence. Thus many of the sorts of things a person could be
said to be 'doing* we could not imagine him doing without his being
aware of doing them; consequently, that his enjoying doing them
requires attention tells us nothing about the nature of pieasure.
The attention is required by the activity itself. Being a slow
bike-rider may require one's giving attention to one's bike-riding,
but it does not follow from this that slowness is a form of attention.
Perhaps, with a bit of creative effort, we can conceive of a
situation in which we might describe a person as 'biking' though
oblivious to what he is doing. It may be logically possible for a
person (a 'body') to go through all the ri^it motions while he is in
no way aware of what he is doing. Perhaps we might speak of him
as 'biking', as we might do of a robot having a similar talent. But
assuming that the 'person' is still conscious, it is no longer
obvious that he could not be having a good time of things and
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enjoying Ms 'biking'. In short, a claim that enjoying biking,
hairing foreplay, or washing the dishes require attention to what
one is doing is only as strong as the claim that biking, foreplay,
and washing dishes require one's attention. Whatever doubt we are
able to throw on the requirement of attention for these activities
on their own throws a proportional doubt on the claim that enjqying
this activity requires attention. Thus, for cases such as these
where the activities require attention to what one is doing, the
fact that enjoying the activity requires attention provides no
grounds for linking the attention to the pleasure and treating it
13
as part of the pleasure.
3.) Different issues are raised by the apparent attention
requirement in the cases of the enjqyment of smells, music, stories,
and movies. Again, it may seem impossible to take pleasure in such
tMngs without being aware of them. But in cases such as these
the thing enjoyed could occur or exist without a particular person's
attending to them. Though my headaches and sexual activities may-
require attention whether or not I enjoy them, a smell or a movie
can exist without my attending to them. Yet, when I enjoy it, my
attention is required, it seems. So cases like these might seem
to provide positive reason for attributing the attention required
for the complex of enjoying a movie (a story, etc.) to the pleasure
13« Earlier I quoted a passage where C.C.W. Taylor wrote: "The
analysis of pleasure as attention seems substantially correct for
pleasure in activities which themselves require the direction of
attention." (Taylor, 1973, p 4) Taylor here does not notice that
by admitting that an activity requires attention independently of
its pleasantness or unpleasantness, he loses his reason for supposing
that the attention required for the enjoyment of that activity is
due to the enjoyment. No reason has been given for supposing that
the enjoyment of the activity is_ the attention other than the fact
that the enjoyment of the activity requires attention.
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part of the complex.
But these examples are much trickier than they appear. They
seem to rule out what is the most reasonable alternative view of
the complex, that of pleasure and its cause. Could the music be
the cause of the pleasure when we enjoy music? It may seem not,
for if the music were merely the cause, the attention requirement
could at most be a contingent requirement for the enjoyment of music.
It would at least be conceivable that the music could cause pleasure
in us without our being aware of it. The claim that it is not
even logically possible to enjoy the music without being aware of
it would then seem to rule out the causal model.
But consider similar cases where a certain psychological state
clearly is the effect and the music, smell, etc., is the cause.
Suppose that a persisting noise causes me to have a headache. Ex
hypothesi the noise is the cause of my headache. A noise considered
in itself does not require my attention for it to exist (as does my
backache or my biking). Nevertheless, is it not a prerequisite of
the noise causing me to have a headache that I be aware of the
noise? And, is it not just as difficult to conceive of the noise
casuing me to have a headache without my being aware of the noise
as it is to think of the music causing me pleasure without my being
aware of it? Yet, here we are dealing wiih a case where the attention
is neither part of the cause (the noise) nor part of the effect (my
headache) but a mediator, or causal prerequisite, in this causal
interaction. Similarly, if a smell or someone's voice (or some
theory or piece of music) is to be the cause of my headache, or is
to cause me to go insane, it seems I must be aware of the smell or
voice. But my headache or insanity is not a species of attention
toward the smell. My attention to the smell is merely a causal
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prerequisite of my being driven crazy by the smell. The attention
required for someone to be driven insane by a smell is not attrib¬
utable to the smell on its own nor to the insanity on its own but
to the complex of the two being related causally.
Employing our creative intelligences to their fullest we mi^it
be able to conceive of a situation in which we would say that 'the
music gave him a headache, though he was not aware of the music'.
Perhaps we would say this of a deaf man sitting in a concert hall
where the music is so loud that the physical vibrations cause him
to have a headache. I think we shy away from thinking that the
music, qua music, gave him a headache (as we resist saying that
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony broke the windows in my house when it
was played on my super-stereo with full volume). But still, speak¬
ing loosely, I suppose we might be willing to count this as a case
where the music caused the headache though the person was unaware
of it. But will this example show that since the causal relations
in question do not always require attention in the way discussed,
the attention requirement in enjoying music is more than a mere
causal prerequisite for such pleasure? No. For one is able to
think of the same sort of case of 'music causing pleasure though
we are unaware of the music' in which, consequently, our enjoyment
of the music does not seem to require attention. Insofar as we are
willing to count such cases as instances of 'music of which we are
oblivious causing us pleasure', we thereby have instances of
'enjoying music' which do not seem to require attention. And so
we still lack any important reason for attributing the attention
present in some enjoyment of music to the pleasure itself. (The
peculiar pleasure: The deaf man sitting in the concert hall is
jiggled in such a way by the loud music that the vibrations soothe
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and please him. There is as much reason far saying he is enjoying
the music though oblivious to it as there was for saying the music
«14
gave him a headache though he was unaware of it.J
4.) Few philosophers would have been persuaded of an important
pleasure-attention link were it easy to produce clearly recognizable
counter-examples to the view, that is, cases of pleasure unac¬
companied by attention to something being found pleasant. However,
attention-theorists have, in their discussions, tended to mean
different things by 'attention' in different points of their
discussions. They have avoided clear-cut counter-examples to their
attention-thesis by equivocating upon 'attention', or by shifting in
their view of what sort of attention they are linking to pleasure.
For the narrower, more useful, attention-concepts there are indeed
clear-cut counter-examples to pleasure-theories formulated with
these concepts. When 'attention' is thought of in the broadest
possible way, the pleasure-thesis is of relatively little interest.
a.) The importance Ryle ascribed to the attention-thesis
seems to be due in large part to his wish to link pleasure to a
fairly restricted concept of 'attention'. Ryle gives the words
'attention' and 'heed' importance in The Concept of Mind. He
thinks of 'attention' as a way of behaving or being disposed to
14. A full explanation of why cases of music causing headaches
seem to require awareness, and why deaf-man cases do not seem
comfortable counter-examples, would, I think, be interestirg, but
would be off the track here. Relevant is the fact that music and
ideas have a peculiar ontological status:, they are not physical
events. Thus, their causal effectiveness is not comprehensible in a
straightforward way. A seccnd relevant fact is that smells and
sounds, though existent independently of a particular individual's
awareness of them, are things which need to be analyzed in a
relational way by reference to some being's consciousness of them.
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behave, namely, as behaving in a careful or attentive way. He
contrasts 'attention' with behaving inattentively, carelessly, or
15
absent-mindedly.
Ryle was thinking of his pleasure-thesis with such a concept
of attention when he wrote: "There is a sort of contradiction in
describing someone as absent-mindedly enjoying or disliking
something."''^
If we restrict the thesis to this concept of attention,
counter-examples to a pleasure-attention thesis are easily noticed.
There is no ti^it correlatiai between pleasure and carefulness and
no incompatibility between pleasure and absent-mindedness. I do not
need to walk with any special carefulness to enjoy walking; no more
carefulness is needed for enjoying walking than is needed for walking.
There is no contradiction in saying, 'Though Joe is a careless,
inattentive driver, he loves (immensely enjoys) driving' . There
are many things we enjoy doing which lack a dimension of carefulness-
carelessness. Normally, relaxing, sunning yourself, and being
massaged are neither careful nor careless, but nevertheless these
activities are often greatly enjoyed.
There is indeed an oddness in describing someone as 'absent-
mindedly enjoying' himself, but the oddness is not due to a contra-
15. Pleasure is one among many psychological concepts which Ryle
analyzes in terms of attention or 'heed' in The Concept of Mind.
The identification of pleasure as a form of attention has an impor¬
tant role within Ryle's overall attack on Dualism in that book.
Since Ryle holds that attention is a property of behaviour, by
holding that pleasure is a heed-concept Ryle is in effect holding
that pleasure is a property of behaviour. By finding fault with his
pleasure-attention thesis we are finding fault with his behaviour-
istic account of pleasure. And so falls this particular chunk in
his attack on Dualism.
16. Ryle (1954b, p 59)
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diction but to a category mistake. Pleasure like pain can be neither
absent-minded nor careful; these terms apply to pleasure and pain no
more than do the terms 'fast' and 'slow'. That one cannot enjoy him¬
self speedily is not due to this idea being a contradiction because
enjoyment is necessarily sluggish and slow. It is neither. As
pleasure lacks a dimension of velocity so it lacks a dimension of
carefulness.
b.) In the broadest sense, the word 'attention' can be
used to extend to all cases of perceiving something, knowing or
believing something, thinking of something, taking care in doing
something, and simply being aware or conscious of something. To
perceive or think about something, etc., is to give it some
'attention' in this broad sense of the term. But as the words
'attention' or 'heed' are most commonly used, they would contrast
with many occasions of barely being aware or conscious of something
or merely 'not being totally oblivious' of something. Though
vaguely aware of the position of my hands while typing I do not
normally 'attend' to them or 'heed' their positions while typing,
in the ordinary sense of these terms. My 'attention' is on the
ideas, not on my fingers. Ordered to 'attend' to the blackboard,
the pupil would not placate the teacher by assuring her that he was
not totally oblivious to it. More is required.
Ryle and others at times have wished to analyze pleasure in
terms of a more narrow concept of attention, namely, the concept ctf
17 18
being absorbed or engrossed. Terence Penelhum linked enjoyment
to 'paying close attention' or 'being absorbed'. Being 'absorbed'
17. Ryle (1954a, pp203 - 205)
18. Penelhum (1964, p 245)
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or 'engrossed* normally means giving a high degree of attention and
thus contrasts with giving average attention or giving only a little
attention. While writing this, it is the work which is engrossing me,
not the background music. Not all conversations are 'engrossing'
ones; to some I give normal attention without finding them taking
so much attention as to be 'absorbing'. I am 'engrossed' when
actively involved in doing something, not when sitting around and
doing nothing in particular.
There are many clear-cut counter-examples to pleasure-attention
theses when attention is thought of in either of these ways. There
is no contradiction in the idea of my enjoying background music.
Ryle said that to say that "a person had enjoyed the music, though
too preoccupied to listen to it even as a background noise, would
be to say something silly." True, no doubt. But the 'attention'
required in listening to music as background music is neither
absorption nor 'attention' in the most common sense of the word.
The pupil aware of the teacher's voice merely as background noise
is not 'attending' to the teacher's voice, in the most commonly
used sense of the word.
Background decoration, like background music, does not demand
one's attention, in this common sense of the word, yet can indeed
add to the pleasantness of a room. I can enjoy relaxing or 'sitting
and doing nothing' but I need not heed my relaxation or inactivity,
in this sense, though I will no doubt be in some way aware of it.
And since these pleasures do not require .attention, in this sense,
they obviously do not require absorption, i.e., a high degree of
attention. Background music or decoration by definition is some¬
thing one does not normally directly attend to or heed.
It might be responded that even when enjoying relaxing or being
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massaged, one is absorbed to some degree in what he is doing or
thinking about. But with this reply one is merely stretching the
meaning of the word 'absorbed' so that it does the work of
'attention' in a broad sense of the word. The normal meaning of
the word 'absorption' is such that the word contrasts with low
attention or average attention. To use the word for the whole
range of 'attention' is either to say something false or merely to
stretch its meaning. By arguing in this manner one does not defend
the view that pleasure requires a higher than usual degree of atten¬
tion, but this seemed to be the whole point in saying that pleasure
requires 'absorption' or 'fairly close attention'.
c.) Might we avoid some of these problems by adopting a
proportionality thesis as, for instance, B.A.O. Williams does? "If
I am pleased by sane thing, my attention is, to that extent, drawn
to it; and the more I am pleased by it, the more my attention is
19
absorbed in it," Williams wrote. According to this suggestion,
great pleasure is necessarily accompanied by a high degree of
attention, or a state of being 'absorbed' or 'engrossed'; moderate
pleasure with a moderate degree of attention; and mild pleasure with
only a low degree of awareness.
The thesis at least has a neatness to it, but unfortunately it
is quite false. It is possible for great pleasure to be accompanied
by only a low degree of attention; consider, for instance, the
pleasure one might gain from relaxing, sunbathing, or being massaged.
Moderate pleasure can be accompanied by close attention or 'absorption',
as, for instance, in my present response to writing this paper. Most
activities that are found pleasant are accompanied by the degree of
19. Williams (1959, p 240)
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attention which one normally gives to the activity, and this is
so regardless of the degree of pleasure experienced while doing the
thing. The difference between the greater enjoyment someone takes
in winning a game of chess than in losing it will not necessarily
be correlated with a difference in degree of attention given.
Though someone may lose a chess game because he gave the game little
attention, people will often give just as much attention to the
games which th^y lose as they give to the games they win. Never¬
theless, people tend to enjoy the game less when they lose.
A theory of pleasure must be able to explain the nature of the
differences between different degrees of pleasure, but apart from
the present suggestion which is clearly mistaken, there is no
apparent way in which one might do so merely by concentrating on
* attention'.
d.) If the word 'attention' is thought of in the broadest
sense, we might include all awareness, including the minimal aware¬
ness of 'not being totally oblivious of something', as well as all
perceiving, knowing, concentrating, being careful, and thinking.
If 'attention' is thought of in this sense, the attention-thesis
asserts that when a person is enjoying himself or pleased by some¬
thing, he at least knows of or is aware of what he is enjeying or
pleased by. To this broad statement there do not seem to be clear-
cut counter-examples. So, we may admit it as a general truth that
a pleased person is at least to some degree aware of what is
pleasing him or what he is enjoying. In.this generalization, however,
we hardly have a developed account of what pleasure is. Furthermore,
as I argued earlier, Ryle's arguments do not succeed in showing
that the awareness (or 'attention') is actually a part of the
pleasure.
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Chapter II: Pleasure as 'Pro-attitude'
In this chapter I wish to examine a number of analyses of
pleasure according to which pleasure is thought of as a kind of
'favourable attitude' or 'favourable orientation' toward some
activity or object of thought. There are differences as well as
similarities between the different accounts, and I do not mean to
suggest that there is a great deal of homogeneity by speaking of
these views as 'pro-attitude' views. I am more interested in the
particular accounts of pleasure which are discussed than in
categorizing these views in some precise fashion.
The term 'pro-attitude' is used both by Nowell-Smith and David
Perry in their discussions of pleasure. In classifying pleasure
(also 'enjoyment') as a 'pro-attitude', Nowell-Smith treats pleasure
as comparable to other 'pro-attitudes' such as desire and approval."'
Though Perry holds that it is not possible to provide one account that
will be applicable to all pleasures, he holds that each of the two
basic types of pleasure (namely, enjoyment and being pleased about
2
something) are species of 'pro-attitude'.
Similar to these views are the descriptions of pleasure whereby
pleasure is thought of as an attitude of favourably 'appraising'
something, valuing or 'prizing' something, or approving some-thing.
MagdaArnold, for instance, defines 'pleasure' as "a welcoming of
something senses that is appraised as beneficial and indicates
3
enhanced functioning." Of the relation of the pleasure to the
appraisal she writes: "When we reflect upon our experience of
1. Nowell-Smith (1954, ppHO - 144)
2. Perry (1967, pp214 - 216)
Jo Arnold (1960, p 74)
18
pleasantness and unpleasantness, we are aware of appraising this
thing as good (pleasant), that as bad (unpleasant); and we often
assume that such an evaluation is the result of our feeling experience*.
But the process of appraisal seems to be inherent in the feeling
experience."^ W.B. Gallie seems to have a similar view in mind when
5
he analyzes pleasure as a form of appraisive attention. John Dewey
thought of pleasure ('enjoyment') as much the same thing as 'prizing'
or 'valuing' some object.^ Stephen Pepper treats the expressions
'enjoying something', liking something for its own sake', and 'valuing
7
something for its own sake' as interchangable. J.N. Pindlay includes
within his definition of 'feelings of pleasure' a kind of approving
attitude toward one's circumstances in life. Findlay writes that a
feeling of pleasure is "our immediate awareness of the deep fit
between wants and circumstances, a consciousness expressible in such
phrases as 'Let this be exactly as it is."^ This exclamation expresses
an approving attitude or favourable appraisal of one's circumstances
in life.
Ryle and other philosophers have, when analyzing pleasure,
4. Arnold (i960, p 73) • Arnold also provides a definition of 'pain*
and'unpleasantness' which parallels her definition of 'pleasure' (and
'pleasantness'). 'Pain' and 'mapleasantness' are defined as "a
resistance to something sensed that is appraised as harmful and indi¬
cates impaired functioning" (p 74). The other 'pro-attitude' accounts
of pleasure discussed in this chapter also permit a parallel 'con-
attitude' analysis of unpleasantness.
5. Gallie (1954)
6. Dewey (1929, Chapter X)
7. Pepper (1949, pp 12 - 13)« In a manner similar to Dewey and
Pepper, David Perry writes: "If one is enjoying a thing, it follows
trivially that he values the thing. The claim here is not that the
fact that one is enjoying a thing is a reason for valuing (this
would be another matter), but that to enjoy is to like and, hence, to
value in a certain manner." (Perry, 1967, p 129)
8. Findlay (1961, p 177)
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concentrated on the desires and inclinations of the pleased person.
Ryle, for instance, writes: "To enjoy doing something, to want to do
it and not want to do anything else are different ways of phrasing the
9
same thing." "Someone who has an inclination to do sanething that
he is doing and no inclination not to do it can be signified indif¬
ferently by 'he enjoys doing it' and by 'he is doing what he wants to
do'."^ Ralph Barton Perry has said similar things. When discussing
the 'peculiar affinity between pleasure and pursuit, and pain and
avoidance', Perry writes that at times "'taking pleasure in' is
synonymous with 'inclination' or 'liking', and 'finding painful' is
synonymous with 'disinclination' or 'disliking'J?11 (Perry says this
of 'taking pleasure in' but resists identifying pleasure with sane
inclination.) Thinking in a vein similar to Ryle's, J.N. Findlay
writes that "to be pleased by a smell is quite, or nearly, insep-
12
arable from wanting it to continue a little longer." Kurt Baier,
too, includes a 'tendency to continue or to repeat the pleasant
13activity' within his analysis of pleasure. The rest of this
chapter will be devoted to examining the above views on Pleasure.
1.) In "the analysis of the caicept of pleasure as in the
analysis of other concepts, it is necessary to be careful to avoid
circular definitions. It is not uncommon for philosophers who think
of pleasure as some 'favourable orientation' to offer an analysis of
9. Ryle (1949, p 104)10. Ryle (1949, p 104). Ryle would view the analysis of pleasure in
terms of wants and inclinations as an elaboration of the analysis of
pleasure as a form of attention and not as a distinct or separate
account.
11. Perry, R.B. (1954, p 29)
12. Findlay (1961, p 155)
13« Baier (1958, p 272)
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pleasure which is circular or in danger of being circular. In
such cases, the philosopher uses words which themselves entail, or
seem to entail, the experiencing of a degree of pleasure when he is
trying to describe or analyze pleasure. If we were to unpack or
elucidate the meaning of the definition or description we would need
to introduce the very concept we are out to explain, namely, pleasure.
A crude example of an analysis of pleasure that is circular
would be an attempt to say what pleasure is by asserting that pleasure
is simply enjoying yourself or being pleased with life. Such a
statement about pleasure, even if considered true, would not provide
a successful analysis of pleasure. 'Enjoying yourself and 'being
pleased with life' themselves entail the experiencing of pleasure.
The question of what pleasure is still remains even after describing
pleasure in this way.
Within his analysis of pleasure, J.N. Pindlay writes that "the
varying states of being pleased are all states of relatively un¬
mixed acquiescence or basking dalliance in some activity or in the
14
thought or sight of some object." Though Pindlay attempts to
explain what pleasure is by referring to a state of 'basking
dalliance', an explanation of what the expression 'basking dalliance'
means would probably necessitate the re-introduction of the concept
of pleasure. A description of someone as 'basking' in the sunshine
or in some state of affairs itself entails that he is finding the
sunshine or state of affairs a source of pleasure or that he is
(passively) being pleased by it. It is nearly a contradiction in
terms to say that someone is 'basking in some unpleasant state of
affairs'; if we used this description we would be implying that the
H. Findlay (1961, p 177)
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person took pleasure in the situation. Furthermore, the description
of someone as 'dallying* (or being in a state of 'dalliance') itself
seems to entail that the person is amusing himself, or taking
pleasure in, some activity which is delaying him. Thus an analysis
of pleasure in terms of 'basking dalliance' risks a degree of
circularity. An analysis of pleasure in terms of 'a tendency to
prolong or continue' captures some of the meaning of 'basking
dallianoe' but avoids the circularity.
Aristotle and Ryle are sometimes interpreted as having analyzed
15
pleasure in terms of carrying on an activity with zeal or zest.
However, the terms 'zest' and 'zeal' are poor for analyzing pleasure
since a proper analysis of these terms would itself probably require
re-introducing the concept of pleasure. The assertion that someone
works 'with zest' (or 'zeal') itself seems to entail that he takes
pleasure in his work. Ryle often talks of the person enjoying him¬
self as having a (strong) 'desire' or 'inclination* to do what he is
doing, and these terms capture much of what might be meant by speaking
of someone as acting with 'zest' but are preferable in the analysis.
An analysis of pleasure in terms of 'desires' or 'inclinations' does
not itself seem to be in danger of circularity.^
J.C.B. Gosling is not so careful as Ryle, and his analysis of
pleasure is in danger of circularity at a number of points. Gosling
15° Williams (1959, p 228) Williams writes that Aristotle and
possibly Ryle hold that "pleasure in the standard case consists in or
accompanies zestful activity."
16. Some philosophers have claimed that a state of desire is nec¬
essarily unpleasant, and that desire therefore needs to be analyzed
in terms of pain or unpleasantness. If this were so, it would perhaps
present problems for ore who would analyze pleasure in terms of desire,
for this would mean that he was analyzing the pleasant by reference
to the unpleasant. And the concept of the unpleasant does not seem
any more fundamental than that of the pleasant.
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believes that it is not possible to give one account for all cases of
pleasure, so he provides different accounts for different species of
'pleasure'. In analyzing the various pleasures he writes that some
17
pleasures are characterized by 'vigour and gusto' , some are
18
characterized by 'enthusiasm' and others are characterized by
19
'eagerness'. However, these terms are similar to 'zest' and 'zeal'
and they, too, introduce sane circularity into the analysis. That
someone works with 'vigour and gusto' or with 'enthusiasm' entails
that he is pleased to work, that be enjoys working or devoting energy
to working, or some such pleasure. The claim that someone is 'eager'
to golf itself seems to entail that he takes pleasure in the prospect
of golfing or that he is pleased to golf.
Gosling also describes some pleasures in terms of being 'cheerful',
20
'being in a good mood', or being 'lighter of heart'. Once again,
Gosling has chosen ezpressi ons which themselves need to be analyzed
in terms of pleasure. Being 'cheerful', in a 'good mood', or
'lifter of heart' entails being in a mood where one is pleased with
various things.
Ryle was sharp enou^i to note that one cannot explain what
pleasure is by referring to cheerfulness. "On idie contrary," Ryle
wrote, "the notion of being cheerful has to be explained in terms of
the notion of pleasure, since to be cheerful is to be easy to
21
please." Gosling's description of other pleasures in terms of
22
'heightened geniality' is equally troublesome, since being in a
17. Gosling (1969, p 133)
18. Gosling (1969, p 134)
19. Gosling (1969, p 56)
20. Gosling (1969, Pp134 - 135)
21. Ryle (1954a, p 197)
22. Gosling (1969, p 132)
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'genial mood' itself seems to entail being cheerful or in a good
mood, and thus being in a mood where one is easily pleased.
It is not uncommon for philosophers to talk as though they have
given a whole or partial elucidation of the nature of pleasure or
unpleasantness by explaining pleasure in terms of 'liking' something
or unpleasantness in terms of 'disliking' something. C.D. Broad,
for instance, wrote: "Is it not possible that the statement 'This
experience of mine is pleasant' just means 'I like this experience
23
for its non-hedonic qualities?'" But does 'liking something'
explain what pleasure is, or would one need to refer back to pleasure
in order to explain what 'liking' is? The claim that Joe 'likes'
going to movies seems almost synonymous with the claim that he 'enjoys'
or 'takes pleasure in' movies or that he finds it 'pleasant' to go to
movies, so one is not justified in assuming that the concept of
'liking' something is either more fundamental or better understood
than the concept of 'pleasure'. Gilbert Ryle often uses the word
'liking' in his discussions of pleasure, but he does not take this as
an explanation of what pleasure is but merely as a way of delineating
the problem being studied. For Ryle, the problem of explaining what
pleasure is, just is, at least in part, the problem of explaining what
O A
it is to 'like' something. Reference to 'liking' something does not
provide the solution but merely a way of posing our problem when our
25
end is to explain the nature of pleasure.
23c Broad (1930, p 237)
24» See, for instance, Ryle (1949» pp103 - 106).
25. Sidney Zink makes much the same point about C.D. Broad that I
have just made: "There is no ground for regarding the liking a3
more elementary than the pleasure. Why not describe the liking of
the quality as a taking pleasure in it? In fact pleasure seems to
be the primary fact." (Zink, 1962, p 91)
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Finally, W.B. Gallie, agreeing with Ryle that pleasure is a
kind of 'attention', attempts to explain what kind of attention
pleasure is by describing it as "the kind of attention that might
26
well be labelled 'appreciative' or 'aesthetic'." To say that
someone enjoying a movie is someone who 'appreciates' the movie is
similar to saying that the person values or favourably appraises the
movie, but the term 'appreciative' is less desirable within an
analysis of pleasure. The claim that someone 'appreciates' the music
of Mahler itself entails that he enjoys the music. The claim that
someone takes an 'aesthetic' interest in his furniture seems to
unpack into the claim that he is able to take pleasure in the shapes,
colors, and general appearance of his furniture. Thus, an analysis
of pleasure in terms of 'appreciative' or 'aesthetic' attention is
circular.
I am not saying that the meanings of words such as 'zest' or
'appreciation' are fully exhausted by a reference to 'pleasure'.
The word 'zest', for instance, has an additional suggestion of being
energetic or active. And it is useful to ask whether pleasure
necessarily involves 'heightened activity', since the idea of
'heightened activity' does not itself unpack into the experiencing
of pleasure. 'Heightened activity' may be found in the agitated
person as well as in the highly pleased. Later in this chapter I
ask whether pleasure involves heightened activity.
2») Most philosophers agree that pleasure is intrinsically
good and that it is something which people want and seek. Historically,
26. Gallie (l954, p 161)
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much of the interest philosophers have had in pleasure has been in
the discussion of Ethical and Psychological Hedonism, the views
according to which pleasure is the sole intrinsic good and the sole
thing which people want and seek for its own sake. What is contro¬
versial in these theories is not the presumption that pleasure is
good and something wanted but the claim that pleasure is the sole
thing that is intrinsically good and the sole thing which people
seek as an end.
A critical test for any proposed analysis of pleasure is whether
the proposal delineates some psychological state with a recognizable
intrinsic value and appeal. When a philosopher identifies 'pleasure'
with something that has no intrinsic value or appeal, or with some¬
thing which people in fact are indifferent to, his proposal has missed
the heart of the matter.
There are, admittedly, some philosophers who would say that
pleasure is not always good, and it is sometimes said that Puritans
have held that pleasure is never itself good. Thou^i I will be
discussing these positions later, at present it is sufficient that
it be agreed that pleasure has an appeal or attraction to people.
Even Puritans would admit that pleasure has an attraction to people
- that it is something that 'glitters' and tempts people to seek it.
To provide an adequate account of pleasure a proposal must at least
succeed in isolating some psychological phenomenon which people in
fact care about, even if they are wrong to do so.
Even the simple claim that the ward 'pain', in the primary sense
of the word, names a kind of sensation passes this sort of test, for
it succeeds in identifying pain with something with a recognizable
unattractiveness. Within our experience we can confirm the claim
26
that some sensations are hateful and of a type which we try to avoid
or mimimize. Those sensations which we feel when we cut or burn
ourselves, and those which we call 'headaches', have this characteristic;
these sensations are unattractive and of a type which we normally try
to avoid or minimize.
The test we must apply to pleasure (and unpleasantness) is one
which can be applied to all of the goods and evils which interest
philosophers, e.g. beauty and ugliness, or justice and injustice.
Happily, the definitions of 'justice' which contemporary philosophers
offer do satisfy the appeal test. John Rawls, for instance, includes
in his definition of 'justice' the assertion that "institutions are
just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the
assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a
proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social
27
life." That duties and rights within institutions should not be
assigned 'arbitrarily' and that a 'proper balance' should be struck
between competing claims to social goods are principles that at least
sound attractive. For one form of justice Von Wright offers the
principle that "no man shall have his share in the greater good of a
28
community of which he is a member, without paying his due." The
principle that someone who takes good from a community should pay back
what he owes is at least a somewhat annealing principle and so is not
guilty from the start of missing the heart of the matter with respect
to justice. (The issue of whether the proposals of Rawls and Von
pq.
Wright are in danger of circularity is another matter. )
27. Rawls (1971, p 5)
28. Von Wright (1963, p 208)
29. Can one, for instance, determine what the 'proper balance' is
when distributing social 'advantages' or goods without re-introducing
the concept of a fair or just distribution?
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The greatest fault in the analyses of pleasure which I have
mentioned in this chapter and the last one is that the philosophers
have identified pleasure with psychological phenomena which have no
intrinsic goodness or attraction - phenomena to which people are, for
the most part, indifferent.
By concentrating on 'attention1 or 'absorption' in defining
'pleasure', as Ryle suggested that we should do, we do not focus
upon something wi th a natural appeal or attraction. Though an
'instinctive1 attraction to pleasure seems to be common to all
people and animals capable of experiencing pleasure, there is no such
universal desire to attend to things or to be absorbed or engro ssed
in doing something. People sometimes care about their attention,
e.g., students sometimes have a desire to listen carefully to the
lecturer so as to learn the subject well. But this desiring to
attend carefully is rare and by no means so widespread as the desire
and attraction for pleasure; furthermore, the student in this case
values the attention as a means to an end, the learning of the subject,
whereas pleasure is something with intrinsic goodness or appeal -
something which people want and seek for what it is in itself. As
pain is avoided for what it is in itself, and not merely because it
might have undesirable effects such as hindering concentration, so
pleasant experiences are wanted and sought for what they are in
themselves and not merely far whatever desirable effects they may
have.
In his discussion of pleasure, A.R. Manser makes some points
related to those I am making, and presents a similar objection to
Ryle's analysis of pleasure in terms of 'heed' or 'attention'. The
central problem in explaining what pleasure is, he writes, is "how
28
it is that pleasure can serve as a motive or reason for our activities."
"No adequate description of the 'nature of pleasure can be given unless
it is seen that this is the central problem". "It is, I think, a
failure to realize this fact which renders so inconclusive the
discussion of the subjects by Professor Ryle and Gallie," Manser
writes. To concentrate on 'attention' within the analysis of pleasure
as Ryle and Gallie do, Manser writes, "is to leave opaque what I have
indicated as the core of the problem, why we should want to do things
30
we enjoy or get pleasure from."
Nor is there a universal appeal in 'having a desire (an
inclination) to do what we are doing and not having a desire (an
inclination) to do otherwise'. Of course, if someone has a desire to
golf he does care about his golfing (which is the 'object' of his
enjoyment). But the point is that he does not care about his state
of desire itself, and it is this state of desire which Ryle equates
with the enjoyment. Ryle equates our enjoyment with our desire to
do that which we enjoy doing (e.g., golfing), but he overlooks the
attraction we have to enjoyment itself. People desire to enjoy
themselves, and they often do things for the sake of enjoying life
more. Enjoyment itself has an intrinsic attractiveness; it is some¬
thing which people want and seek. There are, perhaps, occasions when
a person has a second order desire to have a desire or inclination
to do something. For instance, a person might wish that he had a
greater desire to get out of bed in the morning, or he might wish
that he had a greater inclination to play football with his children.
30. Manser (i960, p 223). Though Manser and I agree on this
important point, I find the main body of his paper unclear and
confused. Thus he is not at all successful in dealing with what he
has rightly labelled 'the central problem' in explaining the nature
of pleasure.
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But these second order desires are rare and relatively sophisticated,
whereas the desire for pleasure is much less rare and is found even
in unsophisticated creatures such as dogs and cats. Pleasure is
something intrinsically good, but there does not seem to be intrinsic
goodness in 'wanting to do what you are doing and not wanting to do
otherwise'.
At one point in his writings on pleasure Ryle seemed to be some¬
what aware that it was a consequence of his view that pleasure is not
something which people want and seek. But he did not notice that this
implication of his view might be seen as a fault in his analysis. Of
someone enjoying a conversation Ryle wrote: "It is more nearly correct
to say that my liking and disliking are not special objects of a
possible secondary introspective interest but rather special qualities
31
of my actual interest in the conversation." This, perhaps, is a
way of saying that we are mistaken to think of pleasure as something
that we want or are interested in; rather, pleasure itself is a form
of interest in something. When we enjoy a conversation, we are
interested in the conversation, not in our enjoyment, Ryle seems to be
saving.
Part of what Ryle is saying in this passage is that when
enjoying a conversation our main attention is on the conversation
and not on ourselves or on our reactions to the conversation.
In the passage preceding the above quotation Ryle wrote that
pleasure is not "some collateral activity or experience which might
conceivably clamour for a part of my interest or attention in the way
32
in which a tickle migfrt distract my attention from the butterfly."
31. Ryle (1954b, p 60)
32. Ryle (1954b, p 59)
30
The main thrust of this passage is both true and important. When
enjoying a conversation, a person normally has most of his attention
on the conversation and not on his own enjoyment, nor is his enjoy¬
ment something that attracts his attention in the way that a tickling
sensation might do so.
But Ryle does not stop at saying this; he also says that pleasure
is not the sort of thing in which people normally take an "introspective
interest". Under normal circumstances "my liking and disliking are
not special objects of a possible secondary introspective interest"
he wrote. But this is mistaken. People do. take an 'introspective
interest' in whether they are liking or enjoying what they are doing
er finding it distressing or disliking it. If someone is finding a
conversation uncomfortable or distressing, or is 'disliking' it, he
may try to lessen the discomfort by changing the subject, disen¬
gaging himself from the conversation, or perhaps even avoiding this
person in the future. If he is enjoying or liking the conversation,
he will often be interested in prolonging or repeating his enjoyment
by encouraging his friend to stay longer or to visit again soon.
The 'introspective interest' which people take in their enjoyment
or distress is manifested not only in the attention which they give
while experiencing the pleasure or discanfort. Their interest in their
enjoyment or distress is also shown in the attention or thought that
they give to their enjoyments and discomforts when they make decisions
and form attitudes about future activities and objects of pursuit. It
is mainly because they are interested in enjoying themselves that
people devote so much time to movies, music, travelling, and talking
with friends. Decisions over careers, friends, hobbies, and coffee
brands are strongly influenced by the interest one takes in prospective
pleasant experiences. A man's decision to pursue the life of thought
31
as a career often results partly through the belief that he would
enjoy the life style. His interest in enjoyment is not limited to
periods in which he is presently enjoying himself; he also shows his
'introspective interest' in pleasure by trying to maximize or increase
his future enjoyments.
The view that people take an 'introspective interest* in their
enjoyment is not easily detachable from the view that pleasure is
intrinsically good. If something is intrinsically good, then we
should, in Hie absence of special circumstances, expect people to
want and seek it. Ryle nowhere denies the assumption - one almost
universally accepted by moral philosophers - that pleasure is (at
least normally) intrinsically good. If Ryle intended to deny that
people are interested in their enjoyment he would be placing himself
in a philosophically awkward position. If pleasure is indeed some¬
thing intrinsically good and thus worth havirg, why is it that people
do not take an (introspective) interest in getting it?
J.N. Findlay is one philosopher who appreciates that an analysis
of pleasure needs to isolate something with an appeal or attraction.
After identifying a feeling of pleasure with "our immediate awareness
of the deep fit between wants and circumstances, a consciousness
expressible in such phrases as 'Let this be exactly as it isl",
Findlay raises the following objection: "All this might appear
intellectualized or peripheral, it might seem to, have missed the heart
of the matter, the glow or sweetness or bloom of pleasure, on the one
hand, and the sick jars, squirming unease, and parched agonies of the
33
unpleasant."
Findlay shows uncommon insight in sensing that the 'glow',
33. Findlay (1961, p 177)
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'sweetness', or 'bloom' of pleasure is 'the heart of the matter' for
pleasure and that his previous description of pleasure does not seem
to capture this. In identifying pleasure with an awareness or
recognition that one's circumstances are as one wants them to be,
Findlay is able to explain why one's circumstances in life appear
attractive to the pleased person, but he does not thereby account for
any attractiveness or 'sweetness' in the experience of pleasure itself.
According to Findlay's account, a person pleased with his car will
think that his car is as it should be, but where is the attraction in
the psychological state of being pleased? What is it about this
psychological state that leads people to want to feel pleased and
strongly to prefer feeling pleased to feeling distressed? Findlay
rightly fears that his account seems 'intellectualized' by focusing
upon some cognitive state (an 'awareness') of the pleased person and
that it seems 'peripheral* because it concentrates on the attractive¬
ness ef one's circumstances without accounting far an attractiveness
in the pleasant experience itself. (The same objection applies to
views where pleasure is said to be an attitude of 'prizing', 'valuing',
or 'favourably appraising' something. On this view, to take pleasure
in one's car is to prize or value the car. But where then is the
attraction or intrinsic goodness in this psychological state? What is
it about the psychological state of favourably appraising something
that leads people to want to feel pleased?)
Findlay attempts to deal with this objection in the following way:
"The glow or sweetness or bloom which seems the heart of the matter in
our states of felt pleasure - can be none other than the condensing
power of conscious experience, its ability to hold complex relation-
34
ships in dissolved suspension." Obviously this reply to the
34. Findlay (1961, p 177)
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objection is unclear and unhelpful. Here Findlay identifies the
'sweetness' of pleasure with a certain power or ability of
consciousness, a power of 'condensing' various ideas and an ability
of holding complex relationships 'in dissolved suspension'. But, it
hardly seems that a 'sweetness' or 'glow' is entailed by the existence
of such a power or ability of consciousness, since a person's
consciousness would retain the same ability or power even when he is
not feeling pleased. A person might feel pleased for twenty minutes
after hearing a piece of good news and then cease to feel pleased,
but his mental abilities or powers do no t themselves undergo some
change during this period.
When Findlay identifies the attractiveness of pleasure with this
mental ability he may be thinking that the attractiveness is caused
by this power—tha t this power creates or causes the attractiveness or
'sweetness' characteristic of pleasure. (For how could some power
itself be attractive? How could a power be intrinsically 'sweet' in
the way that pleasure is?) But what then is the thing that is itself
attractive? Is it some distinct attractive feeling or experience that
is created? (Or, does this power cause our cognitive state or
approving attitude to be attractive? What would it be like for some
cognitive state to be 'sweet' or 'glowing'?) A pleasant experience
is intrinsically attractive and intrinsically good, that is, attractive
in itself and independently of any effects which it might have; there¬
fore, it would be mistaken to identify the attractiveness of pleasure
with some effect of pleasure. Furthermore, if Findlay is thinking
that this power of consciousness causes some attractive feeling, it
would seem that this attractive feeling itself is the pleasure and the
rest of Findlay's account becomes superfluous.
Finally, it seems more than a contingent fact that it is pleasure
34
rather than unpleasantness that is attractive and wanted. Findlay
also agrees with this, for within his discussion of pleasure he writes:
"Plainly it is in some sense almost trivially necessary -that we should
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want pleasure (or not want unpleasure)." But given what he says in
his definition of 'pleasure' and in his account of its 'sweetness' it
would not follow that it is 'trivially necessary' that it is pleasure
rather than unpleasantness that is wanted and attractive.
Much of the study of pleasure in recent years has been carried
on by philosophers viewing their task primarily as one for Philosophy
of Mind rather than as one for Ethics. The belief that the realm of
facts is distinct from the realm of values is widespread these days,
and I suspect that this belief is partially responsible for the tendency
to assume that one can understand the (factual) nature of pleasure
without asking questions about the value or appeal of pleasure.
Divorcing the concept of pleasure from ethical contexts has made it
easier for philosophers to overlook the appeal and value of pleasure
when analyzing it.^
35. Findlay (1961, p 177)
36. Manser makes a related point. After claiming that 'the central
philosophical problem' about pleasure is how it can serve as a motive
or reason for action, he wiites that "it is as a part of Practical
Philosophy that any discussion of the notion should be conducted, not
as an aspect of philosophical psychology". (Manser, 1960, p 223)• The
failure to notice these things is what "renders so inconclusive the
discussion of the subjects by Professor Ryle and Gallie',' he writes. I
agree with Manser that philosophers have tended to divorce the concept
of pleasure from ethical contexts and from contexts of 'practical
philosophy' and that this may have influenced philosophers in such a
way that they miss what Manser and I consider 'the heart of the matter'.
However it is not that the nature of pleasure is not a question for
philosophical psychology, but rather that philosophical psychology at
times overlaps with moral or practical philosophy. Questions about the
way in which pleasure provides a reason for action are of interest to
philosophical psychology as well as to moral or practical philosophy.
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3.) It is clear that the desires and inclinations which Ryle
and other philosophers equate with pleasure are oten present when a
person experiences pleasure. But are the desires and inclinations
one and the same thing as the pleasure, or do they merely accompany
the pleasure? A plausible alternative to identifying the pleasure with
these desires is the position whereby pleasure, or the expectation of
continued pleasure, leads to a person's desiring that thing which is
the source of the pleasure. This latter view is the one which I hold
and will argue for (though this formulation is slightly oversimplified.)
According to Ryle, to enjoy digging is to want orbe inclined to
dig and not want or be inclined to do other things. The first
limitation of this proposal to note is that it does not provide a
sufficient condition for pleasure, for it is possible to have these
desires and inclinations without enjoying oneself. For instance, an
escaped convict fleeing the bloodhounds and police search-party might
be motivated by a strong desire or inclination to flee, and he might
not, at that time, be occupied by any desire or inclination to be doing
something else. The convict might have these desires and yet be
terrified and not be enjoying his flight in the least. The prisoner
may be fleeing willingly, so acting willingly is not sufficient for
37
pleasure. Findlay suggested that being pleased by a smell is
'nearly inseparable' from wanting it to continue a little longer.
However, this desire is not sufficient for pleasure since one can
want a smell to continue without being pleased by it. The police who
are chasing the convict might desire that the scent of the man continue
37« Ryle seemed to be suggesting that willingness is a central
characteristic of pleasure when he says of the child enjoying his
train set that "he does not coerce or marshal 1 himself into playing,
as, maybe, his conscripted father does." (Ryle, 1949, p 104).
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so thqy can continue to track him, but they need not be enjoying the
scent (and would not even be aware of it). Someone might want a
particular unpleasant smell to continue for its own sake simply
because it is unusual; he might be motivated by curiosity and not
by pleasure taken in the smell.
To be adequate, an account of pleasure needs to be able to account
for differences in degree of pleasure. Ryle's analysis in terms of
desires and inclinations does not succeed in doing this. A mild
pleasure need not be associated with only a mild desire to do or
continue doing what one is doing or a greater pleasure with a greater
desire to do or continue doing what one is doing. Though one golfer
may be enjoying the game much more than his companion, he need not
have any greater desire to golf or to continue golfing than his
friend has. Normally, both want to finish the game, and, likely,
both will want to golf again. (Of course, it is possible that the
golfer who enjoys himself little will have little desire to golf
again, but this is not necessary. If he thinks that next time he will
play better or that the wealher will not be so bad, he might have a
strong desire to golf again.)
Ryle includes within his analysis of pleasure the claim that a
person enjoying himself does not have a desire or inclination to do
other than what he is (enjoying) doing. But this part of the proposal
will not do. Though someone may be enjoying his afternoon at work he
still might want to go home and relax (and thus be has a desire to do
other than what he is doing). Though someone has been enjoying the
party, he may nevertheless not want to stay but may want to go home
(thus, though he has been enjoying himself he nevertheless does have
a desire to do something else, namely, to be going home.) Or, imagine
a love-impassioned gentleman who is walking to his lady-friend's house.
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He is in a state of pleasurable anticipation and very much enjoys the
walk. As he approaches her house his desire is not to continue walking
but to do something other than that which he has been doing, namely, to
see and talk with his girlfriend. Though he has been enjoying his
walking, he does not wish to continue walkirg but now wants to do
something else.
The other half of Ryle's proposed analysis is that someone
enjoying himself has a desire or inclination to do what he is doing.
However, even if such a desire were necessary for enjoyment, the
desire on its own is clearly not sufficient. Soldiers in retreat
may be motivated by a strong desire or inclination to flee the enemy
and save their lives but it does not follow that they enjoy their
flight. They might be terrified and might not enjoy it in the least.
Is such a desire or inclination, if not the whole, at least part
of what it is to enjoy yourself? Ryle analyzes enjoyment in terms of
a desire or inclination to do that which one is presently doing. There
are various desires which Ryle might have in mind. For, if we speak
precisely, it is only what we believe to be absent or not presently
our's that we can desire. As G.E. Moore wrote of the word 'desire':
"That name is usually confined to a state of mind in which the idea of
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some object or event, not yet existing, is present to us." It is
not when we have peace that we desire peace but when we do not have
it. It is the poor man, not the rich man, who desires wealth. We
38. Moore (1903, P 69). Anthony Kenny expresses this point well in a
discussion of Aquinas' view of desire: "Aquinas pointed out that it is
impossible to want what one already has as it is to remember what is
now happening. It follows that one can never want what one always has,
e.g. one's own head . . . Following Aquinas we might say that a desire
which did not precede its object would not be a desire, just as a
memory contemporaneous with its object would not be a memory."
(Kenny, 1963, pp 115 - 116).
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could, admittedly, speak in a loose fashion of a rich man wanting
wealth, but this would be to say that he wantes to continue to be
wealthy or that he had wanted wealth before he was wealthy. And
continued wealth is not something one presently has. Similarly, if
we speak of a man who enjoys golfing as desiring to golf we mean that
he desires to continue golfing or to golf on future occasions, or that
he had desired to golf . We normally say it is 'disposed' to rain before
it rains, not while it is raining, and if we did say this while it is
raining we would mean that it is disposed to continue raining. The
same points apply to talk of someone's having an 'inclination' to do
something.
What we must ask, then, when testing the relation of enjoyment
to desire (inclination) is whether a person enjoying himself necessarily
has either a desire to continue doing what he is enjoying doing or a
desire to do this thing again, or whether he previously had a desire to
do it. We find that none of these desires (inclinations) are necessary
accompaniments of enjoyment. And from this it follows that enjoyment
is not analyzable by reference to any of these desires (inclinations)<,
Does someone who is enjoying himself necessarily desire to
continue doing what he is enjoying doing? No. We already have
mentioned pleasures that provide counter-examples to this proposal.
When the love-impassioned man reaches his friend's house he does not
desire to continue walking (on past her house), and this is true even
though he is enjoying the walk. Though someone may enjoy reading in
bed before going to sleep at night, at a certain point he decides to
turn out the ligfrt and go to sleep. When he turns out the light he is
not necessarily fitting to overcome sane desire or inclination
to continue reading, and this is so even if he had been enjoying
reading. So a desire or an inclination to continue what one
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is doing is not necessary for enjoyment.
Similarly, though a desire for the smell to continue often
accompanies being pleased by a smell, as Pindlay suggests, this desire
is not necessarily present - i.e., the desire is not part of being
pleased. To be pleased by a joke it is not necessary to desire that
the telling of the joke be prolonged. A woman hurriedly driving to
work mig^it be pleased by the sweet scent of a field of flowers
without having a desire that the smelling of the scent be continued,
(in this situation, the thought of the smell continuing probably
would not even occur to her.)
Nor is the enjoyment of some activity necessarily accompanied by
a desire to repeat the activity. A person who enjoys his wedding does
not necessarily want to get married again. A man who enjoys killing
a rival in a brawl will not desire to kill him again.
Nor is pleasure always accompanied by a previous desire for the
object which brings the pleasure. There are unexpected pleasures. A
joke, a smell, or a glimpse of a queer cloud may please though it was
unanticipated and thus not desired. The sight of a funny face may
please even though there was no desire to see a funny face. (The same
examples show that 'acting willingly' is not necessary for pleasure.
Pleasures which are unexpected and unsought need have no dimension of
acting willingly or unwillingly. An unexpected funny remark or pretty
sight may bring enjoyment even though the hearing of the remark or
seeing of the sight was neither willing nor unwilling.)
39* The same examples show that 'dallying' (ar 'dalliance') is not a
defining property of pleasure. (Recall Findlay's suggested analysis
maitioned earlier in this chapter.) The lover walking to his lady-
friend's house need have no inclination to linger, delay, or 'dally'
even though he has been enjoying the walk.
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Does pleasure require 'acquiescence', as Findlay suggests? To
'acquiesce* in doing something is to have an inclination to do it and
to give-in or submit to the inclination. We 'give-in' or 'submit' to
an inclination only when there is internal opposition - some additional
desire or inclination not to do it. Some pleasures are indeed accom¬
panied by such submitting or acquiescing. Pleased over her publication,
a lady may 'acquiesce' to her inclination to think over and talk over
the article. But not all pleasures are accompanied by acquiescence.
When sitting through a concert or a meal which I am enjoying, I need
not be 'acquiescing' to the listening inclination or the eating urge,
for I have no inclination not to do it. Nor is 'acquiescence*
involved when one is pleased by a joke. Since being pleased by a
joke does not require a previous inclination to hear the joke, it
also does not require 'acquiescing' or submitting to an inclination.
Is pleasure necessarily accompanied by energy or a heightened level
of activity? (Someone who analyzes pleasure in terms of 'zest' or
'enthusiasm' is suggesting, at least, that heightened activity is
involved.) Calm and passive pleasures provide counter-examples to
this suggestion. To enjoy relaxing is not to relax energetically
(with 'zest'). The pleasant experience in listening to peaceful, somber
music does not involve a state of 'heightened activity' ('zest' or
\40
'enthusiasm*)
Ryle at one point suggests that acting 'with one's whole heart in
40. In his discussion of pleasure, Aristotle wrote: "How, then, is
it that no one is continuously pleased? Is it that we grow weary?
Certainly all human things are incapable of continuous activity.
Therefore pleasure is not continuous; for it accompanies activity."
(Aristotle, 1175a 3-6). The discussion in the text above shows that
pleasure is not so tightly related to activity. Weariness is not
inconsistent with pleasure since one can enjoy relaxing and various
other low-activity, undemanding pleasures.
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it1 is characteristic of pleasure. However, the heightened activity
or strong inclination suggested by this expression is neither
sufficient nor necessary for pleasure. A person can do things 'with
his whole heart in it' when acting out of terror or dread as well as
when enjoying himself. And enjoying sunbathing, relaxing, or listening
to background music do not require sunbathing, etc., 'with one's whole
heart in it'.
To deny that 'pleasure' is definable in terms of desires toward
what we are doing is not to say that no philosophically interesting
connection between pleasure and desire exists. Pleasure is one
common reason or ground for wanting to do something. Secondly,
pleasure is itself something that is wanted. Thirdly, the very fact
that we desire something may cause us to experience a heightened
pleasure upon attaining it. For instance, the fact that the child
has a strong desire far a bicycle causes him to feel a heightened
pleasure upon receiving it as a gift.
Is pleasure to be identified with valuing or prizing an object?
Clearly, we often value things which please us, but is the valuing of
the object a consequence of the pleasure or is it the pleasure itself?
The claim that pleasure just is the prizing or cherishing of some
object may seem plausible when we think of someone who takes pleasure
in the paintings of Rembrandt or in his car; he 'prizes' or 'cherishes'
the paintings or the car. However, the terms 'prizing' or 'cherishing'
are not appropriate for modest pleasures such as mildly enjoying a
movie or a painting; 'prizing' and 'cherishing' imply valuing a great
deal, whereas someone who mildly enjoys a movie or painting might be
expected, at most, to value the object to only a modest degree.
41. Ryle (1949, P 104)
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It migfct be claimed, then, that pleasure is valuing something,
and the degree of pleasure is the degree to which the object is valued;
the more highly the object is valued, the more intense the pleasure is.
But this proportionality view will not hold. People value their lives
very dearly even when they are not enjoying life at all; people who
enjoy life very little normally value their lives to no less a degree
than do those who enjoy life far more. A sick person may greatly
value a certain medicine that helps him but he does not normally enjoy
it.
The link between pleasure and valuing may be close when pleasure
is taken in a car, a painting, or a song: A person comes to prize an
object that is a source of a regular recurring pleasure. However,
when the pleasure is not tied to some single reliable source, it is
less conmon for 'prizing' or 'valuing' to exist. When someone is
enjoying a party he will not normally 'prize' or highly value the
party; someone pleased over a joke rarely gains an attitude of
'prizing' or valuing that joke.
Pleasure is something good, and the correlation between pleasure
and valuing is largely due to the fact that objects which please us
thereby give us reason to value them. Pleasure itself is prized, and
in consequence we often prize objects which bring pleasure. But the
pleasure is not itself the prizing. There are things other than
pleasure which people value as ends; people think of knowledge and life
itself as intrinsically good. This is why the degree to which we value
an object is not always in proportion to the degree to which it pleases
us.
The same situation holds for the relationship of pleasure to
favourable appraisals; we often judge to be good those things which
please us. But the appraisal is not 'inherent in the feeling experience'
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as Arnold, suggested; rather, an object's being pleasing provides us
with reason for favourably appraising it. The degree of goodness
that someone ascribes to an object is not always in proportion to the
degree of pleasantness, and this is because people value things other
than pleasure. When a form of exercise, a new medicine, or a new law
is appraised as good, the appraisal may be based on the fact that the
exercise or medicine promotes longevity of life or the fact that the
law has a tendency to promote justice. Long life and justice, like
pleasure, are valued to some extent as ends in themselves, and a person
may appraise them favourably even if they do not please him. A doctor
might appraise a new drug favourably without taking pleasure in the
drug or being pleased by it.
Find lay suggested that we identify a person's feeling of pleasure
with his awareness that his circumstances are as he wants them to be.
The view seems most plausible when we think of someone who is in a
very good mood and 'pleased with life'. But it does not fit very
well the pleasure of feeling pleased to see a friend. Of this case,
it might be said that one particular circumstance is 'as one wants it
to be': the person wants to see his friend, and he is seeing him.
Shall we say, then, that to feel pleased is to judge something to be
as one wants it to be? No, for we have already noted that pleasure is
not always correlated with a desire for the pleasing object. A joke
or scent may please someone without his having had a desire far the
joke or scent to be that way.
Furthermore, it is possible for someone to realize that his
circumstances are as he wants them to be to approve of his circum¬
stances being this way, and yet not feel pleased. It is often noted
that a person can get what he wants yet not be happy (pleased). But
is there not 'something missing' in the life of this person? The only
44
wanted thing that need be missing would be his being happy or pleased
with life. All of his outside circumstances in life might be as he
wants them to be, but he also wants to be happy or pleased with his
life, and this he is not. But this only shows that being pleased is
not the same thing as having your outside circumstances in life as
you want them to be. Your being happy or pleased with life is some¬
thing over and above your having your external circumstances as you
want them to be, and it is something which itself is desired.
4.) Central to 'pro-attitude' views of pleasure is that pleasure
is identified with a psychological state which can be justified or
unjustified, or reasonable or unreasonable. David Perry explicitly
mentions that this is part of the significance he attaches to his
42
analyses of the different forms of pleasure as kinds of 'attitudes'.
Nowell-Smith in. classing pleasure as a 'pro-attitude' thereby treats
it as parallel to the other 'pro-attitudes' of desire and approval.
And it clearly is possible for a desire or an attitude of approval to
be unjustified or irrational. A desire to act foolish or to injure
oneself is, in the absence of special circumstances, irrational. Under
normal circumstances there is something irrational in a general's
approving a plan of action that he expects to bring a disastrous but
avoidable defeat to his forces. To call pleasure a 'pro-attitude',
then, seems at least to commit oneself to the view that pleasure is the
sort of thing that can be reasonable or unreasonable.
If pleasure were a 'pro-attitude' or a favourable orientation
of any of the types discussed in this chapter, it, too, would have this
dimension of suitability or reasonableness. Pleasure itself would be
42. Perry (1967, p 213)
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irrational, immoral, crazy, or sick whenever the desire, inclination,
or approving or prizing attitude with which it is identified is
irrational, immoral, etc.
My own view is that pleasure, like an itch, a pain, or a feeling
of warmth or of cold is never itself reasonable, unreasonable, immoral,
crazy, or improper. Such conments are, I believe, logically in¬
applicable to pleasure qua pleasure as they are logically inapplicable
to itches and feelings of dizziness. However, that pleasure never can
have a dimension of suitability may not seem obvious to all philosophers,
and I will not press the point at the moment. (Though it will be a
consequence of the positive view of pleasure that I develop in
Chapters IV and V that pleasure is not itself the sort of thing that
has these dimensions of suitability.) But there are at least some
cases where it is clear-cut that pleasure has no dimension of aptness
or suitability but where the corresponding desire or approving attitude
is irrational or inappropriate. And from this it follows that the
pleasure in this case is not in whole or in part some 'pro-attitude'.
For all 'purely physical' pleasures, i.e., those not contingent
upon cognitive activity, the question of reasonableness or justifica¬
tion in feeling pleasure does not arise. If I know that I will
suffer extreme sunburn pain by continuing to lie in the sun, there
would be, under normal circumstances, some irrationality in desiring
to continue lying in the sun or in approving continued sunbathing.
Though there is something irrational in the desire or approval, there
is nothing irrational in finding it pleasant to lie in the sun under
these circumstances. If my pleasure were a desire to continue doing
what I am doing, it would be in some way irrational. Similarly, if
I know that I will be sick tonight if I eat more pizza, there would be
something irrational in desiring to continue eating pizza in large
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amounts, and there would be unreasonableness in 'prizing1, highly
valuing, or approving each additional piece. However, if I were
under the same circumstances en.jeying eating each additional piece of
pizza, I would not be in any way irrational far doing so. Therefore,
my pleasure in eating the pizza is not, in whole or in part, a desire
to continue eating or some other 'pro-attitude' toward eating.
Questions about whether or not a particular attitude is reasonable
or unreasonable some tines allow room for dispute, and someone might
wish to defend the sunbathing, pizza-eating hedonists mentioned from
the charge of being unreasonable in their attitudes. However, no one
would deny that it is at least arguable that a desire to continue
eating pizza is, after one has eaten a great deal, irrational. And
it is at least arguable that the other 'pro-attitudes' would be
irrational in these circumstances. But there is no comparable room for
argument for claiming that there is irrationality in finding the pizza
pleasant or enjoying it under these circumstances. There is nothing
irrational in finding pizza pleasant to eat, and this is so even if one
has eaten a great deal. The fact that the issue of rationality cannot
arise for pleasure in the same way that it can arise for desires and
other 'pro-attitudes' is itself enough to show that the pleasure in
these cases is not itself the desire or any of the other 'pro-attitudes'.
5.) Desires, inclinations, and attitudes of 'prizing' an object
can be reasonable or unreasonable. What then makes a desire or other
'pro-attitude' reasonable or unreasonable?. A desire or other 'pro-
attitude' is reasonable in proportion to the desirability of the
object desired, or, mare precisely, it is reasonable to the extent
that one has reason or justification for believing the object to be
good or desirable. A desire is irrational when the object desired has
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no good features, or when "there is little or no reason for thinking
that it has good features. It is normally reasonable for an intelligent
young man to desire an education, since there is some reason for him
to see value in an education (e.g., in training his mind, expanding
his knowledge, and bettering his job opportunities.) A desire to
shave one's head so as to make it totally bald would be, for most
women and men in the Western World, irrational. This is so because
usually there would be little value in doing so while there would be
bad results (e.g., looking foolish, making oneself unhappy as a
consequerce of looking foolish). Similarly, under normal circumstances
it would be irrational to desire to spend the afternoon rolling and
unrolling one's tongue or to spend a week sitting in a pool of water.
It is possible to think of circumstances in which a desire to shave
one's head would be reasonable, e.g., it might help a particular
person to get rid of ringworm or he]p someone in his singing or acting
career. But the circumstances which make the desires reasonable are
those which bring value or desirability to the state of affairs desired.
For no desire is it inappropriate that it be rated somewhere on a
scale of reasonableness, and this is so whatever the object desired or
the circumstances under which it comes to be desired.
Other philosophers have said things related to what I am saying
about the nature of desire. G.E.M. Anscombe, for instance, writes:
The conceptual connexion between 'wanting' ... and 'good' can be
compared to the conceptual connexion between 'judgment'... and
'truth'. Truth is the object of judgment, and good the object
of wanting.
Supporting a position similar to Anscombe's, J.C. Gosling writes the
following about a person who claims to want an apple:
43• Ansccmbe (1958, p 75)
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If we are to be sure that a person really does want the apple,
we must be given some answer which characterizes its
desirability ... If a desire is to be intelligible, it must be
possible to give a final answer to why the subject war^s what he
does, which gives us the way in which it is desirable.
What makes a desire 'intelligible' is what makes it reasonable,
and what makes it reasonable is something desirable about the object
or the existence of some reason for supposing the object has desirable
characteristics. It is possible to desire something which in fact is
undesirable, but what makes the desire 'intelligible' - i.e., reasonable
and therefore understandable - is some belief of the person's that the
object has some desirable characteristic. A person may desire a drink
which in fact will kill him (and this effect is undesirable), but his
desire becomes 'intelligible' when we learn that, e.g., he thought
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that it would cure his rheumatism and would not threaten his life.
For a desire to be irrational it is not necessary that the desired
object be undesirable; a desire can be irrational when the object is
merely of indifferent worth. Under normal circumstances, a desire to
spend Saturday afternoon crawling around the block would be bizarre
and irrational; crawling is not necessarily bad or immoral (and it
would not necessarily have the bad consequences of gaining the
disapproval of my neighbours, since I could arrange to do it while they
are away), but it is irrational simply because it has little positive
value.
44. Gosling (1969, p 76)
45. Though Anscombe at one point in her discussion admits that it is
possible to desire something that is not good, she at other points
talks as though it is not possible. Gosling also at times talks as
though it is not possible to desire something not good. Both at times
are at the point of assuming that desires which would be 'unintelligible'
would be logically impossible to have (whereas, they are merely
unreasonable). For instance, in the passage of Gosling's just quoted
he is close to assuming that if we cannot find seme desirable charac¬
teristic in an object (apple), it follows that the object is not
really desired.
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It might be claimed that there are some desires where the object
desired has no value but the desire still is not unreasonable. Trivial
everyday desires such as the desire to eat, to sleep, to scratch an
itch, to have a cup of coffee, or to see a friend do not need
justification, it may be claimed. Though these objects have no
special desirable characteristics, the desires are not irrational, it
would be claimed. "Suppose I want to go outside for a walk or want to
take a bath? Do I need a reason far doing so? I often do such things
for no particular reason yet am not irrational for doing so," one
might argue.
There are, admittedly, many desires of which we rarely ask whether
or not they are reasonable or justifiable, but this lack of inquisi-
"tiveness is probably due to our assuming that there is value in each
desired object.
There is often value in eating, sleeping, etc., and this is why
these desires are not irrational under normal circumstances. Eating
and sleeping are necessary biologically and eating may also be a
source of pleasure (something desirable). Scratching an itch relieves
discomfort, having coffee can provide aesthetic satisfaction, and
seeing a friend can be pleasant. These desires are not always rational,
and they can become irrational when the object desired loses the value
it might otherwise have. If a person has already eaten or has slept
more than enough, a continued desire far these things no longer is
reasonable. In a world where sleeping was not biologically necessary,
a desire to sleep would be as crazy and unreasonable as a desire to
crawl around the block is in our world; in such a world, crawling
might be as necessary for health as sleeping is in our world, and
consequently a desire to crawl would be quite reasonable there.
I conclude that any desire will be reasonable or unreasonable
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according to the desirability of the desired object or the available
justification for supposing that the object has desirable character¬
istics. This applies as much to a desire to golf, garden, walk, or
lie in a hanmock as it does for a desire to sleep or to crawl around
the block.^
Let us consider, then, someone who wants to dig in the garden on
his free days 'because he enjqys gardening* or someone who wants to
lie in a hammock or take a bath 'because he expects to enjoy doing
so'. What makes such a common desire 'intelligible' and reasonable?
Digging, lying in a hammock, and sitting in a tub of water are not
intrinsically worthwhile activities; when moral philosophers list
things which have intrinsic value they usually name pleasure,
knowledge, and possibly justice, dignity, and a few other things.
No one that I know of has claimed that digging, lying in a hammock, or
sitting in a tub of water are intrinsically good activities. What
value or desirability characteristic do these activities have that
would make a desire to do these things intelligible and reasonable?
One way in which activities not themselves intrinsically
valuable might come to have value is by being useful as means to seme
desirable end. It is possible for digging, lying in a hammock, or
even sitting in a tub of warm water to gain derivative value through
46. It may be that the reason why 'pro-attitudes' have this dimension
of reasonableness - a dimension tied to the desirability of the object
of the 'pro-attitude' - is that each 'pro-attitude' is_ in part some
judgement about the value of the object. For instance, it may be
that 'desiring x' entails 'thinking that, x is good in some way'.
(Certainly, 'approving x' and 'valuing x' entail 'thinking that x is
good in some way'.) Such a view of 'pro-attitudes' would be in line
with the standard view of emotions among contemporary philosophers.
(It is normally supposed that, for instance, being 'proud' of having
done x entails thinking x is good in some way.) Given this view of the
'pro-attitudes', the reasonableness of a desire or other 'pro-attitude'
will be a function of the reasonableness of the value judgement
entailed by that 'attitude'.
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being useful as a means to some end. Digging in a garden might be
worthwhile for someone who digs for a living to support himself and
his family or for someone merely out to save himself money by growing
his own vegetables. Lying in a hammock could be useful for a person
trying to store up energy for a difficult task or for someone trying
to think out a difficult problem under peaceful circumstances. Can
we appeal to derivative values such as these to explain the 1 intel¬
ligibility' and reasonableness of wanting to dig 'because one enjoys
digging'? No, for if we claim that someone is doing something
'because he enjoys doing it', part or what we are asserting in saying
this is that the person is not viewing his action as a means to some
end. As R.S. Peters writes:
If it is said that a man eats because he enjoys eating or
gardens because of the pleasure he gets out of gardening, this
is a way of denying explanations such as that he is eating out
of hunger or gardening for a living . . . The reference to
pleasure implies that these things are done for their own sake.
The are not done out of necessity, duty, or for any ulterior
motive.47
The claim that 'Joe is digging in the garden because he enjqys doing
so' is inconsistent with the claim that 'Joe digs mainly as a means
to an end, namely, making a living and supporting his family'.
Digging in the garden is not intrinsically worthwhile. In a
case when a person is motivated by enjoyment he is not viewing his
act as means to an end. What, then, makes such a normal desire as
'wanting to dig in the garden because one enjoys gardening' intel¬
ligible and reasonable?
The correct answer, I believe, is as follows: When we say
'Joe wants to dig in the garden because he enjoys digging in the
garden' we are giving Joe's main reason (i.e. his grounds or justi-
47. Peters (1958, p 142)
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fication) for wanting to dig. Pleasure is intrinsically good and is
therefore what Anscombe calls a 'desirability characteristic'.
Because pleasure is desirable, it can give digging a derivative worth,
i.e, a value derived from the value of the pleasure. With this
derivative worth, digging becanes worthwhile and thus worth wanting.
When digging gains this derivative worth, a desire to dig becomes
'intelligible* or reasonable.
Someone like Ryle who holds that our enjoyment in digging is
our desire or inclination to dig is no t able to interpret the
situation in this way. The pleasure cannot be a person's reason for
wanting to dig if it is that desire to dig. For Ryle, the claim that
'Joe wants to dig because he enjoys digging' must be an empty tautology
of the form 'Joe wants to dig because he wants to dig'.
This provides further grounds for concluding that the pleasure
is the reason for the desire and not the desire itself. If we identify
the pleasure with the desire, then, in cases when the action is
motivated by pleasure, we lose the only desirability characteristic
available to account for the intelligibility and reasonableness of the
desire. In cases when someone desires to dig, to lie in a hammock, or
to sit in a tub of water (i.e., to 'bathe') because be enjoys doing so
his desire becomes as unintelligible and unreasonable as a desire to
spend the afternoon rolling and unrolling one's tongue or crawling
around the block.
A comparable problem arises for someone who identifies pleasure
with a prizing attitude. Suppose someone 'prizes' his morning coffee
•because he greatly enjoys it'. By saying that he prizes the coffee
'because he enjoys it' we rule out the possibility that he prizes it
mainly as a means to some end. What, then, makes this 'prizing' of
coffee intelligible? No one would say that drinking coffee has
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intrinsic value; it is not valuable or worth wanting whether or not
one en.joys it. The correct view is that pleasure by being good lends
value to drinking coffee and thus provides reason for valuing it»
Summary and Conclusion
Prom the above arguments I conclude that pleasure is not itself
the desires, inclinations, valuings, or other 'pro-attitudes' with
which it is often identified. In many cases, it is the reason (i.e.,
the grounds or justification) for the 'pro-attitude*.
Pleasure is something which is appealing, intrinsically good, and
something which itself is wanted, valued, and sought; the various
desires, inclinations, etc., associated with pleasure do not them¬
selves have this intrinsic appeal or this character of being wanted
and sought. The desires and other 'pro-attitudes' can occur without
pleasure, and pleasure can occur without the desires and other 'pro-
attitudes'. The desires and other 'pro-attitudes' can be irrational
in cases where pleasure would not be. Various normal desires are seen
to be 'intelligible' and reasonable only by realizing that the
pleasure is something distinct from these desires - something which
provides reason and justification for them.
The association which pleasure has with our desires, inclinations,
and valuings parallels the relationship of pain to various aversions
or 'negative attitudes'. Where pleasure is correlated with a desire
to prolong or repeat an activity found pleasant, pain is correlated
with a desire or inclination to cut short or avoid that which is
found painful. A person who is finding walking painful - for instance,
someone with a broken toe - may want to cut short his walk and to
avoid walking in the near future. What people find painful to do
they tend not to want to do again. A pain sensation in the foot is
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not itself an inclination to cut-short the walking or a desire to
avoid walking in the future, but gives rise to these aversions and
'negative attitudes' by providing reason or justification for them.
In a similar manner, a person's desire or inclination to prolong
or repeat the activity which he is finding pleasant or 'enjoying',
or his valuing or 'prizing' of that activity, is not itself his
pleasure; rather, his pleasure gives rise to these desires, inclinations,
and 'favourable attitudes' by providing reason or justification for
them.
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Chapter Illr Anti-essentialist Views of Pleasure
A thesis commonly held by contemporary philosophers writing on
the subject of pleasure is that the search for a single account of
pleasure is misconceived and that it will not be possible to discover
one definition or analysis that will be applicable to all 'pleasant'
experiences. This anti-essentialist view of pleasure (that is, the
view that there is no 'essence' to pleasant experiences) is a central
theme in David Perry's book The Concent of Pleasure"* and in J.C.
2
Gosling's recent book Pleasure and Desire and is a view which R. S.
3 4 5
Peters , Georg von Wright , Terence Penelhum , and many other
philosophers have endorsed. As well as having seme inherent
importance for our understanding of the nature of pleasure, the view
poses a serious threat to any psychological or moral theory in
which the concept of pleasure is given an important role. This is
evidenced in Gosling's book where a central claim of his is that
the traditional arguments in favour of Psychological Hedonism, the
view that pleasure is the sole end or goal that motivates the actions
of men, gain whatever plausibility they have in large part through
illicit switches in one's arguments from talking and thinking of
one kind of pleasure to thinking in terms of another. The word
'pleasure', he writes, "covers a wide range of partly analogous,
partly interrelated cases . . . This complexity, which tells against
simple analyses of pleasure as a feeling, tells equally against other
1« Perry (1967)
2. Gosling (1969, Ch. 9)
3. Peters (1958, p 143)
4. Von Wright (1963, Ch. IV)
5. Penelhum (1964, pp243 - 246)
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over-all accounts in terms of attention, vigour, relation to desire
or whatever it may be. They, like various attempts at hedonism,
fail both by ignoring the various forms that an explanation in
terms of pleasure must take, and by failing to see the range of
g
variation among 'cases of pleasures'." "The welter of arguments
which outside and sometimes inside philosophy are piled up in defence
of hedcnism emerge not as arguments for a single coherent thesis,
but as a set of arguments for a set of theses ... A very different
brand of either thesis will emerge according to the view of pleasure
one takes . . . Once the independence of the theses has been
7
recognized they seem individually implausible." In this chapter I
will examine the considerations or arguments which have led these
philosophers to this view of pleasure.
I Is the Truth to be Decided by Introspective or Empirical Judgement?
Some philosophers offer what is, in effect, their own empirical
judgement when supporting the contention that there is no 'essence'
to a pleasant experience. William Alston, for instance, writes:
"When we reflect on a wide range of cases of getting pleasure . . .
we are unable to isolate a felt quality which they all share, in the
way in which we can easily isolate a quality of redness which a
number of visual sensations share, or a quality of painfulness which
g
a number of different bodily sensations share." _ Also relying on
his own empirical judgement of various pleasant experiences, R.S.
Peters writes: "The pleasure of tasting sugar is specific to
tasting sugar; the pleasure of sexual activity is specific to sexrual
6. Gosling (1969, pp 137 - 8)
7. Gosling (1969, pp 169 - 70)
8. Alston (1967, p 344)
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activity; the pleasure of finding out things is specific to finding
out things. It is difficult to see what properties the alleged
hedonic states have in common if they are thought of as species
9
under a genus."
Both Alston and Peters are relying upon their own introspective
or empirical judgements when they report that there does not seem to
be some single quality or property that is common to all pleasant
experiences. Thougfr Alston writes that when we reflect on a wide
range of pleasures we are unable to isolate some quality that is
common to all, he should really state that he is speaking for him¬
self. For there seems little reason to suppose that all philosophers
would arrive at the same judgement if they attempted similar intro¬
spective comparisons. There have been many philosophers who have
supposed that pleasure is a special experience. David Hume, for
instance, wrote: "It is evident that tinder the term 'pleasure' we
comprehend sensations which are very different from each other, and
which have only such a distant resemblance as is requisite to make
them be expressed by the same abstract term.""'^ Though Hume would
agree with Peters and Alston that there are great differences between
the various experiences we call 'pleasant' he does, nevertheless,
see scane resemblance or similarity between the experiences and a
similarity which gives us sufficient reason to call the experiences
by the same name. John Stuart Mill and John Locke also thought of
pleasure as a special experience, and it seems likely that if they
had been asked whether they notice any quality or property that is
common to various pleasant experiences they would have said that they
9. Peters (1958, p 143)
10. Hume (1739, Book III, Part I, Section II.)
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did. On this matter, the sort of introspective or empirical judge¬
ment a philosopher will make is likely to be influenced by the
philosophical theories and presumptions which he holds when judging
the matter. Consequently, in cases such as these where philosophers
may be expected to disagree in their empirical or introspective
judgements, and where their empirical judgements may be expected to
be influenced by the philosophical "theories or views they already
accept, philosophers will need to offer more than personal impressions
and introspective reports. They will need to introduce argument.^
The question of whether there is a single quality or feel common
to a certain class of sensations or experiences is not one which we
can assume should be simple to answer. Is there a single feel or
quality common to all instances of feeling warm, feeling tired, or
feeling dizzy? Do all experiences of hearing an oboe include a
common (auditory) sensation? Do all of the visual sensations exper¬
ienced when seeing different shades of green have some sensational
quality or feature in common? I suspect that if we asked these
questions of different people we would get different answers. In
my own case, I simply am not sure what the correct answers are to
each of these questions.
There are two different ways in which different sensations and
11. The issue being raised is not whether pleasure is a special
localized sensation (e.g., comparable to a headache) but whether it
is a special experiential quality. One of Gilbert Ryle's major
contributions on the subject of pleasure is the insight that at
least many (if not all) pleasures are very different from localized
sensations such as headaches or toothaches. Nevertheless, it is
important to ask whether one's experience has a special feel or
quality or tone to it when enjoying a conversation. William Alston
has some helpful things to say about this view when discussing
what he calls the Conscious Quality view of pleasure. (Alston,
1967,IP 342 - 344)
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experiences can have a quality or property in common: 1.) Two
experiences could share a common, unanalyzable quality, or 2.) they
could have a common relational property. Even if pleasant exper¬
iences did not have some unanalyzable quality in common it remains
possible that they have some relational property in common. Whether
or not different experiences have some unanalyzable quality in
common will not necessarily be obvious, and issues become even more
complicated and difficult when we begin to consider various rela¬
tional properties which different experiences might share. The view
I will be defending (in Chapters IV and V) is that pleasant exper¬
iences are defined by some relational property. The defense of this
view requires considerable reflection, making of distinctions, and
argument. Consequently the correctness and usefulness of this
definition would not be obvious before one has heard the argument.
If we have a particular property in mind we can contem¬
plate various experiences in an introspective or empirical manner,
and judge, with some profit, whether or not the experiences have
that property in common. However, without knowing what we are
looking for, our inability to notice a common relational property
among various pleasant experiences is of limited import.
The presence of Wittgenstein is felt in recent anti-essentialist
discussions of pleasure as it is in a great number of other contem¬
porary discussions in Philosophy of Mind. Wittgenstein is the
father of anti-essentialist views of word-meaning. His attack on
the essentialist view of word-meaning was an important part of his
Philosophical Investigations. And the presumption that we might
view the issue of whether objects called by the same name are
called by this name in virtue of common properties as being an
empirical issue is itself rooted in Wittgenstein. "Consider for
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example the proceedings that we call 'games'," Wittgenstein wrote,
"What is conmon to them all? Don't say: 'There must be something
common, or they would not be called 'games'1- but look and see
whether there is anything common at all ... To repeat: dcn't
12
think, but look!" Wittgenstein is, of course, right to reject
the reply that 'there must be something common, or they would not be
'games'', for if the question being raised is whether there is
something in common, this reply merely begs the question. However,
by employing these observational terms ('look and see') and by
contrasting looking and seeing with thinking ("To repeat: don't
think, but look!"), Wittgenstein seems to be encouraging us to take
the question of the unity of games as one for unargued empirical
observation rather than one for detailed, subtle and complex thinking
and argument. However, the question of whether or not there is a
unity or essence to 'games' is not to be resolved merely by approach¬
ing the matter as a straightforward empirical question. Argument,
not unsupported empirical judgement, is what is needed.
II The Thesaurus Argument
The widespread sympathy for anti-essentialist views of pleasure
among contemporary philosophers has other sources. C.C.W. Taylor,
for instance, contemplates a number of sentences about pleasure in
supporting his anti-essentialist view of pleasure. I will repeat
this list:
1. I take great pleasure in humiliating him.
2. I fish purely for pleasure.
I fish for fun.
4. I enjoy fishing.
12. Wittgenstein (1958, paragraph 66)
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5. Pishing is pleasant.
6. I shall be very pleased to come fishing.
7. I was very pleased at the result.
8. Your success gives me the greatest possible
pieasure.
9. Reading is his only pleasure.
10. He was much given to the pleasures of the table.
Immediately upon presenting this list Tylor writes: "It will surely
be obvious that the attempt to isolate the crucial something which
is the pleasure in each case and is common to all cases is a
13
hopeless task."
The diversity which Taylor appeals to here is primarily that of
linguistic diversity, i.e. , a diversity in pleasure-words and
pleasure-idioms. One could ask what is common to enjoying a book,
enjoying a dinner, and enjoying a sexual romp, and this question
would be sufficiently difficult. But Taylor asks what pleasure is
common to 'I fish purely for pleasure', 'I enjoy fishing', 'fishing
is pleasant', etc., where the most obvious diversity is one of
pleasure terminology or linguistic idiom. The pleasure-idioms
which Taylor appeals to differ from each other in various ways in
their meanings: the word 'enjoy' is not totally synonymous with the
words 'pleasant', 'pleased', or 'pleasure', nor is the expression
'taking pleasure in' totally synonymous with 'far pleasure'.
Taylor is trying to prove that there is no common 'pleasure' in
each case. Presumably, what makes each sentence relevant to the
topic of 'pleasure' is that in each case there is a pleasure-word,
i.e., a word which entails the having of a degree of 'pleasure',
(if Taylor is not at least assuming that each of these sentences
entails the having of a degree of 'pleasure', it is difficult to
13. Taylor (1963, p 3)
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see how he could feel entitled to conclude anything about the
meaning of 'pleasure' by considering these sentences. He would
need to be continually defending himself from the charge that the
conclusion he wishes to draw from these sentences have no direct
implications for the question at issue, namely, the nature of
'pleasure'.) 'Pishing is pleasant' entails 'People experience
pleasure while fishing' or a similar sentence containing the term
'pleasure'. Similarly, 'I enjcy fishing' entails 'I experience
pleasure when fishing' or something similar. A similar entailment
relationship could be presented for the other sentences listed.
Taylor's form of reasoning, then, seems to be as follows: There are
a number of words which differ from each other in meaning but which
also entail the having of a degree of 'pleasure'. Therefore, the
'pleasure' which is entailed by each of these different words must
itself be different in each case.
Taylor's form of argument could be paralleled in the case of a
great number of general terms. One might call this the Thesaurus
Argument since one could, for any term such as 'pleasure' which
appears as a general heading in a thesaurus, invent an anti-essen-
tialist argument for that general term merely by listing sentences
containing the words which appear under the general heading. Under
the general term 'moisture', for instance, we find the words
'humidity', 'drenching', 'perspire', and many other words which
entail the presence of 'moisture' but which clearly differ from each
other in meaning in some way. Does it follow from the mere existence
of many moisture-words differing in meaning that the word 'moisture'
has no single uniform meaning? No. There are many ways of account¬
ing for the differences in meaning of these moisture-words without
concluding that the word 'moisture' must have many different meanings.
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'Humidity' is a noun which refers to the property which air has of
containing a degree of moisture; 'drenching' is an adjective which
is used to attribute a high degree of moisture to some object;
'perspire' is a verb which is used to refer to the process of
emitting moisture through the skin. It is quite consistent to
hold that though moisture-words differ from each other considerably
in meaning, the word 'moisture' which appears in the definition of
each has the same meaning in each case. The differences in the
meanings of the individual moisture-words are well accounted for
by the many other differences in the definitions. Thus, it is
consistent for one to hold that though there are many pleasure-
words differing from each other in meaning, the word 'pleasure' as
it enters into the definitions of each of these words, is the same
in meaning in each case.
Taylor and a number of other philosophers have given a great
deal of attention to one particular distinction between pleasure-
idioms, namely, a distinction between enjoying something and being
pleased about something. The distinction is given considerable
attention in the papers by Taylor and Penelhum and is central
in David Perry's book on Pleasure. The authors present this
distinction as a critical stumbling block to one who would attempt
to give a uniform account for all 'pleasure'.
The philosophers defend their distinction by directing argument
at showing that enjoyment is something very different from being
pleased about something, or correspondingly, that the idioms of
'enjoying something' and 'being pleased about' something are not the
same in meaning. "My being pleased to see that you are well is not
the same as my enjoying seeing you are well," Taylor writes.^
14. Taylor (1963, p 9)
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Enjoyment and being pleased take different sorts of objects. One
can be pleased only with something that is seen to serve his
interest, it is argued, whereas no such restriction holds for what
15
one can enjoy. Being pleased with something but not enjoying
something implies thinking of the object as satisfactory."^
In defense of the same distinction Terence Penelhum writes:
"Although both have objects, the typical objects differ. Being
pleased typically has facts for its objects; enjoyment typically
17
has actions or events." For instance, we say that we are pleased
that the day has ended (the object of the pleasure being a fact)
but not that we enjoy that the day has ended. Rather, we enjoy the
day, the evening, and in general 'events' or activities and not
facts.
Penelhum notes additional differences between the idioms:
Although both entail awareness of their objects one has to
specify different forms of awareness for each. All that
is necessary for me to be pleased by something is . . .
that I should know (or think that I know) about it; to
enjoy it, however, I have to be actively engaged in it
. . . or be paying fairly close attention to it.
The object has put (a pleased person) into a state of mind
which may explain his actions over a considerable period
after the occurrence of that which pleases him . . .
When I enjoy something ... it affects me by holding my
attention and distracting me from other things; and this
it cannot do after I am aware that it has ceased, even
though it may continue to please me.
We can be pleased about things after they occur but can enjoy only
what is happening now. ^
The two sorts of pleasures, Penelhum says, are independent of
15. Taylor (1963, IP 11 - 12)
16. Taylor (1963, p 8)
17* Penelhun (1964, p 244)
18o Penelhum (1964, pp 245 - 246)
19« Penelhum (1964, pp 245 - 246)
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each other in that either can occur without the presence of the
other.
I can be pleased by something which it is logically impossible
for me to enjoy such as my child's examination results, or
the upsurge in the economy, and I can be pleased about
something which I do not in fact enjoy, such as managing to
run five miles or refraining from eating dessert. The
unpleasantness is a reason for my being pleased at managing
them. 20
Clearly there are many differences between enjoying something
and being pleased about some state of affairs. Does it follow that
no single account of 'pleasure' applicable to both kinds of 'pleasures'
is possible? This seems to be what these philosophers think that
they have shown. David Perry, for instance, writes of enjoyment and
being pleased (which he considers two kinds of 'pro-attitudes'):
"These notions are so radically different . . . that it would appear
futile to try to formulate a general definition of pleasure that
?1
would cover these ideas yet distinguish them from other pro-attitudes.""
From the premise that the concepts of enjoyment and being
pleased are radically different does it follow that it will not be
possible to give an account of 'pleasure' broad enough to cover
both concepts yet narrow enough to distinguish the concept of
pleasure from other concepts? No. One could as easily argue that
the concept of being a man is so radically different from that of
being a whale that it would be "futile to try to formulate a
general definition of 'mammal' that would cover both these concepts
yet distinguish them from other concepts such as being a lizard or
reptile." Yet, in spite of the vast differences between men and
whales the normal definition of 'mammal' along the lines of an
20. Penelhum (1964, p 246)
21. Perry (1967, p 217)
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'animal with hair and milk-secreting organs in the female' is very-
able to show what is common to mammals and to say how they are
distinguished from non-mammals. Both the species of whales and of
man have the characteristics mentioned in this definition, and the
fact that lizards do not have these characteristics is what accounts
for their not being classifiable as 'mammals'.
Being different is being different in some respects, and being
different in some respects does not preclude being the same in other
respects. It is not possible to prove that two things are not
species of the same genus, or subclasses of the same type of thing,
merely by pointing to differences - even great differences - between
the things. The account of pleasure which I will be developing in
Chapters IV and V cuts across this distinction (of enjoyment and
being pleased) with ease yet is well able to distinguish the pleasant
22
from that which is not pleasant.
22. I suspect that enjoyment and being pleased about something are
not, in fact, two distinct species but are two overlapping classes
of pleasures. The authors rightly note that being pleased about
something is not the same thing as enjoying that thing, that one can
be pleased about something without enjoying that thing (and vice
versa), and that enjoyment and being pleased take different sorts of
objects. Though this is all true it still does not follow that
enjoyment and being pleased are fully distinct or independent of each
other. Though my being pleased about having run five miles does not
entail that I enjoyed running the five miles, it does entail that
some thing was enjcyed. Someone who is pleased about having run five
miles enjoys the thought of his accomplishment.. His knowledge of
having run five miles may cause him to enjoy in a heightened fashion
the walk home after running, the shower afterwards, and the relax¬
ation and conversation afterwards. These enjoyments, it seems to me,
are part, or the whole of, one's pleasure, in feeling pleased about
having run five miles. If all such enjoyments are removed from the
situation one necessarily decreases, and possibly totally removes,
the person's pleasure in feeling pleased about having run five miles.
One who would claim that enjoyment and being pleased are fully
distinct must also prove that one's pleasure in being pleased about
something is distinct fromal 1 such enjoyments as these.
67
III Non-literal and Other Secondary Pleasure-idioms
Much of the discussion of Pleasure in the recent literature has
been carried on by philosophers trained in, or sympathetic to, the
Ordinary Language school of philosophy. Philosophers of this
school do not directly contemplate the nature of pleasure (the
experience) but of pleasure-words and pleasure-idioms. In particular,
it is the 'ordinary* or 'idiomatic' terms and expressions that are
given central attention. A danger inherent in this method of
philosophizing is that of having secondary or figurative senses of
the word being discussed creep into the discussion. Yet philoso¬
phers of this school are almost never seen in practice to employ
this distinction between primary and secondary senses of the word or
expression in question.
The sixth sentence on C.C.W. Taylor's list of pleasure-sentences
(the list which I presented on page bO of this chapter) was 'I shall
be very pleased to come fishing'. This sentence, superficially, looks
just like the seventh sentence, 'I was very pleased at the result'.
The only explicit difference is one of tense; the sixth sentence is
in the future tense and the seventh in the past. However, I suspect
that Taylor had an additional difference in mind when he included
both on the list. A more important difference between the two sen¬
tences is that the sixth would normally be used in a figurative, non-
literal sense. The sentence 'I was very pleased at the result' would
normally be used literally to report or assert that one felt a certain
way at sometime in the past. But the sentence 'I shall be very
pleased to come fishing' would not normally be used to describe or
report an expected future pleasure. (No doubt, it could be used or
intended in a literal fashion, but the point is that normally it
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would not be used literally.) Such a sentence would normally be
used merely as a polite acceptance of an offer. Someone who accepts
an offer with these words would not have said something that would
be mistaken or false if he did not in fact feel pleased to fish when
the day of the fishing arrived. The use of this sentence is compar¬
able to that of the sentence 'I'll see you later' as it is comnonly
used by Americans. Americans say 'I'll see you later' in the place
of 'good-bye', and when they are using the words in this idiomatic
way they would not be insincere or mistaken if they had no intention
of seeing the person later. The utterance, in the sense in which
it would normally be intended, is what J. L. Austin would call a
23
Performative Utterance.
Perhaps if the person at the time of accepting an offer with
these words were feeling reluctant or distressed at the thought of
going fishing we might accuse him of being insincere. But, even so,
it would not follow that his words were asserting some fact about his
present state of mind. One can be insincere when saying 'welcome to
my home' or 'thank you', and yet one is obviously not directly
asserting some fact about one's own attitude with these words.
Taylor also includes the sentence 'I fish purely for pleasure'
within his list, yet this sentence also is 'idiomatic' and not fully
literal. When a sentence of the form 'I fish for x' is used in a
fully literal sense it means 'I fish for the sake of getting x'. A
fisherman who says 'I fish purely for money' means that the getting
of money is his sole reason for fishing and that he views his fishing
as a means to an end (money). But someone who says 'I fish purely
for pleasure (for fun)' is no t asserting that the attainment of
23. Austin (1962)
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pleasure or fun is his sole goal or purpose in fishing. To someone
who claimed that he fished 'purely for pleasure (for fun)' it would
not be appropriate to reply "But do you in fact get pleasure (fun)
from fishing?", for this would be to take his words in a too literal
sense. The sentence 'I fish for pleasure' is comparable to 'I fish
as a hobby'. These sentences, of course, have some connection with
pleasure (the psychological state); someone who fishes 'for pleasure'
or as a hobby normally would enjoy fishing. Many philosophers in
recent years have given considerable attention to the expression 'for
pleasure' in their studies of pleasure, but the conclusions they draw
are thrown into doubt by their not having questioned the presumption
that the expression is fully literal.
Other sentences on Taylor's list are of a form sometimes used in
a literal sense and sometimes used in a figurative sense; because they
have these two meanings the sentences are equivocal. 'Your success
gives me the greatest possible pleasure' has a formal ring to it.
It might be used by someone not attempting to describe his own
response but wanting merely to congratulate someone. Indeed, one
might even use such an expression of someone whose success does not
really please us at all - e.g., of a rival or an acquaintance whose
success we are indifferent to or even resent. The sentence in this
sense is like 'I'm pleased to meet you' or 'It gives me the
greatest pleasure to introduce the renowned . where the person
using the sentence is normally not attempting to describe his own
feelings. The sentence is one which could be used in a literal
fashion - indeed, even the sentence 'I'll see you later' could be
used by some American in a literal fashion - but the point is that
normally, or at least quite frequently, the sentence would not be
used in a literal sense.
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Similarly, the seventh sentence on Taylor's list, 'I was very
pleased at the result' would sometimes be used non-literally. When
we see a neighbor and congratulate him on his son's promotion by
saying 'I am pleased at your son's good fortune' we might simply be
congratulating our neighbor and not describing our own feelings. Our
sentence when used in this sense would not be false even if we did
24
not feel pleased upon hearing of the news of our neighbor.
In his article Taylor had set out to prove that no single
feature is common to pleasant experiences. He probably felt that
by including sentences such as these, he was supporting the conten¬
tion that no special experieice was necessary to pleasure. ("For
surely no special experience is required for saying 'I shall be
very pleased to come fishing'", he may have been thinkirg.) But
when we are wondering what, if anything, is common to all pleasant
experiences (and this presumably is the question at issue) we are
in this instance using the word 'pleasure' or 'pleasant experience'
as descriptive of a psychological response, and we are asking what
is common to these psychological responses. That there may be
sentences which contain the word 'pleasure' or a.cognate but which
25
do not refer to psychological states at all does not bear on the issue.
24. Not all sentences of the form 'So and so is pleased that ...' are
figurative, however. When a son says that he is very pleased at his
father's new-found happiness, or that his father's success gives him
great pleasure, he would normally be speaking literally and reporting
a pleasure which he felt. Nor are we speaking figuratively when we
describe the smiling, laughing child as being 'pleased with his new
train'.
25. Taylor, in his list, concentrated on first-person pleasure-sen¬
tences, that is, sentences where it is oneself who is said to be
pleased. And it is the first-person sentences which are most fre¬
quently used as performatives and therefore as sentences where one is
not literally reporting a pleasure that was felt. I can promise or
apologize for myself by saying 'I promise' or 'I apologize* but I can¬
not promise or apologize for myself or for someone else by saying 1 he
promises . . .' or 'he apologizes'. In How To Do Things With Words.
Austin discusses this fact of first-person, present tense sentences being
the most common explicit performative sentence (in Austin, 1962, p 56).
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Perhaps a philosopher might be inclined to reply, "Yes, the
idioms mentioned here differ from the ones which you call 'central'
or 'literal'. But rather than dismiss them as 'figurative', we should
consider them on a par with the idioms you consider 'literal'. They
are closely related to these other idioms. The fact that these uses
have a meaning different from that of the other cases merely supports
the contention that no unified account of pleasure is possible."
Firstly, this reply fails to say how, e.g. , a sentence of the
form 'I shall be ... ' when not used to describe or predict a
future something can be considered literal. (Does the term 'shall be'
have a special, literal sense where it is not used futuristically?)
Furthermore, this reply contains a serious confusion, a confusion
found to some extent in many recent discussions of pleasure. In the
reply one shifts from talking about words to talking about things.
One wishes to draw conclusions about pleasure, a thing, by noting the
varieties of usage of pleasure-words. Of course, one often can do
this in philosophy with no problem. But in the present shift there
is a problem.
Suppose that I say of my boss that he gives me a headache. The
word 'headache' here does not refer to a thing, but is merely used
figuratively giving the whole sentence a certain, non-literal meaning.
There is no headache, a thing, in the situation which I can compare
with other headaches - those I take aspirins for. So the question of
whether the word 'headache' is always used in the same way does not
quite correspond to the question of whether there is something common
to all headaches. Those cases in which the word 'headache' is not
used to refer to something will not force a decision on whether there
is something common to the things referred to or described in those
cases when the word does refer to something. It is this latter issue
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we are raising when we ask if there is something common to all
headaches.
Similarly, the question of whether there is a something common
to all pleasures constitutive of the pleasure in each case does not
quite correspond to the question of whether pleasure-words are always
used with the same sense. When a person says he is pleased to meet
another person, or non-descriptively says he is pleased at another's
success, there is no pleasure, a thing, to compare to other pleasures,
e.g., the enjoyment of a movie. When we ask if there is something
common to all pleasures we are using the word 'pleasure' to refer
to something and we are asking if there is something common to the
things referred to by the word. Considerations of situations in
which pleasure-words are not used to describe or refer to things
will have no direct bearing on this question.
So, the ordinary language philosopher, if he wishes, could
point to the fact that pleasure-words are sometimes used non-des-
criptively to support a view that pleasure-words are not always
used with the same meaning, and he might also argue that there
are interrelationships between these different senses. But he
cannot point to these uses to support a contention that no unified
account of pleasure (the thing) is possible. However, it is the
26
latter view that is philosophically important.
26. The tendency to overlook the distinction between literal and
non-literal senses of the word in question is also present in the wcrk of
Wittgenstein, the founder of recent anti-essentialist thinking.
Consider, for instance, Wittgenstein's discussion of 'tools' in his
Philosophical Investigations (paragraphs 11 - 14). He defends his
anti-essentialist position by arguing: "Think of the tools in a tool¬
box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a
glue-pot, glue, nails and screws ..." "Imagine someone's saying:
'All tools serve to modify something. Thus the hammer modifies the
position of the nail, the saw, the shape of the board, and so on.'
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IV Different Forms of What?
The claim that there are differences, even vast differences,
among pleasures is not in itself a new or controversial one. With
great notoriety, John Stuart Mill claimed in his Utilitarianism that
pleasures differ significantly in quality or kind. (His point was that
we should consider the quality of the experience as well as the
(26. contd.) -And what is modified by the rule, the glue-pot, the nails?"
The argument is that words are like tools, and there is no single
definition that can be given for a 'tool' (since counter-examples always
arise). For instance, the reasonable suggestion that a 'tool' is an
object which 'serves to modify something' meets Wittgenstein's counter¬
example that a rule, glue-pot, and nails are tools but do not serve to
modify something.
But are a rule, glue-pot, and nails 'tools' ?! (The fact that they
might be found in a 'tool-box' does not prove they are tools, for we
could find pencils, sandwiches, and just about anything in a tool-box.)
It seems to me that we would not normally call them 'tools', but if we
did do so we would mean something different from what we mean when we
call a hammer a 'tool'. The Concise Oxford Dictionary lists as the
primary meaning of the word 'tool' a "mechanical implement". As an
additional, second meaning or sense - one which is listed as 'figur¬
ative' - the dictionary lists a "thing used in an occupation or pursuit".
As illustrations of the word in this sense it lists "literary tools; the
tools of one's trade; the computer as a research tool". (Sykes, 1976)
Now it seems to me that if we would call a rule or glue-pot a 'tool' we
would be doing so in the same sense in which we might call a computer
a 'tool', and this would be, roughly, a way of saying that the object
is useful in the attainment of some practical end or desired result.
Wittgenstein has no argument against this reasonable suggestion that we
have two senses of 'tool' here. If the dictionary is right in distin¬
guishing two senses of the word 'tool' here, Wittgenstein is guilty of
equivocating on the word 'tool' and of switching from the primary
meaning of the word to a secondary, less literal sense.
Now it may be replied that, of course, Wittgenstein is not going
to try to prove that the word 'tool' is being used in the same sense,
for his whole point is that no single account of 'tools' will be possible.
But this reply will not be appropriate to the thesis Wittgenstein
presumably is holding, for he is not merely claiming that the word 'tool',
and indeed most words, have more than one sense and that these different
senses (including literal and non-literal senses) share a family resem¬
blance. This doctrine would not be controversial or important. As Haig
Khatchadourian writes, "Wittgenstein is concerned with things which are
called by the same name in one and the same sense, and not in different
(literal) senses. Obviously, if what Wittgenstein is maintaining is
simply that things which are called by the same name, but in different
senses, have only 'family resemblances' of one sort or another and not
any common determinate characteristics, his view would be of relatively
little significance. For hardly anybody would hold the contrary."
(Khatchadourian, 1957).
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•quantity' or intensity of the pleasure when deciding what intrinsic
value it has.) As is apparent from the passage quoted earlier (on
page 57of this chapter), David Hume also recognized that there are
differences among pleasures. Indeed, few philosophers would deny
this.
Where contemporary philosophers tend to differ from traditional
opinion on the subject is not in their claim that there are differences
among pleasures but in their further claim that there is no feature or
property (or combination of properties) which is common toall pleasant
experience which constitutes the pleasantness of the experience in
each case. As Taylor wrote (in a passage quoted earlier): "The
attempt to isolate the crucial something which is the pleasure in each
case and is common to all cases is a hopeless task."
A crucial problem which these philosophers face, but which Mill
and Hume did not face, is whether it is a consequence of their view,
that the word 'pleasure' is a homonym, i.e., a word with differing
meanings. If, for instance, enjoyment and being pleased have little
of importance in common, do we not then mean something quite different
when we call enjoyment a kind of 'pleasure' from when we call being
pleased a kind of 'pleasure'? These philosophers explicitly deny that
it is by virtue of some important common characteristic that we call
both 'pleasures'; they deny that these things are in some crucial
respect 'the same sort of thing'. Perry wrote: ".These notions are so
radically different . . . that it would appear futile to try to form¬
ulate a general definition of pleasure that would cover these ideas
yet distinguish them from other pro-attitudes." But if this is so
does it not follow that there is no important reason or grounds for
grouping these two kinds of things together and calling them by the
same name ('pleasure') yet distinguishing thai from things we could
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not call by tha t name?
None of the philosophers involved actually adopts the view that
the word 'pleasure* is a homonym and all regularly talk as if it is
not. Perry entitles his book The Concept of Pleasure as if there
were really one concept he was talking about and analyzing all the
time. All of the philosophers involved regularly use the word
'pleasure' without quotation marks, apparently as if there were
really one kind of thing which they are discussing all the time. How¬
ever, if one is committed to the view that the word 'pleasure' is a
homonym with two very different meanings, one faces a serious problem
in justifying this manner of proceeding. For it would seem that the
word is seriously ambiguous. Would it not be odd to write an article
or book entitled 'Banks' and then to proceed to discuss both banks
which one puts money in and banks which form sides to rivers? Could
one sensibly say that he was analyzing the concept of being a bank?
J.C. Gosling treats it as a central thesis of his book that no
single all-inclusive account of 'pleasure' will be possible and takes
the view that the word 'pleasure' "cavers a wide range of partly
27
analogous, partly interrelated cases." Some pleasures, he argues,
28
are distinguished by a 'heightened geniality', some by a 'vigour and
29 30
gusto', others by 'absorption and attention', while still others
31
by different characteristics. Yet, he nowhere views the word
27. Gosling (1969, p 137)
28. Gosling (1969, p 132)
29. Gosling (1969, p 133)
30. Gosling (1969, p 135)
31. Though he uses 'vigour and gusto' as well as 'geniality' in the
analysis of kinds of pleasures, it seems, as I suggested earlier,
that the former concepts, and maybe the latter one, themselves, need
to be analysed in terms of pleasure. That is, one cannot appeal to
'vigour and gusto' to explain what pleasure is since it will be
necessary to appeal to pleasure to explain what 'vigour and gusto'
are.
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'pleasure' as equivocal. He uses the word throughout the book with¬
out quotes as though it had a decisive, unmistakable meaning in each
case. For instance, he considers ways in which pleasure might be
considered a feeling and wonders how pleasure is related to sane of
the emotions. Given his view that the word can name at least three
things which he emphasizes have no common core of 'pleasantness', one
wonders whether he takes himself to be talking of a number of very
different sorts of things all at once.
Penelhum explicitly argues that we are not dealing with a
homonym. "The generic notion of pleasure is no linguistic accident.
I would be a strange, inconsistent sort of person if a great many
things which I was pleased by I did not in fact enjoy, or if a
32
great many things which displeased me I did in fact enjoy."
Penelhum here wishes to argue that it is no 'linguistic accident'
that the word 'pleasure' is used for the two types of things.
Though it is not clear what he means by 'linguistic accident' his
account does not rescue him from the position that the word 'pleasure'
is a homonym with two very different meanings. On his view, we
speak of these two very different things by the same word ('pleasure')
merely because they normally accompany each other, and because one
would be 'a strange, inconsistent sort of person' if he failed to
be pleased by what he enjoyed. However, the fact that one thing
is normally accompanied by another provides no justification for
thinking of them as the same sort of thing. The only common char¬
acteristic which such conjunction shows is temporal conjunction.
Penelhum has given what looks more like a causal explanation of how
we would come to call two different things by the same word than
32. Penelhum (1964, p 246)
77
33
anything that would count as a rational justification for doing so.
After arguing that enjoyment and being pleased are very different
with no conmon essence, Taylor spends ccnsiderable effort showing how
the two things are interrelated. He argues, in effect, that enjoyment
is one possible reason, among many, for being pleased. However, this,
too, only shows a contingent correlation and does not provide any
justification for thinking of the two as the same sort of thing. Thus,
he provides no reason for not supposing that it is a consequence of
his view that the word 'pleasure' is a homonym with two very different
meanings.
Gosling, does raise the question of how we come to apply the same
word to such diverse phenomena. However, the question which he asks
is not quite clear enough. Does he want to decide how it happens
that the word 'pleasure' came to be used in so many different senses?
Or, does he want to decide how things differing so much can be
'pleasures' in the same sense of the term? (Like Wittgenstein in his
discussions of 'tools', Gosling shows no awareness of the possibility
of distinguishing some of these diverse 'pleasures' according to
different, perhaps primary and derivative, senses-of the word.)
The word 'pleasure', Gosling explains, "covers a wide range of
partly analogous, partly interrelated cases". The pleasure of 'being
pleased', he says, is central and the other things we call 'pleasures'
are called by this name as a result of their relationship to this
central 'pleasure'.
33= In the quoted passage, Penelhum speaks of the word 'pleasure' as
being a 'generic' notion. It would seem that the word 'generic' is
being used very carelessly and casually here. For, from his general
position I would infer that he is denying that we have anything like
a proper genus-species relationship here. If pleasure were a genuine
genus of which enjoyment and being pleased were species, the account
of why it is not a 'linguistic accident' that we use the same word
here would be quite different from the one Penelhum presents.
34. Gosling (1969, p 136)
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There are three sorts of relationships of other things we call
'pleasures' to cases of 'being pleased' which Gosling mentions:
(a) In some cases this (relationship) may be very obvious:
what I enjoy may bi'ing a smile to my face, and it may be
indifferent whether I am said to have enjoyed seeing someone
win a race or to have been pleased at seeing him . . . (b)
Sometimes it may be that my manner of engaging in the activity
enjoyed bears a relation to my humdrum manner of behaviour
analogous to that between being pleased and being unaffected or
disgruntled . . . (c) Even so, it is doubtful what we should
make of such cases (those 'pleasures' that are not cases of
'beirg pleased') if it were not at least usually the case that
they leave us refreshed, and relatively pleased with life . . .
The result of the relevant enjoyment is to restore equilib
and leave us more pleased with life than we were before.
The first relationship which he suggests (a) is that in sone
cases my response may indifferently be described as one of 'enjoy¬
ment' or 'being pleased' (and this is why both responses come to be
called 'pleasure'). But this seems to be the same as saying that
sometimes enjoyment just is_ being pleased, or thaffe' enjoyment' in one
sense means 'being pleased'. If this were so, then 'enjoyment' in
this sense is not a different sort of thing from being pleased. Given
this account there is no problem about why we call these 'two things'
by the same word, because 'enjoyment' in this sense has the same
meaning as 'being pleased'.
The second sort of relationship portrayed (b) is one where
certain 'enjoyments' are related to their opposites in a way analogous
to the way in which being pleased is related to its opposite. But to
say that such things are called 'pleasures' by virtue of some sort of
analogy with pleasure in the central case is to say that they are
called 'pleasures' in either a metaphorical or some other derivative
sense of the word 'pleasure', and this is at least to say that they
are 'pleasures' in a different sense of the word from those things to
^ium
35. Gosling (1969, pp136 - 7)
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which they are analogous. If something is not a nose, but is analogous
to a nose in some way, then in speaking of it as a 'nose' I am using
the word in either a figurative sense or in some other derivative
sense (i.e., in a sense derived from the primary sense in some way).
When I speak of the 'nose' of an airplane, I am using the word in a
sense that is different from the sense in which a person or dog has a
•nose', but the two senses are related, and the former sense is a
derivative of the latter.
The third reason Gosling gives for calling some states other
than being pleased 'pleasures' is that they 'usually leave us refreshed
and relatively pleased with life'. But this is simply to say that some
things are called 'pleasures' because they cause pleasure in the central
sense of the word. These states are related to pleasures in the central
sense as eyestrain is related to the headache which it may cause. But
then the sense in which a cause of pleasure (in the central sense of
'pleasure') is called 'pleasant' will be comparable to the sense of
'painful' in which the cause of a headache is itself called 'painful'.
We can call eyestrain 'painful' and in doing so we mean that eyestrain
causes, e.g., headaches. But we clearly are using the word in a
different sense when we call eyestrain 'painful' than when we call a
certain sensation 'painful'. So, too, according to this suggestion
of Gosling's, these different 'pleasures' are 'pleasures' in different
senses of the word.
Thus, according to the relationships which Gosling in fact maps
out between the various things we call cases of 'pleasure', these
various things are, at least according to the second and third
relationships he mentions, 'pleasures' in different (primary and
derivative) senses of the word.
Probably a Wittgensteinian view of the relationship between
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strains of meanings which a word has lies behind the authors' com¬
fortable acceptance of the apparent inconsistency in presuming some
kind of unity in meaning of words while explicitly denying a unity or
uniformity among the things being named. With his Family Resemblance
view of meaning Wittgenstein provided a model of word meaning which
was intended to make it possible for someone consistently to hold
both that there is a lack of uniformity among the things called by
the same word and that the word is not a homonym with many distinct
senses. But Wittgenstein never claimed that a Family Resemblance
model would apply to any and every manner of distinguishing strains
of meaning of a word. Ee never claimed that no matter how you dis¬
tinguish strains of meaning of a word, the word will retain a rough
'unity' in meaning and the various things referred to will always be
related to each other in the way in which members of a family are
related to each other. Rather, his view was that if you distinguish
strains of meanirg in a certain way, and interrelate them in a
certain way, the word may retain a kind of rough 'unity' in meaning.
However, it turns out, that the sort of relationships which the
authors we discuss see between the types of things which the word
'pleasure' names do not fit the Family Resemblance model.
35
The Family Resemblance account of meaning is as follows. We
often think of there being a certain characteristic look to a family,
where we think of a rough sort of 'unity' in appearances. In fact the
'unity' is not dependent on there being a number of family traits
shared by all the members of the family. -Rather, traits will be
shared by some members, but not by others; the two brothers will
have the eyes of their mother, one brother will have the build of his
35<> From Wittgenstein (1967, paragraphs 66 - 67)
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father, one brother and one sister will have the same sort of ears
as the mother, and so on. It may be that no single characteristic is
shared by all, or if there are shared features, the overall 'unified'
look to the family is not limited to just the properties shared by all.
The unified look is due to many features 'overlapping and criss¬
crossing' and not to features being shared by all.
Wittgenstein argued that in a similar way the different sorts of
things which a word such as 'game' names are related to each other in
the manner in which members of a family are related to each other.
They are not all 'games' by virtue of having some common property or
set of properties but they are related to each other in such a fashion
that they share a 'family resemblance' to each other. Norman Malcolm,
expressing Wittgenstein's view, writes: "The unity of games is like a
family resemblance." "What makes all of them games, what gives unity
to those activities, is not some feature present in all games but a
multitude of relationships."
According to the Wittgenstein model, the rough appearance of
'unity' which a family may have is due to a network of 'overlapping
and criss-crossing' properties. The authors who take the anti-
essentialist view of pleasure do not, however, present this picture of
a network of 'overlapping' and 'criss-crossing' features. There is
little overlapping of features that Gosling mentions when explaining
how the different 'pleasures' are related to each other.
For Taylor, Penelhum, and Perry there are primarily two sorts of
things which the word 'pleasure' names. These philosophers have not
noticed, however, that a Wittgensteinian Family Resemblance view is
36. Malcolm (1967, p 335)
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not applicable to a 'family' of things having only two members.
Crucial to the model is the presence of certain characteristics in
many but not all members. (it is not by having characteristics
present in all members that we avoid the essentialist view of word
meaning.) However, a characteristic does need to be repeated, or
found in more than one member of the family, if it is to be a trait or
a part of 'the unified look' to a family. We can speak of a charac¬
teristic look to a family because of the five members who have brown
eyes, not because of the one who has blue eyes. What is not shared
at all is not a family trait but an individual peculiarity.
But if we are talking of a group of two things, then any feature
that is not shared by the other member in the 'group' will be peculiar
to oneself. If there are only two 'pleasures' in question, namely
enjoyment and being pleased, then it is not possible to find a
'rough unity' in this family of 'pleasures' by finding traits in
many but not all members. Features that contribute to unity in the
family are common to both members; features that are not present in
both members are peculiar to one member (if present at all), and
features that are peculiar to one member are idiosyncratic and do not
contribute to an appearance of unity in the family. The Wittgen-
steinian Family Resemblance model as it was intended to work does not
apply to such small families. Thus, if someone is going to hold that
the word 'pleasure' refers to a 'family' of two very different sorts
of things and combines this with an anti-essentialist position, he
will have to hold that the word 'pleasure'- is a homonym, and he will
need to handle the word as he handles a word that has two very differ¬
ent meanings and which is therefore ambiguous.
It might be suggested that 'enjoyment' and 'being pleased' are
themselves not -uniform in nature and that each of these words refers
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to a number of different things which share only a family resemblance
to each other. There are a number of individual properties of the
two kinds of 'pleasures' that overlap, it might be suggested, and it
is because of these there are a number of overlapping individual
properties that there is a good deal of 'rough unity' between
enjoyment and being pleased. But this suggestion will not help the
philosophers being discussed. On their view, enjoyment and being
pleased are supposed to be very different, so there cannot be too
many features that overlap and there must be many that do not. Further¬
more, on their view, the 'pleasantness' of enjoyment and being pleased
is not constituted by the features that these states have in common.
So, if their 'pleasantness' is not constituted by what they have in
common, and these two things are for the most part very different,
then it still follows that when calling each of these sorts of
things 'pleasant' we must mean something different in each case.
There are no simple charges or amendments which would enable
these authors to fit their claims about the nature of various
'pleasures' to the Wittgensteinian Family Resemblance model. A major
overhauling of their views on the nature of the different types of
things which the word 'pleasure' names and on the interrelationships
between these things would be needed.
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Chapter IVr The Attractiveness of Pleasure
and the Repulsiveness of Pain
Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding
permanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end which
supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the
flower of their age.
(iristo tie)
The love of pleasure is one of the great elementary instincts
of human nature.?
(Aristotle)
Pain is something which by its very nature disposes men to shun
it#
3(Eudoxus mentioned by Aristotle)
Intro due ti on
Gilbert Ryle has convinced many philosophers that pleasure and
pain are not opposites. When they think of 'pain' they are thinking
of localized sensations such as a headache or a stabbing pain in the
leg. The word 'pleasure' is normally used to speak of such things
as enjoying a football match or delighting in good news^where the
word 'pleasure' does not name a special localized sensation. A
pain (sensation) is something which attracts our attention to itself;
pleasure is not. Within Ryle's thinking, pleasure is itself a form of
attention (to something else). To contemporary philosophers, pleasure
and pain seem so radically different that they do not have enou^a in
common to be opposites of the same sort of thing. No longer confident
of an opposition of pleasure and pain, philosophers have come, as a
1. Aristotle (1174b, 31 - 35)
2. Aristotle - a (Book X, ch. 1)
3« Aristotle - a (Book X, ch.2). Much of the material in the present
chapter is contained in a paper that will be published in Phi1osophy
(during 198 0). The paper has the title "Why People Prefer Pleasure to
Pain".
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matter of course, to discuss the subjects in isolation from each
other. Philosophers write books and articles on pleasure while
making only incidental references to pain, or they write articles
on pain while saying little or nothing about pleasure.
A failure to see the opposition of pleasure to pain is an
oversight as serious as a failure to see the opposition of hot to
cold or good to bad. Admittedly, if we are thinking solely of
localized pains, pleasure is not a perfect opposite to pain. Never¬
theless, in essentials, pleasure and pain are opposites. As pain is
an unattractive, disagreeable experience, so pleasure is an attractive,
agreeable experience. Pain is evil, pleasure is good. Pain is an
experience whose nature normally disposes someone to dislike it,
to avoid it, or to try to rid himself of it. Pleasure is an
experience of such a nature that it disposes one normally to want it,
to cherish it, and to seek it. It is this attractiveness Aristotle
was thinking of when he compared pleasure to the beauty of a flower
in bloom and to the health and handsomeness of youth. It is this
attractiveness that philosophers are thinking of when they speak of
the 'glow' or 'sweetness' of pleasure. It is because pleasure is
attractive and pain repulsive that pleasure and pain concern people
in their practical affairs and moral philosophers in their theories.
Good is opposite to bad; attractiveness is opposite to unattractiveness;
being wanted and sought is opposite to being disliked and avoided.
Though a headache is localized in the body in a way that enjoyment
of a soccer match is not, the pain is opposite to the pleasure by
being a bad rather than a good experience, an unattractive rather than
an attractive experience, an experience avoided rather than sought.
It is not a drastic change when we turn from -thinking of the
'pain' of a localized ache or a sharp sensation in a limb to the
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'pain' of remorse or despair; the shift is not so sharp as the
shift from talking of the 'bark' of a tree to talking of the 'bark'
of a dog. The pain of despair is not localized in the body as is a
headache. However, this 'pain' is also an experience of disagreeable,
unattractive, or bad quality. People are averse to these experiences
as they are to backaches, and they do things to avoid or minimize these
'pains' as they do things to avoid or minimize backaches and stomach¬
aches. 'Pain' of this type is also an opposite to pleasure.
The word which seems the most perfect opposite to 'pleasure'
is 'unpleasantness'; as any agreeable or attractive experience is
'pleasant', so any experience of disagreeable or unattractive quality
is 'unpleasant'. Both the 'pain' of headache and the 'pain' of
despair are unpleasant. The word 'pain' has upon occasion been
used by philosophers and psychologists to mean any unpleasant
experience. In everyday, non-scholastic English the word is also at
times used in this broad sense. The words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'
may in some contexts have a connotation of pleasure or unpleasantness
mild in degree (e.g., it may seem an understatement to speak of
great art merely as ' pleasant* to look at); however, it is also
established usage to use the words for the whole range of agreeable
and disagreeable experiences including the very intense. That bliss
is pleasant and agony unpleasant is a truism. Though the word 'good'
may not be the best choice of words to apply to the Mona Lisa -
'great' or 'excellent' might be a better choice - this should not
lead one to think the Mona Lisa is not a good work of art. Under¬
statements are not false statements.
Of the philosophers in recent years who have analyzed the concept
of pleasure, very few explicitly discuss pleasure's nature of being
attractive, good, wanted, and sought. Yet it hardly can be an ordinary
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contingent fact that it is pleasure rather than pain that is
attractive, pleasure rather than pain that is good, and pleasure
rather than pain that is wanted and accepted as a positive reason
for doing something.
In this chapter, my goal is to try to understand pleasure's
character of being attractive or agreeable and pain's being dis¬
agreeable or unattractive. Attention will center around the value
cf pleasure and pain and the attitudes toward pleasure and pain which
rational beings normally have; that is, I concentrate on pain's
being intrinsically bad and its nature of disposing rational beings
to shun it and pleasure's character of being intrinsically good and
its nature of disposing rational beings to want, value, and seek it.
I attempt to understand which is the more fundamental feature of
pain, its being bad or its being unwanted; that is, I ask whether
pain is bad because we shun it, or whether we shun pain because it
is bad. The parallel issue concerning pleasure's being good and its
being wanted is discussed.
My central questions are these: Why do we have these attitudes
toward pleasure and pain? Why do we dislike and wish to avoid pain
and suffering? Why do we want and seek pleasure? Why do we prefer
pleasure to pain? There are three answers to be considered: 1.) We
have a reason for wanting pleasure and for shunning pain. Our normal
attitudes are guided by some rational insight about the nature of
pleasurable and painful experiences. 2.) Pleasure and pain do not
in themselves provide any reason for wanting the one and shunning the
other. It is just a brute contingent fact about our constitution
that we are disposed to want and seek pleasure and dislike and avoid
pain. 3») That pleasure is wanted and pain unwanted is a simple
tautology. The attitudes toward the experience enter into the
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definition of 'pleasure' and 'pain'. A 'pleasant1 experience is
defined as a wanted experience and a 'painful' experience is defined
as an unwanted one. We will be discussing philosophers who have
held the second and third positions. I defend the first position.
I Are 'Pleasure' and 'Pain' Definable as Wanted and Unwanted
Experiences?
That someone should want and seek pain and not want pleasure
is a puzzling idea, and so it is not surprising that philosophers
sometimes argue that it is analytic that pleasure is wanted and
pain disliked - that it is part or the whole of what is meant by
calling an experience 'pleasant* or 'painful' that it is valued or
disliked. C.D. Broad suggested:
Is it not possible that what we have called 'hedonic quality'
is really a relational property and not a quality at all? Is
it not possible that the statement: 'This experience of mine
is pleasant' just means: 'I like this experience for its non-
hedonic qualities' 7^
Though Broad formulates his definition in terms of 'liking' an
experience, his suggestion is similar to a claim that 'pleasure' is
defined by the attitude had toward an experience. On this view, if we
are attracted to an experience, value it, or have some welcoming
attitude the experience is ipso facto pleasant. In a similar vein,
Herbert Spencer equated pleasure with "a feeling which we seek to
bring into consciousness and retain there" and pain with "a feeling
4* Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, p 238. Having denied that
there is a hedonic quality of experiences it seems unnecessary and
misleading for Broad to identify a pleasant experience with one liked
'for its non-hedonic qualities'. If there is no hedonic quality
then there is no non-hedonic one either. A pleasant experience must
simply be one 'liked' for its quality.
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which we seek to get out of consciousness and keep out." Many
contemporary philosophers are suspicious of calling pleasure a
'feeling', but the presence of the word 'feeling' is not crucial in
the definition. R. Brandt suggests that we may analyze a 'pleasant'
('unpleasant') experience as "an experience with a subjective element
that the person at the time wants to prolong (terminate or avoid) for
itself."6
It is important to be clear from the outset that proposals
whereby pleasure is analyzed according to the attitude had toward it
are really very different from those analyses discussed in Chapter III
whereby pleasure itself is said to be an attitude. On 1he present
view, pleasure is a feeling or experience (one which we want to
prolong). It is one thing to say that a person's pleasure in
enjoying golfing is his feeling or experience which he wants to
prolong and quite another thing to say that his pleasure is his desire
to golf. Notice the comparable difference between two proposed
analyses of beauty (or goodness): It would be one thing to say that the
beauty (goodness) of an object consists in its possession of qualities
that we want and value and quite another thing to say that beauty
(goodness) itself is our favourable attitude.
If these proposals are read as offering a sufficient condition,
5. Spencer (1870, Vol. I, Part II, ch. IX, Sect. 125)
6. Brandt (1959, p 307). D.M. Armstrong takes a related position:
"It is of the essence of pain that we wish it to stop". (Armstrong,
1962, p 92)0 He does not present this as the full acc cunt of pain.
His full account is that the concept of pain "involves both the
having of a certain sort of bodily impression, and the taking up of a
certain attitude toward the impression." (Armstrong, 1962, p 107).
The account of pain which I defend in this chapter goes a step
further than this in that I argue that pain's being a certain sort of
'bodily impression' is responsible for our taking up a negative
attitude toward pain. Pain sensations, I argue^ are of a nature that
provide us with a reason or justification for, e.g., wanting the
sensation to stop.
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for pleasure or pain, then the particular 'feel' of the experience
becomes incidental to its pleasantness or painfulness. There is no
experience which could not be a pleasure or pain provided that we have
the mentioned attitude toward it. As Kurt Baier said when defending
such a view:
Ve might have liked and disliked different sorts of sensations
from the ones we actually like and dislike, but whatever sorts
of sensations we like and dislike, we only call pains those
which we dislike. And if there are sensations which we
ordinarily dislike but on some occasions like having, then we
do not call them pains on those occasions on which we like
having them.7
(Baier has since modified his position.)
This consequence of the view some philosophers might find
attractive. J.N. Pindlay has argued:
Were pleasure and unpleasure peculiar qualities of experience,
as loud and sweet are peculiar qualities of what comes before
us in sense-experience, it would be a gross, empirical
accident that we uniformly sought the one and avoided the
other, as it is a gross, empirical accident in the case of
"fee loud or the sweet, and this is of all suppositions the
most incredible and absurd. Plainly it is in some sense
trivially necessary that we should want pleasure (or not
want unpleasure) . . . ®
This argument supports a Broad-type view where pleasure is simply
any quality of experience that is wanted or Valued' and unpleasantness
any unwanted or 'disliked' quality.
Findlay emphasizes that the relationship between an experience's
being pleasurable or unpleasant and its being wanted or unwanted is
an intimate one. Unless this intimate tie is fixed within the very
meaning of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' it becomes some gross
accident that it is the one rather than the.other that we want. Why
should such an accident be, as Pindlay says, "of all suppositions the
7. Baier (1958, p 273)
8. Pindlay (1961, p 177)
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most incredible and absurd"? When they are adults, all people,
all dogs, all gorillas, and indeed all animals normally shun the
painful and welcome the pleasant experience. In other respects
there are the greatest variations from one animal to another. The
extent of such agreement on tastes over pleasure and pain would
constitute an extraordinary coincidence if there were no deeper
requirement for such agreement. Secondly, is theienot something about
pain which makes pain a more suitable or more fitting object to
dislike than pleasure? Finally, it must be more than a contingent
fact that people prefer what is good to what is bad, and it seems
more than a contingent fact that it is pleasure rather than pain or
suffering that is good (intrinsically). These are some ways in
which the second position outlined at the beginning, that it is
simply some brute contingent fact that we want pleasure and do not
want pain, is unacceptable.
There are a number of philosophers who have thought that it is
more than a contingent fact that it is pleasure rather than pain that
is good. William Alston, for instance, writes that "It does not
9
seem merely to be a contingent fact "that pleasure is desirable."
H. Sidgwick is proposing an analytic link between pleasure and its
desirability (or, more precisely, its perceived desirability) when
he defines 'pleasure' as "a feeling which, when experienced by
intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable
or - in cases of comparison - preferable."^ Of intense pain, Brand
Blanshard writes:
What sort of assertion is one making in saying that intense
9. Alston (1967, p 345)
10o Sidgwick (1967, p 127)
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pain is intrinsically evil? It does not seem like an
empirical assertion; we do not say that it is only highly
probable that an intense pain will be intrinsically evil,
as we do that the next swan we see will be white. Such pain
is evil by reason of its nature; we can see from what it is
that it must be bad . . . The proposition is, therefore,
necessaryJ ^
A. Manser is perhaps reaching towards this necessary evil of pain
when he speaks of "the most important quality of pain" as "its to-be-
avoidednes s"•^ ^
The most obvious way to avoid the problems found in a view
where the relationship between pleasure and the desire for it and
pain and the aversion for it are contingent is to adopt the Spencer-
type definitions whereby it becomes true by definition that pleasure
is wanted and pain unwanted. Unfortunately, there are also serious
problems in this position.
Though Spencer did not realize this, it is an implication of his
definition that the particular feel of the experience is incidental
to pleasure and pain. What is sufficient is that one have a certain
attitude toward the experience. In principle, it must be logically
possible for any feeling or experience to be a pain or pleasure. Any
sensation or experience would be painful if a desire to be rid of it
were introduced.
Findlay, thinking in terms of 'unpleasure' rather than 'pain',
argued that pleasure and unpleasantness could not be special
experiences. Findlay thought this followed simply from the fact
that pleasure and unpleasantness have such a reliable effect on
motivation. But there has to be sons mistake here. Itches, and
even pains, have equally reliable effects on motivation yet there is
11. Blanshard (1961, p 230)
12. Manser (i960, p 224)
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an apriori limit on the sort of sensation that can be an itch or a
pain. As pleasure is connected, with a desire to seek the experience,
so an itch is connected with a desire to scratch. But not just any
sensation could be an itch with the mere addition of a desire to
scratch the area. Nor could just any sensation be a pain. Brush
your cheek lightly with your finger and you feel a light sensation
which is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. That sensation would never
be an intense pain, nor even a mild pain, whatever desire you might
introduce; it is not logically possible for that sensation to be an
intense pain.
Nor could just any experience be intrinsically pleasurable.
Consider the pain you feel when the dentist is drilling a tooth and
unexpectedly catches a raw nerve. A sensation of that quality or
feel could not lose its painfulness and become intrinsically pleasant
merely by charging the accompanying desires. Masochism does not
refute this claim. The sensation in question remains a pain; the
person would not be a masochist unless it were pain that he inflicted
upon himself. The masochist experiences pleasure along side, and
in consequence of, pain. The pain may cause him pleasure or delight,
but it cannot be intrinsically pleasant. (More will be said about
masochism shortly)
A definition of 'pleasure' as a wanted experience and 'pain' as
an unwanted experience begins to appear unsatisfying. By putting no
limits on the kinds of sensations or experiences that can be pleasur¬
able or painful the definitions seem too loose.
II Is It Possible Not To Shun Pain Or Welcome Pleasure?
And Lise, as soon as Alyosha had gone, unlocked the door, opened
it a little, put her finger in the crack, and slanmed the door
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as hard as she could. Ten seconds later she released her hand,
went slowly to her chair, sat down, and looked intently at her
blackened, swollen finger and the blood that was oozing out
from the nail. Her lips quivered. "I am a vile, vile, vile,
despicable creature," she whispered.
"I want someone to marry me, tear me to pieces, betray me,
and then desert me. I don't want to be happy."
(From Dostoevsky's, The Brothers Karamazov)
There is an oddity in the idea of someone not wanting to enjoy
himself or in someone's seeking pain. While suffering the dentist's
drill, how can one help but dislike the sensation caused by the
grinding, probing instrument? Yet, are there not masochists, people
who, at times, want and perhaps enjoy pain? Were there not Puritans
who frowned on certain pleasures - those gained from the flesh? Are
there not even now puritans or ascetics who show little or no wish
to enjoy themselves, and even friends or acquaintances who have moods
when they do not want to enjoy themselves?
One common interpretation of the idea of someone wanting pain or
not wanting enjoyment is that the person is irrational, perverted,
or 'sick'. However, if we are right to think of these cases as
instances of irrationality, then it follows that the attitudes in
question are logically possible. If it is merely irrational to
welcome pain or shun pleasure then it certainly is logically possible
to do so. And it is the possibility, not the rationality, of such
cases that is presently at issue.
Philosophers who hold that the word 'pleasure' is defined as a
wanted experience and the word 'pain' as an unwanted experience
probably think that they are accounting for the undeniable oddity
in the idea of wanting pain or not wanting pleasure. But these views
do not correctly interpret the oddity which we are confronting.
If a philosopher maintains that the word 'pain' entails 'being
unwanted' it only follows that _if a sensation is not unwanted it could
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not be a 'pain'. It would not follow that there will be some
sensations which will in fact dispose people normally to wish to be
rid of them or to dislike them. But if you think of the sensations
we call 'pains' and the way they feel, it is not simply that we
would not call them 'pains' if people did not want to be rid of them;
these sensations feel awful, and -they normally compel us to dislike
them. The puzzle in the idea of desiring pain is not located at the
linguistic level (being a contradiction in terms), but at the
phenomenological level. The perplexity about masochism is not how
a masochist can want a sensation and still call it a 'pain' but how
he can want these sensations - sensations like those which our
dentists create.
Yet it must be logically possible not to want to be rid of even
such awful sensations as these. The attitude toward a thing is
not part of the thing at which it is directed. Whenever someone
wishes to be rid of something it must be logically possible to have
the same thing without wishing to be rid of it. So, too, far the
sensations we call 'pains'; it must be logically possible to have the
same sensation, the one which normally provokes aversion, without the
aversion or wish to be rid of it. The compulsion we are dealing with
here is a psychological one not a logical one. Sensations of the
particular quality of those we get when, e.g., breaking bones or
harming organs, by virtue of the way they feel, compel or force us
to dislike them.
Similarly, the agreeable experience a person has when enjoying
a warm, relaxing bath is logically distinct from the welcoming
attitude he would normally have toward the experiences; it must be
possible to have an experience of this same tone or quality and yet
not receive it with a welcoming attitude. Though we normally want
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and value those pleasurable experiences we have when listening to
fine music or eating a juicy, delicious steak, it is not through
some logical necessity that we have these attitudes. Rather, these
experiences are of a nature which inspires us to be attracted to them;
the experiences are 'nice', and they would feel the same (i.e., no
less 'nice') even if we were not attracted to them.
That something is good does not entail that it is wanted under
all circumstances, and that something is bad does not entail that it
is unwanted under all circumstances. This holds for pleasure and pain
as it does for other good and bad things. It is reasonable for
someone not to want a particular diamond, if, for instance, the
diamond was stolen from someone in another country, and this is so
even though the diamond is in itself exactly like other diamonds
and no less beautiful
Though pleasure is in itself good, there may be times when it
is preferable not to be pleased. For instance, it may be improper to
be particularly pleased at funerals, or soon after the death of
someone close. Nor is it desirable to be excessively pleased with
onself for, say, having won an argument with a relative. Thus a
person could, if he were pleased at the time of someone's death, or
highly pleased over having won an argument with his son, desire that
he not continue to feel so pleased, and he could have this desire
at the same time that he is pleased.
Few men desire or seek the pleasure which conceivably could be
gained from rape, and this is so even if they believe that they
could in fact gain pleasure from rape. It is not that they want the
pleasure but disapprove of gaining pleasure from this source: most
men would not want the pleasure. If a father is required to punish
his children, we should desire, and he might do so as well, that he
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not take pleasure in doing so. A teacher normally does not want to
enjoy failing those students whom he must fail. A father who found
himself taking pleasure in punishing a child, or a teacher who found
himself enjoying failing a student, might desire that he would cease
to feel pleased. Puritans frowned upon pleasure taken in sex, card-
playing, the theater, and other activities which they considered
frivolous. What distinguished the Puritan from others is not the
fact that he disapproves of pleasure from some sources but that he
1 3
disapproves of pleasure from these sources.
The puzzle in understanding how someone could want pain is in
understanding why he should do so, i.e., what reason he might have
for wanting something so bad. Desiring pain has the same oddity as
desiring to be castrated or wanting to be torn to bits by lions.
One wonders, "What reason could one have for wanting things so bad?
What good could one see in them?" Though perplexing, there is
obviously no self-contradiction in the ideas of these other desires.
The oddity is one of rationality; it seems that one could have no
reason for wanting to be eaten by lions and that such a desire would
consequently be irrational or perverted. And, a desire which is
merely irrational or sick, is one which it is logically possible to
have.
In a similar way, the puzzle in not wanting pleasure or
happiness is in what reason one could have for not wanting something
so good. It feels nice to be pleased and to enjoy oneself; why
13« Though the Puritan is sometimes said to have been against pleasure
as such, in practice it was only pleasure from some sources that he
shunned. He still probably would have preferred the more pleasant
of two breakfast foods, and probably would have wanted and sought
pleasant surroundings, pleasant friends. He would have wanted to
enjoy such things as great literature or prayer services. No one
in practice shuns all pleasure.
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would someone not want such good experiences? The oddity in not
wanting pleasure or happiness parallels the oddity in not wanting
other good things such as health, sound judgement, or sanity. What
reason could someone have for not wanting to be healthy or sane?
An action of a rational creature becomes intelligible when we
see the good he sees in "the act. Maeochists often view their pain
14
as deserved punishment, and this is a clue to their thinking. For
there is good in being punished when one deserves it. (Parents
punish their children and the state its citizens because they see
good in just punishment.) His viewing pain as an instrument of
something good - a deserved punishment - is a thread of rationality
in the masochist.
The same thinking that can lead someone to desire pain might
lead him not to desire pleasure or happiness. We sometimes think
that certain people do not deserve to have good "things; we may do so,
for instance, when they have behaved in a nasty or an immoral way.
In such cases, we might desire that they not have good things such
as wealth, happiness, or long life. As we sometimes think that
another person does not deserve to be happy, people sometimes think
that they themselves do not deserve to be happy. It was because she
thinks of herself as 'vile' that Dostoevsky's Lise does not want to
be happy. She thinks that she does not deserve happiness. It is no
more a contradiction in terms that one should not desire happiness
than it is a contradiction in terms that one should not desire wealth
or long life.
14. The masochist would not necessarily enjoy all pain, e.g., he
would not so readily appreciate the unexpected pain from a surprise
karate-chop in his neck or suffering the unpleasantness of feeling
nauseated. Normally, the pain must be viewed as punishment for the
masochist to seek it.
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Philosophers who think that pain is necessarily unwanted some¬
times argue as follows: 'The masochist suffers guilt feelings. He
finds that pain and punishment relieve his guilt and bring him
satisfaction. Consequently, he seeks pain but does so solely as a
means to an end - a quite rational end - namely, satisfaction and
relief from the greater pain of guilt feelings. But though he seeks
pain he does not want or like pain; while he suffers pain he hates it
15
and desires to be rid of it as much as anyone else does.'
No philosopher that I know of has given any positive argument
for supposing that pleasure must be wanted and pain unwanted; those
who defend the view that pleasure is always wanted and pain unwanted
tend to offer individual explanations of possible counter-examples.
However, it is crucial to keep in mind when considering such arguments
that, as I previously noted, the attitude we have toward a sensation
or an experience is logically distinct from that sensation or
experience, so it must be at least logic ally possible not to dislike
the experiences we call 'pains' and not to be attracted to the
experiences we call 'pleasures'. Once this logical possibility is
noted, and we turn our attention to imagining cases of wanted pains
and unwanted pleasures, what clearer, better cases of such phenomsia
could be conceived of than the ones we have just mentioned? The
15« Armstrong uses this argument: "The neurotic who 'seeks punishment',
or who is said to 'seek punishment unconsciously'", is a somewhat
different case. For him, I think, the pain is endured, perhaps gladly
endured, because it represents ex-pi at ion. The pain is a punishment
which assuages guilt. But the whole point about its being punishment
is that it is something he has an unfavorable attitude to in itself.
In itself it is something that he would rather be without; but it is
better than unpunished guilt." (Armstrong, 1962, p 91.)
Armstrong seems to think that something must be unwanted to be
punishment. I am arguing that the idea of wanting something as
punishment is a perfectly clear, intelligible idea. What is crucial is
that an object be bad for it to serve as punishment, and being bad is
not the same thing as being unwanted.
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felt need to explain away these cases as in sane way mis-described
thus seems unfounded.
Why insist that a person must be attracted to a pleasant
experience and that it would not be pleasure otherwise? A person
might say that he is not attracted to such an experience and that he
does not want pleasure that comes in this way. He may feel guilty
that he is pleased. He may try to think about something else so as
to minimize his malicious pleasure. If it is not things such as this
one wishes to exclude by claiming we have some favourable attitude
toward the pleasure, it is hard to see what meaning is left in saying
that the person has a 'favourable attitude' or a'liking' for this pleasure.
It mi^it be admitted that the masochist is spurred on to punish
himself by the hope of relieving an unpleasant guilt feeling, but it
does not follow from this that he has no_ positive desire to punish
himself but has only a desire to relieve his discomfort. It would
be as natural to conclude that he does want to be punished and that
relief from the unpleasant guilt is one of his reasons for doing so.
The satisfaction a person might foresee from punishing himself
need have no greater role in motivation than would the satisfaction
someone might foresee from punishing someone else. The husband who
shoots his wife's lover may be spurred on by his distress over the
man's intimacies and may expect satisfaction from seeing the man's
potency bleeding out, but few philosophers would conclude from this that
he has no positive wish to hurt this intruder but only a desire for
his own satisfaction and relief. Rather, most of us would conclude
that he does want to punish the man, and that perhaps his own
expected satisfaction is one of his reasons for doing so. I see no
reason for taking a different position on a person's punishing himself.
From the fact that the masochist expects satisfaction from punishing
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himself we need not conclude that he does not desire this pain; we
should conclude that he does desire it and that the satisfaction he
expects is perhaps one of his reasons for doing so.
Admittedly, a Psychological Hedonist might hold that even when
punishing another person, it really is only one's own pleasure, and
not the other's punishment, which one wants. But few philosophers
today accept Psychological Hedonism, and there is no more reason for
insisting upon the hedonist account for someone inflicting pain on
himself than for someone inflicting pain on someone else. People do
not always gain pleasure from causing pain to people. The jealous
husband who feels pleased upon beating up or killing his wife's
lover would not feel equally satisfied to beat up a man off the street
or a neighbour's dog instead. That he thinks the victim deserves
punishment is not incidental. The act brings him satisfaction just
because he thinks the man deserves punishment and consequently
approves and desires punishment. If he did not desire the punishment
it would not please him. Similarly, it is just because the masochist
wants pain and punishment that it pleases him. If he did not want and
approve it, the pain would not please him. I conclude, then, that it
is possible for someone not to want pleasure or happiness and not to
want to avoid pain or unhajpiness.
Ill The Mill Fallacy
That pleasure is good and that it is desired are obviously
interrelated. But which is the more fundamental fact? 1.) Is our
desire for pleasure a consequence of pleasure's being good? Is
pleasure's being good our reason for wanting it? 2.) Or, is pleasure's
being good a consequence of our desiring it? That the foimer position
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is the correct one may be shown by proving the latter to be the
incorrect one. There is no sensible third alternative.^ On any
third position pleasure's being good would be neither our reason for
wanting it nor a consequence of our desire. Prom this it would follow
that we want pleasure for no reason, or for the wrong reason, and that
it is merely through lucky coincidence that what we want is actually
good or worth wanting. This proposition would be absurd.
How are we to understand a suggestion that pleasure's being good
is a consequence of our desiring it and that pain's being bad is due
to pain's being unwanted? One interpretation is that an object's
being good is simply entailed by its being desired, or that the word
'good' when applied to pleasure simply means 'desired'.
To see tha fault in this position we need only recall a lesson
gained from studying Mill's Utilitarianism. While attempting to
establish happiness, or pleasure, as the sole standard for what is
good Mill referred to the fact that people desire happiness as proof
that happiness is desirable. G.E. Moore pounced on Mill for this,
calling it a fallacy, so obvious, "that it is quite wonderful how Mill
17
failed to see it." 'Desirable' and 'good' do not mean simply
'desired' but 'worthy or deserving of being desired'. An object can
be desired without being worth desiring, or it could be worth desiring
without being desired in fact. That people desire to lynch rapists,
or enslave their neighbors, does not entail that it is desirable or
good that they do so.
Recently, some philosophers have come to Mill's defense, arguing
16. This is slightly oversimplified. An Emotivist or Prescriptivist
moral philosophy, would try to account for the relation of pleasure's
being 'good' to its being desired in a different fashion. I will
discuss the views of these philosophers in Section IV of the present
chapter.
17. Moore (1903, p 67)
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that we do have some sort of proof of desirability in actual desire,
though something short of strict deductive proof. It would seem that
they are committed to finding some sort of inductive proof.
The distinction between something's being desired and its being
worthy of desire can hardly be denied. In what way, then, mi^at
desire be inductive evidence of what is worth desiring or desirable?
Defenders of Mill have not been clear. The only sense I can give is
as follows: Actual desire is evidence of desirability in the way
that actual belief may be evidence of what is true.
That people in a village believe that their postman's nans is
Jack is some evidence that his name is indeed Jack. That his name is
Jack is not contingent upon their having this belief; rather, their
belief, if it is correct, is a contingent consequence of his name's
being Jack. Because people are rational they are disposed to believe
what they have reason to believe. Given this, there is more than a
random chance that there is some truth in what people in fact believe.
Similarly, because people are rational they tend to desire
objects when they have reason for doing so. In consequence, there is
more than random chance that there is good in objects in fact desired.
However, people can be mistaken in wanting something as they can be
mistaken in believing something. They may desire some food thinking
that it is good when in fact it poisons them. They may desire that
their country enter into a war with another country without realizing
the disaster it will bring.
What is said here holds for intrinsic goods and not just far
instrumental goods. There remains a distinction between an object's
being desired as an end, and its being worth desiring as an end. That
people sometimes come to desire money as an end in itself does not
entail that money is intrinsically desirable. One who would desire
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money as an end is simply mistaken or misguided. It is conceivable
that some species could evolve so constituted that the individual
desires as an end in itself to stand in a corner pummelling his bead
with a rubber mallet. The activity would not thereby be intrinsically
worthwhile. Rather, we would have a silly, misdirected creature.
That one should hinge goodness upon people's desires parallels
the often ridiculed tying of an action's being good or rigfrt to God's
commanding it. One asks: Does God command the act because it is
right, or is it right because God commands it? If we take the former
position, we are admitting that the commanding does not make the
act right, and that it must be right on its own account, independently
of being conmanded. If we take the latter position we are stuck with
the implication that if God had comnanded us to murder and rape our
neighbour rather than to love platonicly, these acts would have been
good. But this is preposterous. Given this dilemma, we are forced
to conclude that an act's being right or good could not originate
with its being commanded. The same dilenma arises for one who would
connect goodness to God's desires. And this same dilemma arises for
one who would tie goodness to man's desires. We are forced to conclude
that an end's being good and desirable could not originate wiih its
being desired and that the thing must be good and desirable on its
own account and independently of being desired.
Recently Norman Kretzmann argued in Mill's defense against
Moore's charge that Mill committed a fallacy in his attempted proof
of the desirability of happiness. Kretzmann writes:
As Pierce was later to say of the truth that it was the 'opinion
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate',
so Mill might consistently be made to say that the good, or the
desirable is the object or set of objects that are fated to be
ultimately desired in common by all who have desires.
18. Kretzmann (1958, p 115)
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It makes no sense to say that there can be anything good
or beautiful or right that would over the longest conceivable
run not ccme to be desired by the normal desirer.19
Suppose we agree with Kretzmann that desirable objects are
objects 'that are fated to be ultimately desired in conmon by all who
have desires' and that desirable objects would indeed 'over the
20
longest conceivable run' come to be desired by the normal desirer.
Shall we say that an object is desirable because it is one which
people are destined to desire or that people are destined to desire
certain objects because those objects are desirable?
If we take the former position, as Kretzmann seems close to
doing, we are stuck with the implication that whatever people might
have been destined to desire would ipso facto have been desirable -
that, if people had been so constituted as to desire to kill indis¬
criminately, - rape, or take from their neighbours at their own pleasure
these actions would have been desirable. (There are no apriori
limitations on the sorts of things which creatures could be destined
to desire. There is no logical oddity in the idea of some creature
being so constituted that be is, e.g., 'destined to desire' to kill
and eat his grandparents.) But this is bizarre. Ve can no more hold
that whatever man would have desired would have been good than we can
hold that whatever action God would have commanded would have been
19* Kretzmann (1958, p 114)
20. This presumption is at best an optimistic hypothesis about
people and by no means a truism or analytic truth as Kretzmann seems
inclined to suppose. There is no contradiction in "the suggestion that
there might be certain truths or desirables which people are doomed or
'destined' to remain ignorant of. It is logically possible for there
to be objects or properties of objects that will never be known
because they are beyond the realm of our five senses. As the deaf man
will never know the pleasure of hearing the voice of his beloved, so
there may be desirable objects which 'normal' desirers may never sense,
never know of, and thus never desire.
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desirable. We must conclude, then, that an object's being desirable
could no more originate with its being one which we are destined to
desire than an action's being desirable could originate with its
being commanded. Prom this it follows that pieasure's being good
does not originate from its being desired - that it is not because
pleasure is desired that it is good. But if pleasure's being good
is not a consequence of its being desired, the most plausible
alternative position is that its being desired is a consequence of
its being good. And the clearest way of interpreting this position
is that pleasure's being good or worth having is our reason for
wanting it, or, more precisely, pleasure's being good is one and the
same thing with its having a nature which provides reason (i.e. , grounds
or justification) for wanting it.
An object's being desirable is not contingent upon its being
desired. That an object is desired may provide inductive evidence but
not deductive proof of desirability. When a philosopher appeals to
the fact that people desire an object as 'proof' of the object's
desirability, this 'proof' has little use within a philosophical
argument. This 'proof' of the desirability of an object has no
greater use within philosophy than a 'proof' of the truth of a
proposition based on the inductive evidence that a number of people in
fact believe the proposition. AL philosopher who seriously questioned
whether a particular object is desirable or a particular proposition
true would be, at the same time, questioning whether people are right
to desire that object or right to believe that proposition.
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IV. Hume and. Epicurus
Happiness requires something in its own nature, or in ours, to
give it influence, and to determine our desire of it and
approbation of pursuing it*.
(Richard Price, 1787) '
An experience is pleasurable or painful not merely by being
wanted or unwanted but by being worthy of our desire or aversion.
But it is possible for something to be worthy of desire without
actually being desired. How then does an object which is worthy
of desire come to be desired in fact?
By meriting our desire pleasure provides us with reason to
desire and seek it. It is, however, logically possible for there
to be creatures which do not desire what they have reason to desire.
A creature must have a rational disposition to be disposed to follow
reason. Man and the other pleasure seeking animals are creatures
of rational disposition. A creature capable of feeling pleasure
and pain but having no rational capacity is conceivable. He could be
indifferent to pleasure and pain, as he could be indifferent to his
own bodily mutilation or death. As it is logically possible for there
to be a creature whose beliefs are not influenced by evidence or
reason, so it is possible for there to be creatures whose desires are
not influenced by good and bad. But such a creature is very different
from man. Man is a rational being; indeed, this rationality is
21. Price (1787, Chapter I, Section i)
22. Some of the things that I say in this'section and elsewhere in
this chapter may appear to commit me to the view that pleasure and
pain are special experiences, and this view would raise the problems
which Wittgenstein discussed in his Private Language Argument. In
Chapter VI, I do directly comnit myself to the view that pleasure and
pain are special experiences, and at that time I will discuss
Wittgenstein's arguments.
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entailed by the very concept of being a man. Entailed by being a man
is that one's beliefs and desires will not arise randomly but will
arise in conjunction with reasons.
Thus, as Price suggested of happiness, there are two parts to "the
explanation of why we want and approve pleasure. One part lies in the
nature of pleasure, and the other part lies in our own make-up.
Pleasure is good and thereby provides a reason for desiring it. We
are of rational disposition and thus disposed to desire things whai we
have reason for doing so.
The account of how pleasure and pain influence action is
similar to the account of how they influence desire. It is part of a
person's rational disposition that his actions are not arbitrary. An
animal who seeks or prolongs some experience because he finds it
pleasant has a reason for behaving this way, and his reason is the
value he recognizes in the pleasure. David Hume argued that moral or
value judgements could not be judgements of reason, or factual judge¬
ments, by claiming that if they were they could not influence action.
However, that one thing influences another cannot be ruled out a
priori: indeed, it is entailed by the idea of being a man or any other
rational animal that one's actions are influenced by reason. Further¬
more, even if it is admitted, as Hume insisted, that all action
requires desire or passion, it still must be acknowledged that part
of being rational is that one's desires do not arise randomly but that
they normally will arise in conjunction with reason. When rational,
one's desires do not have a life or will of their own but are guided by
what one perceives as worth having or worth avoiding. Thus reason
clearly does influence action, either directly, or indirectly by
first influencing our desires. In the case of pleasures and pain it
is the apprehension, or recognition, that pleasure is worth having and
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pain worth avoiding that leads to the seekirg behaviour characteristic
of pleasure and the avoidance behaviour characteristic of pain and
23
unplea santness.
Some philosophers have denied that reason has a role in our
coming to want pleasure or to dislike pain. Indeed, David Hume
denied a role to reason in the acceptance of any ultimate end. He
argued:
It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human action
can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but
recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and
affections of mankind, without any dependence on the
intellectual faculties. Ask a man why he uses exercise;
He will answer because he desires to keep his health.
If you enquire why he desires health, he will readily
reply because sickness is painful. If you push your
enquiries further and desire a reason why he hates pain,
it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate
end, and is never referred to any other object.
Preseiting a parallel argument whereby one thing is desired for the
sake of another, and the other is desired as a means to pleasure,
Hume proceeds:
And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason.
It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum;
and that one thing can always be a reason why another
is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account^
and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human
sentiment and affection.^4
Epicurus is also reported as holding that reason does not guide
our attitudes toward pleasure and pain. Diogenes Laertius wrote:
23* That there are analytic connections between pleasure, pain, and
reason,has been noticed by other philosophers. Kurt Baier writes:
"Having a pain is one of the paradigms of (a person's) having a reason
for doing something, namely, for doing what promises relief, or what
promises avoidance of the possible occurrence." (Baier, 1960, p 15)
Of pleasure, William Alston writes: "It does not seem to be merely a
contingent fact that . . . the fact that an activity is enjoyable is
a reason for doing it." (Alston, 1967, pp 345 - 6).
24. Hume (1751, Appendix 1)
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As proof that pleasure is the end he adduces the fact that
living creatures, so soon as they are born, are well content
with pleasure and are at enmity with pain, by the promptings
of nature and apart from reason.
Though there is sense in both arguments, notice the position into
which both philosophers have argued themselves. Both deny that our
attitudes toward pleasure and pain are guided by reason. Neither
seems to think that the attitudes enter into the definition of
'pleasure' and 'pain'. Consequently, both occupy the position which
Findlay calls "incredible and absurd" whereby it is merely an ordinary
contingent fact that it is pleasure rather than pain that is wanted and
sought.
Secondly, by denying that we have reason for desiring pleasure
both philosophers implicitly deny that pleasure is good prior to
our wanting or approving it. (if it were good prior to our wanting
it, its being good would be a fine reason far wanting it.) Both
were thus led to explain pleasure's being desirable as a consequence
of our having a favourable attitude toward it or desiring it, and in
doing so both commit the Mill Fallacy.
Epicurus referred to our attitude of being "content with"
pleasure and "at enmity with" pain as proof that pleasure is
desirable and good (indeed, the sole good or "the end"). But as an
object to be desirable and good must not merely be desired but be
worthy of desire so it must be not merely something we in fact are
"content with" but be something worthy of our being "content with" it.
Our being "content with" something no more deductively proves its
desirability than does our desiring it.
Hume assigned pleasure's being desirable to its being in "accord
with human sentiment". He argued: There cannot be a reason for
25. Laertius (Vol II, p 663)
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every desire; something must he desirable in itself "and because of
its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment". But what is
this but to attribute pleasure's being desirable to its being
desired? For what does it mean to say that pleasure "accords with
our sentiments" but that it is something we in fact want or approve?
In another context the claim that something "accords with our
sentiments" might mean that it is not simply desired but worthy
of desiring. But Hume can hardly be interpreted as claiming that
pleasure is desirable 'because it is worthy of being desired', for
this is circular and explains nothing. To explain why pleasure is
desirable one must explain why it is worth desiring. Furthermore, if
Hume is ready to distinguish our desire for pleasure from pleasure's
being worthy of desire, then why is this worthiness not our reason for
desiring pleasure? He is here in the middle of arguing that we have
no reason for desiring pleasure. Consequently, it seems that by
attributing pleasure's desirability to its "accord with human
sentiment" Hume is simply attributing pleasure's desirability to its
being desired. Thus when his statements are unpacked, we see that
Hume has committed a version of the Mill Fallacy.
That there is a clear distinction between an object's being
desired and its being worthy of being desired, and that an object
is desirable and good only by being worthy of desire, have not always
been within the philosopher's store of wisdom. This becomes obvious
once it is pointed out, but will not occur to every thinker on his
own. Had Epicurus and Hume been clearly aware of the distinction,
they would have found it difficult to admit that pleasure merits
our desire and then to deny that we have reason for wanting pleasure.
What better reason could there be for desiring somethirg than its
being worthy of that desire?
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The claim that we have no reason for wanting pleasure and.
disliking pain is equivalent to the claim that our attitudes toward
pleasure and pain, and our preference of the one over the other,
are arbitrary. It strikes one immediately as absurd to say that
our preference of pleasure to pain is an arbitrary one; the absurdity
lies in the obvious fact that pain does not merit our desire and
approval in the way that pleasure does.
What, then, led Hume and Epicurus to deny a role to reason?
Hume argued as follows: Though health might be your reason for
wanting exercise, and avoiding pain your reason for wanting health,
one cannot give a reason for hating pain. Pain "is an ultimate
end, and is never referred to any other object". One cannot have
a reason for every desire: "It is impossible there can be a progress
in infinitum: and that one thing can always be a reason why another
is desired."
Hume in this passage assumes that the only kind of reason one
could have for desiring something is that object's being a means to
some other object which one desires. Hume ri^itly claims that it
is not for thi3 sort of reason that we hate pain. He is also
right to conclude that if every desire had this sort of reason, the
existence of a single desire would entail an infinite number of
additional desires. However, Hume's idea of what could be a reason
for desiring something is too narrow. It does not here occur to
Hume that our reason for desiring something could lie in the nature
of the object itself rather than in some connection it has with another
desired object. Our reason for hating pain lies not in some effect
of pain but in the very quality of the experience. No infinite
regress need arise. Health may be our reason for wanting exercise,
and the avoidance of pain, our reason for wanting health. The nature
115
of the experience is our reason for disliking pain, and that is the
end of the matter.
Epicurus' reasoning was quite different. "Living creatures, so
soon as they are born, are well content with pleasure and are at
e.nmity with pain, by the promptings of nature and apart from reason",
he reportedly held. This suggests that Epicurus reasoned as follows:
Since all creatures, including the species of the lowest intelligence,
have these attitudes toward pleasure and pain, and since all animals
have these attitudes from birth or early in life and thus when their
rational capacities are negligible, it cannot be reason or some
rational consideration which has determined their attitudes. The
desire for pleasure therefore must be instinctive and pre-rational.
However, though the welcoming attitude toward pleasure and the
shunning attitude toward pain is common to all animal species which
we believe to experience pleasure and pain, it does not follow that
reason is not involved. For a rational capacity or intelligence is
also common to all such animals. Indeed, it may be an analytic
point about 'animals' that such beings have some rational mental
capacity. That children and mice as well as adult human beings are
"content with" pleasure and "at enmity with" pain does not show that
no reason is required in coming to have these attitudes but that no
sophisticated reason is required. Creatures of elementary intelligence
are still capable of elementary insights.
When we think of Reason, or The Intellect, we often think
immediately of the more complex rational processes and overlook the
primitive ones. However, some rational capacity is involved simply
in recognizing a sound or a face as familiar, i.e., as one which one
has experienced previously. And most animals are capable of this
sort of recognition. Even an act so basic as seeking or avoiding
1 T6
something manifests intelligence in many ways. When a mouse avoids
a certain turn in a maze after being shocked there earlier, he
manifests the rational capacity to distinguish right from left and the
recognition that the shock occurred at this spot. In fearing repet¬
ition of the shock he manifests inductive reasoning. Seeking or
avoiding something entails knowing what one is seeking or avoiding,
knowing what one is doing, and recognizing some connection between
one's behaviour and the end which is being sought or avoided. An
animal who cuts short an activity he finds painful or prolongs an
activity because he is finding it pleasant shows a recognition of a
connection between the pain or pleasure and bis present activity,
i.e., he realizes that the present activity affects or is responsible
for the pain or pleasure. Even the most primitive animals who want
pleasure and shun pain have numerous rational capacities such as
these. Thus we cannot conclude from the fact that a creature is
unsophisticated that its attitudes toward pleasure and pain are not
mediated by reason.
Epicurus almost seemed to be thinking that there are some
creatures totally devoid of rational capacity who nevertheless
are attracted to pleasure and averse to pain. Prom this premise it
would directly follow that their attitudes toward pleasure and pain
were not mediated by reason. But, firstly, there are no such creatures;
all creatures who have these attitudes toward pleasure and pain in
fact have some intelligence. Furthermore, such a premise could
never be established with empirical evidence. Creatures who lack
language provide only their behaviour as possible reliable evidence of
their attitudes. The best evidence that a being who lacks the use of
language wants and approves pleasure is that he seeks objects or
prolongs activities which we expect him to find pleasant or avoids
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objects or cuts short activities which we expect him to find, painful.
But, as we have shown, seeking and avoiding require the use of a degree
of intelligence. Prolonging an activity because one finds it pleasant
or cutting short an activity because it is painful require the
additional intelligence of recognizing some relation between the
pleasure or pain and the activity. For the creature has, with seme
reason, come to think of this activity as associated with pleasure or
pain. Thus the evidence which best shows us what attitudes a creature
has toward pleasure and pain also shows us that he has some rational
• +, 26capacity.
That we do have reason or justification for our attitudes toward
pleasant and unpleasant experiences may be confirmed by directly
contemplating some pleasant or unpleasant experiences. Consider, for
instance, the pain sensation we feel when having a tooth drilled by a
dentist (without anaesthetic) or the kind of sensations someone would
normally feel when breaking bones. Would these sensations provide a
person with any reason or grounds for wanting to be rid of them?
26. Other philosophers have argued that animals have a degree of
rationality. David Hume, far instance, writes: "Next to the
redicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to
defend it; and no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts
are endowed with thought and reason as well as men." Hume argues:
"We are conscious, that we ourselves, in adapting means to ends, are
guided by reason and design, and that 'tis not ignorantly nor casually
we perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the
obtaining pleasure, and avoiding pain. When therefore we see other
creatures, in millions of instances, perform like actions, and direct
them to like ends, all our principles of reason and probability
carry us with an invincible force to believe the existence of a like
cause." (Hume, 1739, Book II, Part III, Sect. XYl). Hume is not, of
course, here arguing that an animal employs reason in coming to seek
pleasure as an end, but rather that the fact that animals seek things
that are a means to pleasure shows that they employ a reasoning
faculty. And this is my point at present, that animals have a degree
of rationality or intelligence. By showing that they have a degree of
intelligence I am replying to someone who would argue that 'the
attitudes which animals have toward pleasure and pain are unmediated
by reason since animals lack rationality.'
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Consider, for instance, the very agreeable experience of eating your
favourite food in your favourite restaurant with your favourite
companions. Would this experience provide any intrinsic reason for
wanting or valuing it? Or, try to recall as vividly as possible the
nature of the pleasurable experience had when luxuriating in a hot
bath when tired. Do these experiences provide any intrinsic reason
for preferring them to the sensations which our dentists create?
The suggestion that pain sensations are worth avoiding because of
their connection with bodily harm or that eating delicious food is
worthwhile for its connection with bodily nourishment is not directly
relevant. I am asking whether there is anything about the intrinsic
nature of the experiences in question that justifies a particular
attitude; that is, consider the sensation we feel when the dentist's
drill is gnawing away at a tooth apart from its contingent connection
with damaged teeth. Ask whether the sensation simply by virtue of
the way it feels provides any reason for wanting to avoid or minimize
it. Would an intensely pleasurable experiaice of eating delicious
food provide any intrinsic reason for preferring it to the sensation
felt when having a tooth drilled or to the experience had when
feeling nauseated? Are our normal preferences here merely arbitrary
- i.e., totally devoid of justification? Is it merely some strange
prejudice that we have in that we normally cannot help but be averse
to the one experience and attracted to the other? The answer is all
too obvious: our tastes on this matter are not arbitrary: we do
have intrinsic reason for preferring the. one experience over the
other.
To this it may be replied that since it is our own predilections
that are under scrutiny we are not in a position to be the arbitrator
of judge; we are not impartial, and given that we do hate certain
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sensations we cannot but be expected to think we have reason for our
hatred. Who is in a position to say he is prejudiced? But though
this argument has some application with many prejudices, it has less
application in the present case. Normally, when a person is unable to
recognize that an attitude of his is unwarranted he does have some
reason for his attitude; the problem normally is that he cannot see that
his reasons are bad reasons. However, the person who says, that our
aversion for pain is not mediated by reason is not saying that though
we do have reasons for disliking pain our reasons are bad reasons. He
is not saying that we dislike pain for the wrong reason but that we
do so for no reason. The claim is not that to people it seems that
the sensation of pain warrants aversion and that people are in this
regard confused. (An attitude which is based on bad reasons is still
mediated by the faculty of reason.) Though we might admit that a
person often is not in a position to see that his reasons are bad
reasons, I do not see why he should not be in a position to say that
it is not by any reason that he has come to dislike or be attracted
to something o
It is not only possible for reflective persons to realize that
some of their attitudes may be groundless or unwarranted, it is
common for people to do so. A person afraid of walking under ladders
or terrified of open spaces, closed spaces, mice, or frogs can, at
least at times, tell you that his aversion is unwarranted (and can do
so even while feeling fear). Though someone prefers peaches to pears
and philosophy to astronomy, he may tell you that there is as much
reason for one to hold an opposite preference as to hold his own.
However, a fear of being tortured, of suffering pain at the
dentist's, or of suffering the pain from an operation we can recognize
as not being arbitrary or unfounded in this way.
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That one should have a strong aversion for experiencing sensations
of redness and a compulsive attraction for sensations of greenness
would be unwarranted or arbitrary in a way that an aversion for the
experience of racking pain and an attraction for the experience of
eating delicious food is noto
The rational insight about pleasure and pain which guides cur
attitudes is simple and basic and thus accessible to unsophisticated
animals. No complex reasoning or comparing of pros and cons is
needed to recognize something intrinsically good and worth having in
pleasant experiences and something intrinsically bad and worth avoiding
in pain. The good or bad in these experiences is not hidden; it is not
merely contingently associated with the experiences waiting to be
noticed or discovered. Experiential qualities do not exist undetected;
that quality of a sensation or experience which is good or bad we
necessarily must be conscious of. That there is something in a
pleasant experience worth having and something in a painful experience
worth avoiding is obvious.
V Richard Hare
In Emotivist or Prescriptivist moral philosopher would resist
my thesis. I hold that pain is bad independently of our attitude
toward it and that in being bad pain provides us with reason for
disliking it. For these philosophers there is no property or fact of
pain which is_ its being bad or worth disliking. Thus pain could not
provide us with reason for disliking it in being bad or worth disliking.
For an Emotivist, by calling pain 'bad' one is merely expressing some
present emotion or attitude toward pain. For a Prescriptivist, by
calling pain 'bad' or pleasure 'good' one is merely performing some
speech act of condemning pain or commending pleasure.
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These philosophers, however, will stumble upon weaknesses in
their theories when they are asked to explain why we should desire,
aporove, or commend pleasure rather than pain. Without acknowledging
seme property of merit in the experience, they will be unable to give
a sensible and sound answer to this question. The problems they are
vulnerable to are well illustrated by Hare's discussion entitled
"Pain and Evil".
Why, for Hare, do we have such negative attitudes toward pain?
The constraints we are under are contingent, though they
are readily explicable. There are good reasons why very
few people get into a state in which they do not mind
high intensities of pain. Nearly all causes of pain are
also causes of harm to the organism; pain is, therefore,
suchagood warning device - and has indeed been developed
as such - that we have acquired, partly by evolution and
partly by learning, a very firm disposition to avoid pain;
and this disposition is associated with a subjective feeling
of dislike.
Pain is correlated with bodily harm. In consequence, there was a
survival advantage to animals who dislike it. By disliking and
avoiding pain an animal would, unwittingly, be avoiding bodily harm.
Animals who disliked pain were more fit to survive than those who
did not, and thus a universal dislike of pain resulted from evol¬
utionary forces. This account, though plausible at first sight, is
riddled with problems.
Hare speaks of this connection with bodily harm as a "good
reason" for disliking pain, and he may be thinking that this connection
28
provides our .justification for disliking pain. But it does not.
27. Hare (1964, p 96)
28. For, are there not 'good' causes for just about everything? Why
should it be surprising that there would also be a (good) cause of our
dislike of pain? Furthermore, Hare mentions that our avoidance and
dislike of pain is acquired partly by learning. Is this not to suggest
that we have a reason for disliking pain? In any case, it would be
worth asking whether the connection which pain has with bodily harm
justifies our aversion for pain - even if this was not what Hare was
intending to suggest.
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That one thing signals the presence of something baa provides no
justification whatsoever for disliking that thing or regarding it as
evil. An alarm which is a good warning device of fires or burglars
would not be disliked or called 'evil' for being so, and pain's being
a reliable sign of bodily harm does not in itself give us reason for
disliking pain or calling pain 'evil'. Indeed, when a thing is a good
warning device of something bad we have reason for liking and
appreciating it raiher than disliking it.
Furthermore, pain is an intrinsic evil - something bad on its
own account and independently of any connections it may have with
other evil things (such as bodily harm). Pain would be bad even if
29
not correlated with bodily harm. The justiflcation for disliking
pain and calling it 'bad' is to be found in the intrinsic nature of
the experience.
Hare's account may be read as a causal hypothesis, but here too
it runs into serious problems. Pain is correlated with harm and thus
through evolution nature has ingrained an aversion for pain. A
dislike of pain has survival advantage. Within this explanation of
the origin of our dislike, it is a primitive, unexplained fact that
pain already happened to be correlated with harm. But how is it
that pain came to be correlated with harm in the first place?
Within Hare's thinking, that pain has a particular feel to it is
is incidental to its coming to be disliked and avoided. Dislike is
ingrained because the sensations happened to be correlated with harm.
A sensation of a different quality would have served quite as well.
29» Baier makes a similar point: "Even if the person did not know
what it signalled or if he took it as the sign of a desired event,
such as child-birth or a necessary operation, it would still constitute
a strong motive for taking alleviating action." (Baier, 1962, p 11 )
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Had pleasurable or tingling sensations been correlated with harm,
nature would have as happily ingrained dislike of them. Had those
sensations which we call 'pains' not been correlated with harm,
people might have easily been indifferent to, or perhaps even desired
them.
An implication of Hare's view is that the uniformity throughout
nature in our attitudes to pleasure and pain is an ordinary contingent
fact. One sensation could serve a warning function as well as
another; all that is needed is for nature to ingrain dislike of it.
It could be as natural that seme people would have pleasant or
tingling sensations correlated with harm, and consequently disliked,
as it is for some people to have blue eyes while others have green eyeso
Thus, in the end, it remains on Hare's view merely an ordinary
contingent fact that our attitudes to pain are uniform and that we
prefer pleasant to painful sensations. And this is unacceptable.
Hare did not directly ask what, if anything, .justifies our
disliking pain and calling it 'bad'. The question is crucial. I
have already noted that no justification for considering pain
intrinsically bad is found in pain's being a sign of bodily harm. One
might, however, suggest that the fact that we dislike pain itself
justifies calling pain bad. But it does not. If an object did not
warrant our aversion of it, it would not warrant our calling the
object 'bad' either. Prom the fact that someone .dislikes Indians it
does not follow that he would be justified in calling them 'evil'.
Only if one is justified in disliking something is he justified in
considering it bad.
A suggestion that desire or dislike might itself justify calling
an object 'good' or 'bad' is another version of the Mill Fallacy. As
something must be not merely desired but worth desiring to be
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desirable and good, so it must be worth desiring and not merely-
desired to provide complete justification for our calling it
'desirable' and 'good'.
That we are justified in calling pain 'bad' could not seriously
be denied. No one would claim that a judgement that pain is normally
bad is an arbitrary judgement, and that it is no less appropriate and
sensible to commend pain as being universally worth seeking and
intrinsically good. Hare nowhere doubts that we are right in calling
pain 'bad*o Where then lies our justification far disliking pain and
calling it 'evil'? It will be clear by now that our reason for a
negative attitude toward pain lies in the intrinsic nature of the
experience. In feeling the way it does (i.e., awful and bad) pain
justifies our aversion for it. Similarly, our justification for
desiring pleasure and calling pleasure 'desirable' and 'good' lies in
the intrinsic quality of the experience. By being good and meriting
our desire a pleasant experience provides justification for desiring
it and for conmending it as 'good'.
Meriting our desire must be some fact about pleasure. That
pleasure provides reason for desiring it entails that it provides
justification or merit far desiring it and that it is worth desiring.
And to say that pleasure is worth desiring is equivalent to saying
that it is desirable. These concepts - providing reason or justifi¬
cation for desire; meriting desire; being worth or deserving of
desire; being desirable and good - are all interconnected. If the
first one represents some (abstract) property of pleasure, as it
plainly does, tiien those which it entails also must represent some
property.
That pain provides reason or justification for dislike is a
factual claim. But this claim entails that pain warrants, merits, or
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deserves our dislike. And this entails that pain is undesirable or
bad. These propositions are all interconnected. If the first one is
factual, as it clearly is, then those which it entails are also
factual.
The argument in this paper presses us towards the conclusion
that pleasure's being desirable or worthy of desire and pain's being
undesirable or worthy of dislike are facts. One who would deny a
factual status to such merit would become vulnerable to serious
problems. He will be unable to show why the judgement that it is pain
rather than pleasure that is 'bad' is not arbitrary, i.e., completely
30
devoid of justification. Yet the judgement clearly is not arbitrary.
He will be unable to provide a workable account of why we should
dislike and avoid pain rather than love and seek it. Yet there
clearly must be some important reason. He will be vulnerable to the
numerous objections found with the two accounts which were alternatives
to my own in explaining our preference of pleasure to pain.
Am I not committing myself to some IntuitLonist view of goodness
and thus making myself vulnerable to the objections that are often
30. Other philosophers have noted that Emotivism and Prescriptivism
have the unacceptable consequence that moral and value judgements
ultimately become arbitrary. Gerge Kerner (in Kemer, 1966) writes:
"Since Stevenson rejected the notion that there are such things as
moral qualities existing independently of the wills and desires of
moral agents, the acceptability of a moral judgement became a purely
arbitrary and subjective matter" (pp 97-8). "In the theory
expounded in The Language of Morals, what reasons- can be given for a
moral judgement is a matter to be ultimately settled by the decisions
we in fact happen to make - for no reason" (p 182). "Hare's new theory
(as expressed in Freedom and Reason) was really no improvement over
the old: morality is in the end a matter of non-rational decision or
commitment" (p 194). Kerner sees this implication of arbitrariness
or non-rationality in moral judgement to be a fault or unacceptable
consequence of these theories, and presumably this.is a fault in the
theory because these judgements are not in fact arbitrary, or at
least they do not seem to be.
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raised against such views? Though I hold that pleasure's being good
is some property of pleasure, I am no t holding that goodness is seme
unanalyzable property. Pleasure's being good is. at least in part,
its property of providing some reason or justification for wanting and
seeking it. To say that pleasant experiences are 'good' or 'desirable'
is to say that they are 'worth desiring' or that they 'merit' a being's
desiring them, and this is much the same as saying that they provide
'reason' or ' justification' for desiring them. To say that pleasant
experiences give us some reason for wanting and seeking them is much
the same as saying that they are worth desiring and that they are
desirable and good. It seems to me an odd and difficult position if
someone should hold that it is a fact that pleasant experiences
provide some 'reason' for wanting them but that pleasure's being
'worth desiring' or 'desirable' is not some fact about pleasure. I
will be saying more in the next chapter about my rejection of the
alleged Pact-Value Distinction.
There are special features of pain sensations not shared by
pleasant or tingling sensations which make them particularly well-
suited as correlates of bodily harm. To miss this is to miss the
heart of the matter. Nature, through evolutionary forces, 'chose'
pain over pleasant or tingling sensations to be correlated with harm
because pain, being bad and worth avoiding on its own account, is
something creatures have reason to avoid on its own merit. The
consequences of pain's being associated with harm is that rational
creatures tend to minimize harm; but they do so for the wrong reason.
An animal favours a hurt leg, not to allow it to heal properly, but
because pain is awful or worth disliking and he has reason to avoid
it. Had pleasant experiences been correlated with harm we might expect
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It is sometimes said that the questions 'Why do people want
pleasure (or 'happiness')?' or 'Why do people dislike and want to
avoid pain?' are senseless or unintelligible. Kurt Baier, for
instance, writes: "It is absurd to ask why men hate pain or love
pleasure for the same reason as it is absurd to ask why circles are
32
round or why fathers are male." It is because Baier believes that
'pleasure' and 'pain' are defined, at least in part, by reference to
the attitudes had toward an experience that he thinks that these
questions are absurd. However, according to the position which I have
defended these questions are not absurd. The answers to the questions
are that we 'hate' pain and 'love' pleasure because pain and pleasure
provide us with intrinsic reason or justification for taking up
these attitudes. Indeed, even for a philosopher like Richard Hare
the question why people hate pain is a sensible one. Hare holds that
it is a contingent fact that people dislike or 'hate' pain, and he
31. Many of the arguments which have driven us to these views of
pleasure and pain will have equal force in driving us to a comparable
position for other ultimate ends. That knowledge, love, justice, ccr
dignity may have intrinsic goodness cannot be a consequence of our
desiring them. The attitudes we have to intrinsic goods are not
themselves accidental and arbitrary. The value of these ends does
not originate with our having favourable attitudes to than. Ignorance
and hatred would not become intrinsically desirable merely by a
creature's coming to desire them as ends. That knowledge and justice
have intrinsic goodness is one of man's reasons for desiring them.
As Richard Price wrote: "Why, therefore, reasonable beings love truth,
knowledge, and honour, is to be answered in the same manner with the
enquiry, why they love and desire happiness." (Price, Chanter III).
32. Baier (1958, p 267)
128
provides a causal explanation of how people came to dislike pain.
Hare argued that a dislike of pain (in one sense of the word 'pain')
is a result of evolutionary processes, and this explanation certainly
could be considered a straightforward answer to the question "Why
do people dislike or 'hate' pain?" The question is absurd neither for
Hare nor for myself.
In a recent article Robert Simpson wrote: "If a man explains a
wish or an action by referring to happiness, there the chain of reasons
33
comes to an end: it makes no sense to ask a man why he wants happiness."
Like Hume, Simpson seems to be assuming that the only sort of reason
(ground) one can have for wanting an object is that object's being a
means to some end. However, I have argued that pleasure (and happiness)
in themselves provide us with intrinsic reason or grounds for wanting
34
them. This is certainly an intelligible account, but it has not
occurred to Simpson. Indeed, this explanation of why people want
pleasure and happiness is not only intelligible, it is correct.
33• Simpson (1975, p 169)
34. "Pleasure' is not identical with 'happiness', and one could, of
course, take a different position in explaining the desire for pleasure
than he takes in explaining the desire for happiness. However, I take
the same view for both, and the arguments I used in defending my
position on pleasure are, for the most part, applicable to happiness.
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Chapter 7: The Good in Pleasure and the Evil in Pain
To be a pleasant experience is to be an experience that is
'agreeable' or 'attractive' in quality. An experience that is
'agreeable' or 'attractive' in quality is one which by virtue
of being good or worth wanting has a tendency (or 'power') to
dispose rational beings to be attracted to it. An unpleasant
experience is one viich is 'disagreeable' or 'unattractive' in
quality, that is, an experience which by being bad or worth avoiding
has a tendency (or 'power') to dispose rational beings to be averse
to it. Pain sensation is one species of unpleasant experience.
Pleasure's being good or worth having and pain's being bad or
worth avoiding are the more fundamental of the characteristics.
That we want, value, and seek pleasure is a consequence of
pleasure's nature, a result of the fact that pleasant experiences
provide some reason for wanting them. It is logically possible
not to want and seek pleasure and not to want to avoid pain and
unpleasantness. The responses are contingent upon a creature's
having a rational disposition. In some cases a person may find
more reasons for not avoiding pain than for avoiding it, and in
such instances he need not be disposed to avoid pain.
It is not logically possible far pleasant experiences to fail
to be good in quality or for unpleasant experiences to fail to be
bad in quality. A 'pleasant' experience therefore is to be
defined as an experience of good quality, i.e., an experience
which provides some reason for wanting and seeking it. An
'unpleasant' experience is to be defined as an experience bad in
quality, i.e., an experience with a quality which provides one witii
some reason for wanting to avoid that experience. (To say that an
experience provides 'reason' for seeking or avoiding it is to say
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that it provides grounds or .justification for doing so.) These
definitions provide conditions that are both necessary and sufficient
for an experience's being 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant'. In this
chapter I defend and elucidate the claim that pleasure is necessarily
good and that pain and unpleasantness are necessarily bad.
A.) Is Pleasure Always Good?
There is widespread agreement among philosophers that pleasure
is good and that pain and unpleasantness are bad. A number of
philosophers have thought that it is more than a contingent fact
that it is pleasure rather than pain that is good. However, with
the notable exception of Henry Sidgwick, few philosophers have
directly suggested that the good of the one and the bad of the
other actually enter into the definition of 'pleasure' and
'unpleasantness'. But what clearer way is there for establishing
that the relationship is more than contingent than by mentioning
the goodness and badness within the definition of 'pleasure' and
'unpleasantness'? By defending a definition of pleasure in terms
of its value, as I do in the present chapter, I am following out
and developing an intuition which many philosophers have had.
Since the publication of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica
seventy-five years ago it has become apparent that the nature of
the good or the bad is difficult to understand. For this reason a
contemporary philosopher might be unenthusiastic over a definition
of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' in terms of 'good' and 'bad'. In
the preceding chapter I began to sketch my view of these concepts
(an experience's being good is, at least in part, its possessing a
nature that provides some reason far wanting and seeking that
experience); in this chapter my views of these concepts will become
clearer. However, I do not pretend to be providing a developed,
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detailed account of goodness and badness, nor do I claim to be
dealing with all of the important problems which arise in trying
to understand the nature of the good and the bad.
However, from the fact that the concepts of good and bad
are philosophically puzzling one should not conclude that it is
useless to use them in analyzing other concepts. That the terms
which appear in a definition give rise to their own philosophical
problems is no evidence whatsoever against the correctness of the
definition. If the concept of good were crucial to the under¬
standing of pleasure, as I am suggesting it is, it would be futile
to ignor this and to pursue the analysis in a different direction.
It can hardly be an ordinary contingent fact that it is pleasure
rather than pain that is good, and this cannot be ignored. Prom
the fact that the concept of goodness is itself puzzling the most
that we can conclude is that a better understanding of pleasure may
hinge in part on our gaining a better understanding of goodness.
It is canmon, indeed normal, to find within philosophically
useful definitions concepts which themselves are fertile ground for
philosophical study. One useful definition of 'knowledge' has been
that of 'justified true belief', yet the natures of justification,
truth, and belief are very difficult to comprehend and are poorly
understood by philosophers. It is important to see the inter¬
relationships between concepts. When analyzing pleasure in terms of
goodness we see that pleasure cannot be defined directly in terms
of the attitudes had toward pleasant experiences for many of the
same reasons that 'goodness' cannot be defined in terms of the
attitudes had toward good things. The relations of pleasure to
our desire and seeking of it needs to be understood as being that
of goodness to our wanting and seeking of that which is good.
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Since philosophers, along with non-philosophers, almost
universally believe that there is, at least normally, something
good about pleasure and something bad about pain, a deductive
proof that pleasure is good is not of urgent necessity. What does
require discussi cn is the common, and quite reasonable, claim that
some pleasures are bad rather than good and that pain is some time s
good and not bad.
Having defined malice as 'thinking of another's undeserved
misfortune with pleasure', C.D. Broad wrote: "Is it not perfectly
plain that it is an intrinsically bad state of mind, not merely
in spite of. but because of. its pleasantness?"^ There are other
pleasures that might seem to be bad. Is there not something bad
in sadistic pleasure, i.e., pleasure taken in causing harm to
another? The suggestion is not simply that it is wrong to harm
another but that it is worse when scmeone feels pleased over it.
Must there be something contradictory in the Puritan claim that
pleasure, at least pleasure in frivolous activities, is not
desirable?
As pleasure is sometimes said to be bad, so pain is sometimes
said to be good. Pain and suffering are sometimes praised for
educational, character-strengthening, or soul-purging effects.
Severe pain is sometimes valued as a testing ground for will¬
power or courage. A biologist or a doctor might say that physical
pain is generally a good thing, since it serves as a good warning
device - a rudder steering people and animals away from harm. Is
not pain or suffering a good thing when it is inflicted as just
punishment?
1. Broad (1930, p 234)
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That there is bad in a certain state of affairs does not rule
out there also being good in the situation. My general view on
such suggestions as these is that though there sometimes may be
something bad in the occurrence of pleasure and something good in
the occurrence of pain, there remains something good about the
pleasure and something bad about the pain and unpleasantness.
When considering such cases one must ask, 'Even though there is
something bad about this pleasure, does there not remain something
agreeable or nice - i.e., something good - in "the pleasant
experience?' For instance, though it is bad to laugh at our
friends when they bungle their affairs does there not remain
something agreeable or nice, something good, in our experience
when we are feeling pleased? Even if there is something desirable
in suffering pain as a deserved punishment, does there not remain
something disagreeable, something bad, in the sensation?
This mixed account will be accepted readily for instances in
which pain is praised for its effects or pleasure condemned
because of its consequences. For instance, though pain and
suffering may be valued for their effect in strengthening character
or in toughening one up it is consistent to say that the pain
itself is bad though the strengthened character (or education) is
good. Indeed, it is just because the pain itself is bad that it
can strengthen character or educate a person.. Similarly, should
it be held that pleasantness sometimes makes a person lazy or
apathetic, we need not say the pleasure itself is bad but only
that these effects are bad.
These cases show that 'being good', cannot be equated with
'being something that should always be sought' and that 'being bad'
should not be equated with 'being something that in every instance
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should be avoided'. In certain instances the beneficial effects
of pain might outweigh the bad of the pain so that one should not
avoid the pain. (Though the person has some reason for avoiding
the pain he has more reason for not avoiding it.) There are
many pleasures whose consequences would make the pleasure not worth
seeking; though many of us could expect to enjoy a luxurious
world cruise, we do not usually choose to throw all our savings
into such a venture. The bad consequences would make the venture
silly, but this is obviously not to say that the pleasure would
not itself be good, but only to say that one is wise not to seek
this pleasure.
It is sometimes desirable to inflict pain as a just punishment.
It might even be said that such pain is a good thing. But still
there remains something bad about the pain. Being 'punished'
entails having something bad inflicted. It is because a fine,
the loss of freedom, a pain, and death are bad that they are
able to serve as punishments. We do not punish people by giving
them money, by serving them delicious meals, or by giving them
health, precisely because these things are good.
Even if it sometimes is intrinsically good to inflict pain as
punishment, there remains something intrinsically bad about that
which we are inflicting. What is good in the situation is that we
are justly punishing someone. What is bad is the feel or quality
of the sensation or experience inflicted. Though we might say
that the pain here is good, this would be a way of saying that
there is good in inflicting pain here, namely, the good of just
punishment. It would be mistaken to overlook the fact that there
is still something bad in the feel of the pain.
In a similar way, it is quite consistent to say that though
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something is itself good, it is undesirable for it to exist in some
circumstances. That the lives of wicked people should be as good or
better in length of life, in happiness, or in public esteem than
the lives of persons of kindness and virtue is undesirable. For
an immoral person there is a point at which his life would be
too pleasurable - a point at which any more pleasantness would be
undesirable. This is not to say that there is nothing good in
additional pleasure. On the contrary, it is just because there
would be something good in additional pleasure that its existence
would be undesirable. The person does not deserve or merit
additional pleasure, and this is to say he does not deserve or merit
something good. There is injustice in wicked people experiencing
greater personal good than that which good people experience. There
is a double-dose of injustice when someone deserves punishment yet
not only fails to receive bad things but actually benefits from
his wrongdoing. The American public was at times aggravated over
the Watergate proceedirgs, firstly, because the tried or convicted
often received little punishment and, secondly, because the guilty
parties were often able to benefit from their actions by receiving
large amounts of money from their misdoings, e.g., by giving talks
on university campuses or on television, or by selling their
memoirs.
What is bad in the pleasure of malice, i.e. in pleasure that
is taken in sane undeserved misfortune of another person? That
the person feels pleased indicates that .he thinks of the mis¬
fortune as a good thing and that he welcomes it. A person who saw
no personal advantage in another's misfortunes or who did not want
the person to suffer this misfortune would not feel pleased when it
happened. It is bad to want misfortune to come to the undeserving,
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and it is bad to view other people's troubles primarily from the
perspective of how they serve our own interests. These responses
are bad whether or not they are accompanied by pleasure. It would
be evil for me to desire that my son die an unnatural death, and
this is so even if I do not take pleasure in the thought of it.
To feel pleased over the misfortunes of another person is to
feel good at -the thought of those misfortunes. The person feeling
malice feels good, i.e., he has an experience 'nice', 'agreeable',
or good in quality.
When a person feels pleased at the thought of another's mis¬
fortunes the pleasure shows not only that he has evil thoughts
and an undesirable attitude to the other's misfortunes but it also
suggests that the person is benefiting (with pleasure) from his
wickedness. This sense of offended .justi ce is, I think, one of our
reasons for thinking of malicious pleasure as evil. When we are
in a heated argument with someone, we hate to have him look at us
in a manner that suggests that he is enjoying making us miserable,
for this not only suggests that he desires our unhappiness but also
that he is benefiting from it. There is a 'double does' of injustice
since the person deserves to be punished for his wicked thoughts
and desires but instead is actually benefiting. It is quite
consistent to say that though the pleasure itself has positive
value to the pleased person, it would be desirable for him not to
feel pleased over the misfortunes of others.
This explanation of the undesirability of malicious pleasure
is not merely consistent with an admission that the pleasure itself
is good but actually requires this admissicn. For the claim that a
person is benefiting by receiving pleasure from his actions entails
that he is receiving something good from his actions.
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It is often thought desirable for someone to suffer remorse
or guilt if he has acted immorally. Shall we say that pain or
distress felt through remorse or guilt in these circumstances is
good (and therefore not bad)? To suffer the pain of remorse or
guilt is to be pained by the thought of something one disapproves
of having done or wishes that he had not done. That a person
suffers remorse after wrongdoing shows that he realizes that his
action was wrong and that he has sympathy or concern for his
victim. The sympathy for the victim and moral sensitivity to one's
own wrong-doing are themselves desirable whether or not the person
suffers pain in conjunction with them.
A further way in which it might be desirable for a person to
suffer the pain of remorse after wrongdoing is that the pain mi^xt
be desirable as punishment for the wrongdoing. Pain of guilt
might serve as some atonement, expiaticn, or as an event which
purges oneself for wrongdoing. However, it is only because the
pain is evil that it can provide compensation or repayment for
wrongdoing.2
To be pained over an acticn is to feel badL or terrible over
the act. To say that it is sometimes desirable to feel pained over
one's wrongdoings is to say that it is sometimes desirable to feel
terrible or bad over having done some act. There remains a
disagreeableness and badness to pain even in cases when it is
desirable far someone to feel pain. To say that it is sometimes
desirable for someone to suffer pain is to say that it is sometimes
2. That people often feel pain through their awareness of having
done wrong could almost be interpreted as evidence of the Divine
Hand at work, since we have in this psychological phenomenon a
built-in mechanism for punishing wrongdoers.
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desirable for someone to undergo a bad experience.
B.) Are There Pains that are not Unpleasant?
Though it may be granted that a pleasant experience is
necessarily good in quality and that an unpleasant experience is
necessarily bad in quality, there are sane philosophers who think
that it is possible for a sensation of pain not to be unpleasant
and thus not to be of a quality that is bad.
3
Richard Hare, in his article entitled "Pain and Evil" , main¬
tains that it is merely a contingent fact whether or not a pain is
found unpleasant in the way that it is merely a contingent fact
whether or not feeling cold is found unpleasant. It is very common
for 'pain' sensatiais to be found unpleasant, he holds, and far this
reason the word 'pain' has come to have a second sense whereby un¬
pleasantness is implied. My concern in the following discussion
is with what he has to say about 'pain' in this alleged sense
whereby unpleasantness is supposedly not implied.
Hare begins his argument by noting that the word 'pain' as it
is most commonly used would not apply to all disliked or unpleasant
sensations. Sensatiais from itches, tickles, electric shocks, or
sweltering heat, though unpleasant, are not usually thought of as
'pains'. Rather, pains are, Hare says,distinguished from these
others by having a special quality or feel to them. In this
observation Hare has a point against Kurt Baier, who at one point
4
said that a pain is sLmply any disliked sensation. However, this
3* Hare (1964)
4» Recall the following passage of Baier's which was quoted earlier:
"We might have liked and disliked different sorts of sensations from
the ones which we actually like and dislike, but whatever sorts of
sensations we like and dislike, we only call pains those which we
dislike. And if there are sensations which we ordinarily dislike
but on some occasions like having, then we do not call them pains on
those occasions on which we like having them." (Baier, 1958, p 273) •
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point gets us no closer to a conclusion that pain need not be
unpleasant. Prom an admission that not all unpleasant sensations
are pains it does not follow that not all pains are unpleasant.
Prom the fact that there are coloured objects that are not red
we cannot conclude that there are red objects that are not coloured.
While assuming that what he says in terms of 'dislike' of
pain applies equally to 'unpleasantness' of pain, Hare argues,
"There are, in fact, small degrees of pain which are by no means
disliked by everybody. Most people could draw the point of a
needle across their skin (as in acupuncture) and say truthfully
that they could distinctly feel pain, but that they did not dislike
5
it." Other philosophers have suggested that mild aches are not
always unpleasant.
I agree that for some sensations it may not be obvious whether
or not they are unpleasant, but is ther not as much doubt whether
or not these sensations are pains? Admittedly the sensations that
Hare mentions are not particularly unpleasant, but ex hynothesi
we are considering 'small degrees of pain'. But are these sensations
not at least a little unpleasant?
If a friend is drawing a needle lightly across my skin I will
soon want him to stop, and this suggests that the sensation is to
some extent unpleasant. Admittedly, we may not be much concerned
about it. If the music on the radio is slightly too loud, and thus
unpleasant, we may not be highly worried about it, yet, if we are in
reach of the radio we will turn down the volume. Similarly, though
we will not be highly concerned about a mild headache, we still take
5. Hare (1964, p 97)
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aspirins for it if it is too slow in going away on its own. Why
do we take aspirin? Do we have any reason for doing so? The
action is not merely blind instinct. We take the aspirin not merely
because the sensation might be distracting us, for we would do
so even if it were not. Rattier, it is just slightly unpleasant or
disagreeable and we think that we would be better off without it.
There are some sensations that seem to be pains which, because
they are associated with pleasure, have been interpreted by
philosophers as not being unpleasant. One philosopher mentioned
that after a good physical work out someone might be happy to have
those aches that tell a person that his body is becoming stronger.
Von Wright mentions the sensation that a child feels when being
pinched by his mother or father in a spirit of love and affection.^
However, though it may be uncertain whether the sensation is
unpleasant, it seems equally uncertain whether the sensation
is a pain. Significantly, Von Wright seemed uncertain over how to
describe the situation; he not only says that the 'pain' is not
unpleasant, but he also says that it is not 'painful', and if this
is not a direct contradiction I do not know what is.
The 'pains' which Von Wright and the others mention as pains
that are not unpleasant invariably are examples of mild 'pains'.
However, if it were a contingent fact that pain is unpleasant
it must be logically possible for the most intense of pains to be
not the least bit unpleasant. But what would it be like for an
intense pain to be not the least disagreeable? One should not be
quick to admit that this is a logical possibility.
There is indeed a queerness in the experience of being
6. Von Wright (1963, p 71)
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pinched, an oddity which may be misleading Von Vright. There is
both a disagreeable element and an agreeable one. Though a child
who is being pinched may feel pleased to receive affection, he
will at the same time be experiencing unpleasantness in the
sensation. It is wrong to reason that since the child enjoys
the situation he does not find it unpleasant. With equal over¬
simplification, one might reason that since the pinch is
unpleasant, the child could not be enjoying the attention he
receives. It is true that the same thing cannot be both pleasant
and unpleasant in exactly the same respect. But it is quite
possible far pleasantness and unpleasantness to exist 'side by side'
concurrently. One can enjoy a movie while having a headache,
while aware of an unpleasant smell, or while feeling uncomfor table
in his chair. (There is no need to say that the pleasure and
unpleasantness must be alternating in time. A person obviously can
be aware of two sensations at the same time. And one sensation
could be unpleasant while the other is pleasant; for instance,
while someone is feeling unpleasant sensations from being un¬
comfortable in his chair he may be smelling a pleasant perfume.
In a similar way, a person can experience pleasure which is not
localized while he is experiencing an unpleasant sensation. While
experiencing an unpleasant sensation from a pinch a child may be
enjoying the affection and playing. Though the sensation itself
has a bad quality, the child's experience in general has a good
tone.)
It is possible to be pinched and yet feel nothing or to be
pinched and feel a sensation that is not a 'pain'. But if we are
considering a case where ex hypothesi the person is feeling pain
when pinched by a parent, then, even though the child appreciates
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the show of affection, we expect the child to try to squirm out
of the grasp of the parent. The squirming is not blind reflex
in the way that a leg jerking from a tap on the knee is pure
reflex. The squirming movement is not purposeless as is a
knee-jerk but is directed at permitting the child to escape the
the pinch or lessen its effect. But why would the child have an
inclination to escape from the pinching if the sensation were not
itself unpleasant or bad, i.e., worth escaping?
The situation here is similar to that of teasing or tickling
a person. The context may be one of general fun and amusement.
7
However, at the core of the fun is something itself unpleasant.
A person being tickled will normally try to wriggle away; again,
the action is not totally involuntary but is partly directed at
receiving relief, however temporary, from the discomfort being
inflicted. On the other hand, a child may be glad that he is being
tickled and may want it to continue, and his ground for this
desire is the enjoyment that he is also experiencing. A philosopher
who denies that there is unpleasantness will be left unable to
account for the attempt, perhaps half-hearted but nonetheless real,
to wriggle out of the grasp.
The presence of a mixture of pleasure and unpleasantness is
clear in many cases of teasing. Causing a degree of unpleasantness
is central to teasing, though the unpleasantness need not be that
of pain in particular. Not only do we pinch, poke, or tickle when
teasing, we also frighten (shout in a friend's ear unexpectedly),
7. According to the definition offered by The Concise Oxford
Dictionary.to 'tease' is to "irritate playfully or maliciously ..."
(Sykes,1976). 'Irritating' a person needs to be analyzed in terms
of causing that person some form of discomfort or unpleasantness.
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embarrass (as children we would corner a friend and jerk down his
trousers), or irritate (cause a friend to sneeze or itch). Like
anyone else, the victim finds embarrassmen t, fright, or irritation
unpleasant. He may also find amusement and enjoyment in the
humour. Though there may be fun in being teased there remains
g
this core of unpleasantness.
An important trouble-spot in Hare's discussion is that thou^i
he formulates much of his discussion in terms of 'dislike' of pain,
he assumes that whatever he finds to be true of dislike of pain will
apply to the relationship of unpleasantness, discomfort, and
suffering to pain. In Chapter II, I discussed the tendency to
think of pleasure in terms of 'liking' something and to view
pleasure as a 'pro-attitude', or a valuing or prizing of an
object. In a similar way, Hare thinks of suffering and un¬
pleasantness in terms of 'disliking' something, which he equates
with some negative attitude, and he thinks of all of these
experiences as comparable to thinking of an object as bad. (Hare
uses the expression 'affective attitudes', and I suspect that he
8. Philosophers commonly believe that a person's judgements about
his own feelings and experiences are incorrigible - that, for
instance, a person who sincerely claims that he is or is not enjoying
himself or finding something unpleasant cannot be mistaken. However,
the above suggestion suggests that it should be possible to err in
these enjoyments. Hare and Von Wright hold that certain ('pain')
sensations are not unpleasant, and I have argued- that these
sensations are unpleasant. Though this disagreement took place at
the level of philosophical discourse, it seems quite possible that
my judgements of the unpleasantness of these sensations might differ
in practice from the judgements that Hare and Von Wright would make.
If a pin were drawn across the skin of Hare's arm, Hare presumably
would be ready to say that he felt a mild 'pain' that was not
unpleasant. However, if ^ were subjected to the same sensation I
would say that this mild pain was mildly unpleasant. One of us
must be wrong. Hare would judge some mild pains not to be un¬
pleasant, whereas there would be no pains that I would judge not to
be unpleasant. So, at least one of us would be mistaken about
whether or not certain sensations are unpleasant.
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thinks of disc cm fort, unpleasantness and suffering as well as
dislike as fitting into this category.) In Chapter II, I argued
at length that the ' pro-atti tude' view of pleasure is wrong, and
Hare's 'con-attitude' view of unpleasantness is wrong for much the
same reason. The unpleasantness of a pain is not itself an
attitude had toward the pain but that (bad) quality of the pain
which provides us with reason for having a negative attitude
toward it.
This misconception of unpleasantness has a crucial role when
Hare argues:
I do not see how it can be impossible to understand,
though it may be difficult to believe, a man who says
that, by practice, he has got into a state in which
he does not dislike lying on a bed of nails, although
he has exactly the same experiences, apart from the
dislike, that I would have if I would lay on a bed of
nails.^
Since dislike is an attitude and not a quality of the experience
which we have the negative attitude toward, Hare is right that
when we have some negative attitude towards an experience it must be
logically possible to have the same experience without.having this
attitude toward it. However, since the intrinsic unpleasantness
of a sensation is not itself an attitude, this argument does not
directly apply to it..
If the feel or quality of an experience is crucial to an
experience's being pleasant or unpleasant as it is on my view,
thai Hare's above suggestion if formulated in terms of 'unplea¬
santness' rather than 'dislike' would not be a logical possibility.
On my view of unpleasantness it is logically impossible for two
experiences to be exactly alike in quality while one is intrin-
9. Hare (1964, p 98)
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sically unpleasant and the other is not. An experience is unpleasant
when it is bad in quality and therefore has a quality which provides
some reason for avoiding the experience. Pain sensations are
intrinsically disagreeable and unpleasant and not merely unpleasant
through being a cause of some feeling that is intrinsically
unpleasant. It is not logically possible for two experiences to
be exactly alike in quality while one is intrinsically bad in
quality and the other is not and while one has a quaility which
provides intrinsic reason for avoiding the experience but the
other does not. ^
In another argument Hare tries to establish a separability of
pain from its (attendant) unpleasantness by appealing to the
effects that a lobotomy has on the way people react to pain. A
lobotomy, an operation on the frontal lobes of the brain, is
sometimes given by doctors to pacify or calm people with severe
emotional disorders, and the operation also can be used to provide
relief to patients with severe pain in cases in which other remedies
have failed.
There seems to be more than one way in which the operation
affects a person's pain. The operation, it seems, can affect
someone's condition so that he feels less pain after the operation
than he was feeling before it. His pains may be less intense than
they had been before the operation and they may become less frequent.
Secondly, people will be less anxious about their pains afterwards,
10. As Hare argues that pain is not necessarily unpleasant, so he
argues that 'suffering' is not necessary for pain. To 'suffer' is
to experience extreme unpleasantness. There are some pains which do
not entail suffering because there are some pains that do not
entail extreme unpleasantness: mild pains do not entail extreme
unpleasantness. However, intense pain does entail suffering since
it entails extreme unpleasantness.
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and this will happen not just to the extent that their pains are
less frequent or less intense. The patients become less concerned
or worried about pains of an intensity which have worried them
more before the operation. Thirdly, it seems that the persons
suffer less because of their pains afterwards and that they find
the experience of pain less unpleasant. This, too, seems to be out
of proportion to the decrease in the intensity of the pain sen¬
sations they feel; pains of a given intensity seem to be less
unpleasant after "the operation than they had been before it. The
descriptions and reports of these pains given by the patients and
doctors are not always as clear as would be desirable for philoso¬
phers who are concerned about important, but rather subtle,
distinctions. There sometimes seem to be inconsistencies between
what is said and how the patient actually behaves. (For instance, he
may say that he no longer cares about his pains but may still take
aspirins for them.) From some things that are said one might think
that it is being said that these people have pains which are not at
all unpleasant.^ ^
It is plausible to say that these operations do indeed reduce
the suffering and unpleasantness that the patient experiences with
pain sensations. With this proposition as premise Hare develops the
following argument:
If we can understand what it would be. for the suffering
to be reduced while the sensation remained the same,
we can surely understand also what it would be for the
suffering or the distress or dislike to be altogether ^
removed without any diminuation in the pain sensation.
11. Roger Trigg has a useful, detailed discussion of Lobotomy and
its effects on pain (in Trigg, 1970, Chapter VII).
12. Hare (1964, p 102)
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This argument is a non sequitur. Consider the following
parallel argument which an American car manufacturer might present:
"If we can understand what it would be for the length of our cars
to be reduced while the size of the passengers' seating compartment
remains the same, we can surely understand also what it would be
for the length of our cars to be diminished to zero without any
diminuation in the size of the seating compartment." A car
manufacturer can reduce the length of his cars without affecting
the size of the seating compartment if he chops inches off the
length of the bonnet and boot. However, if he were to reduce the
length of the car to zero this would entail a very substantial
reduction in the size of the passenger compartment.
My under standi ng of the relation of pain to the unpleasantness
felt when experiencing it is comparable. On my view, being a
sensation of pain entails being a sensation of unpleasant quality.
However, it is possible for someone at the time that he is
experiencing a pain sensation also to experience additi onal un¬
pleasantness which is not itself a quality of tie sensation. For
instance, if one is feeling depressed or gloomy while experiencing
pain, the experience as a whole will be more unpleasant than it
would be if he were having the pain without also being depressed.
Being depressed or gloomy is in itself an unpleasant experience,
and when it is added to the experience of pain the resultant
experience is all the more unpleasant. Given the possibility of
removing the unpleasantness of being depressed without removing the
accompanying pain sensation it must be possible to lessen a person's
suffering or unpleasantness while he is in pain without affecting the
pain. The fact that this is a coherent picture of the situation
shows that Hare's argument is a non sequitur.
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To be annoyed or aggravated is to be bothered by something one
thinks bad or has some negative attitude toward. Pain is something
bad. Annoyance and aggravation are feelings which are in themselves
unpleasant; it is unpleasant to be aggravated by the cat as well as
by a pain. Often a pain causes a person to react to it with a
separate, additional unpleasant feeling such as annoyance,
aggravation, anxiety, depression or despair, and when a person has
a pain and is aggravated or depressed by it the resultant experience
is more unpleasant than it would be if he had the pain but was not
also aggravated or depressed. For instance, when a headache con¬
tinues far too long it might become what we describe as a 'nagging
headache', which is a headache which is beginning to annoy us. The
sensation itself need not have changed, yet by being around so
long, weno longer feel fresh to it, and we begin to respond with
additional feelings and emotions toward the pain. The pain someone
feels at the dentist's or when stubbing his toe would be a source
of much additional suffering and distress if, though in itself it
remained exactly the same sensation, it were felt under different
circumstances. For instance, if our 'dentist' was not someone
interested in the well-being of our teeth, but was a man attempting
to persuade us to provide him with Information, and we were not a
volunteering patient but someone taken by force and strapped down to
the chair, our mouth clamped open, our resultant experience would
13be unpleasant. Or less dramatically, consider a child's visit
to a dentist. Before going, he may be anxious, and after the visit
when on the way home he may be in tears and very distressed over the
whole business. During the actual drilling he not only suffers the
13* Such a visit to the dentist was vividly portrayed by Dustin
Hoffman and Lawrence Olivier in the recent movie, The Marathon Man.
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pain sensations but also suffers this separate emotional response.
(A parent or the dentist sensing that it is logically possible
to avoid these accompanying, disagreeable emotions may attempt
to calm the child. This emotional suffering might actually be
\14
worse for the child than was the pain sensation itself.)
How then could a lobotomy decrease the suff ering or unpleas¬
antness someone experiences over a pain sensation? When not used
for the purpose of easing suffering, the operation is used to calm
persons with severe emotional troubles. After having his operation,
McMurphey, the central character in Ken Kesey's novel, One Flew Over
The Cuckoo's Nest, becomes apathetic and passionless - in this
respect more a cabbage than a human being. Hare quotes a son as
having said of his father after the poor man has had this operation:
"It would make no difference to Dad whether I told him I had won a
thousand pounds or that I was going outside to shoot myself." In
such a condition of total apathy or lack of emotion over good and
evil - a condition difficult to imagine vividly - it is quite
intelligible that this residue-of-a-person would now feel little
anxiety, aggravation, or emotional upset over his own pain, even
14« Prom this last exanple we can also see how people's suffering
over pain will vary not just with the intensity of the sensation
but also with the subject's personality and character traits, such
as maturity and courage. A person of nervous, timid or hypochon¬
driac character mi^it find the experience of pain more disagreeable
than would a person of a calmer, braver disposition. Similarly,
a person's attitude or emotions toward pain on specific occasions
will affect the degree of unpleasantness he experiences in connection
with the pain. Someone who feels guilt and a consequent need for
punishment (e.g., a masochist) need not feel anxious or depressed
over that pain which he seeks voluntarily. Indeed, unlike the
child who suffers anxiety at the prospect of pain, the masochist
might feel only pleasurable relief at the prospect of pain. But
this is not, of course, to say that the pain sensation is not in it¬
self unpleasant for the masochist but only to say that his overall




though the pain is something which is in itself bado
There is one final example of what someone might be tempted
to think is a sensation of 'pain' which is not unpleasant. The
masochist wants pain and may even 'find pain pleasant'. Does this
fact show that his pain is not unpleasant or bad?
Already I have argued that it is just because the pain is bad
(unpleasant) that the masochist desires and takes satisfaction in
pain. Realizing this is crucial to understanding what is peculiar
or queer about masochism.
As was decided previously when discussing pinches and tickles,
we cannot deduce from the fact that there is pleasantness in an
experience the conclusion that there is no unpleasantness. Indeed,
it is misleading to describe the masochist's pain as 'pleasant'
without qualification, for this seems to suggest that the pain is
an unmixed pleasure. But 'enjoying a pain' is not at all like
enjoying a meal or a movie, and this is because 'enjoying a pain' is
a mixed experience. A pain, though unpleasant in itself, can be a
source of a pleasant satisfaction which is experienced simul¬
taneously with the pain.
15» As someone may feel an emotion that is itself unpleasant in
responding to an unpleasant sensation, so one can respond to
pleasant sensations with emotions that are themselves pleasant.
As pain sensations are intrinsically unpleasant so the sensations
experienced from eating food that one finds delicious are
intrinsically pleasant. It is not uncommon for someone to continue
to feel pleased after he has finished a good meal; if the person
has eaten such food on previous occasions, he might also, before
eating, look forward to the meal with an emotion of pleasurable
excitement. If he experiences these or other pleasurable emotions
while eating the delicious food, the resultant experience will be
more pleasant than it would be if he experienced the agreeable
gustatory sensations without responding with these pleasurable
emotions. The pleasure in the pleasurable emotions is a pleasure
logically distinct from the intrinsic pleasantness of the
gustatory sensations themselves.
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Though we scoetimes describe the masochist as 'enjoying pain'
or 'finding pain pleasant1, these descriptions should not fool us.
With equal justice we could say that the masochist finds his
'suffering' or 'unpleasantness' pleasant or enjoyable, and obviously,
we cannot conclude from this that his suffering or unpleasantness is
not unpleasant. There is, of course, oddity in talking of someone
finding his 'unpleasantness' pleasant, but there also is an oddity
in talking of 'pain' being pleasant. A less odd way of talking is
to make it clear that the experience being discussed is a mixed
16
experience - one with both unpleasantness and pleasantness.
A pain sensation is intrinsically unpleasant as it is
intrinsically bad. That is, it is unpleasant and bad because of the
1&. That unpleasantness may sometimes be a source of pleasure
gives rise to the question whether it is worthwhile for someone to
bear the unpleasantness for the sake of the pleasure. Often, the
pleasure in being tickled will make the acceptance of the disagree-
ableness in the sensation worthwhile. There may be times when the
pleasure in scratching an itch may lead someone to be glad that he
has this itch, even though this means enduring some irritating
unpleasantness.
Does the masochist's pleasure compensate for the unpleasant¬
ness so as to make masochistic activity, at least sometimes, a
worthwhile enterprise (as, for instance, being tickled or having
an itch may be)? It would be logically possible for the satisfaction
and relief of guilt feeling to compensate in degree for the pain
voluntarily inflicted. However, there would remain some irrationality
in masochism. You or I do not normally take pleasure in pain. Why
does the masochist? A peculiar outlook on pain is, I suspect,
entailed by the idea of 'masochism', (it can never be a compliment
to call someone 'masochistic', and I suspect that this is because
some irrationality is entailed by 'masochism'.) The masochist is
sometimes said to be ridden by an unwarranted sense of guilt; be
'needs' punishment because he has this (irrational) sense of being
guilty. It is abnormalities and irrationalities such as these that
enable him to take satisfaction in pain. What is strange, then, about
the masochist is not that he wants satisfaction and relief from pain¬
ful guilt feelings but that he has these unwarranted guilt feelings
to begin with and that he consequently 'needs' pain. If the
masochist's ability to take pleasure in pain is, as I suggest it is,
contingent upon his having some irrational or perverted attitude
toward pain, thenmasochism would not be a worthwhile or desirable
enterprise even if the pleasure he felt did outweigh the pain.
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way it feels in itself and not simply because it may be a means
to some feeling that is itself intrinsically unpleasant. A pain
sensation cannot cease to be unpleasant because the very quality
that is distinctive of pain is a quality that is bad and such as
to provide reason for avoiding the sensation. The badness and
intrinsic unpleasantness of a sensation cannot be 'peeled off'
as Hare seemed to think it could. The intrinsic character of a
sensation cannot be affected by purely external changes, such as
changes in the person's attitude toward the sensation. The
quality of a sensation remains the same through all changes that
are purely external. If a sensation provides intrinsic reason
for avoiding it, then it will continue to do so whatever changes
occur externally. For a pain sensation to cease to be unpleasant
it would be necessary for the sensation to lose that quality by
virtue of which it is a pain.
C.) The Alleged Fact-Value Distinction
In Chapter IV, I argued that a property of meriting, or
providing reason for, our desire or aversion is a fundamental
characteristic of pleasant and unpleasant experiences. I argued
that this merit in an experience, this goodness or badness, must
be a property of the experience, and I gave a rough account of what
sort of property this is. In the present chapter, I have argued
that this property of meriting desire or aversion, this desir¬
ability or undesirability, of an experience is the defining
feature of the 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'.
Many contemporary philsophers are sympathetic to the view
that there are no properties of good and bad in objects. The main
support which contemporary philosophers explicitly or implicitly
153
rely on when defending this alleged Fact-Value Distinction is the
argument that whereas disputes about facts are always in principle
resolvable, judgements of value are always disputable. Though all
of the facts in a situation may be stated and known, no indisput¬
able conclusion about issues of value in the situation can be
drawn, these philosophers claim. No factual assertion or series of
factual assertions entails a value judgement, they say. There are
a few things that need to be said about this argument.
When reasoning in this way philosophers usually are thinking
specifically of moral judgements, e.g., judgements about whetiier
some action is moral or good. And it is true that with many
moral issues there is considerable room for reasonable dispute
over the Tightness of some particular act, and often there will
not be a straightforward, obvious way of resolving the dispute.
However, those who hold The Fact-Value Distinction do not in practice
limit themselves to claiming that if a Value judgement is seriously
disputable, the value judgement is not a judgement of fact. Rather,
it is assumed that all value judgements provide room for serious
dispute and that for any disputes over values there is no possi¬
bility of resolving the dispute with a decisive, correct answer.
Philosophers who argue in this fashion have not based their
argument on a discussion of the value of pleasure and pain. The
premise these philosophers rely on when concluding that value
judgements are not judgements of fact does not hold in this case.
There is general agreement on the values of pleasure and pain.
Most philosophers agree that pleasure is good and that pain is bad,
at least normally. Contrary to what the Fact-Value theorist says
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is true of value judgements, there is little room for serious
dispute about the values of these experiences. And even though
there may be room for reasonable dispute in some cases, there is,
as I have argued, a correct answer to the dispute. The issue is
by no means irresolvable. (Those who say that some pleasures are
bad are right insofar as it is true that there are some occasions
where it is undesirable for someone to experience pleasure. However,
as I argued, this is simply to say that it is sometimes undesirable
to have a good experience or to feel good. The pleasure remains
intrinsically good in quality even in these cases.)
The Fact-Value theorists claim that no factual judgements
entail value judgements. Yet this does not hold for pleasure and
unpleasantness since, as I have argued, a reference to the value of
the experience is contained within the definition of these terms,
and therefore goodness and badness is entailed by a reference to
these psychological states. Brand Blanshard is one of a number of
philosophers who have noticed this:
¥hat sort of assertion is one making in saying that intense
pain is intrinsically evil? It does not seem like an
empirical assertion. . . Such pain is evil by reason of its
nature; we can see from that it is that it must be bad. . .
The proposition is therefore necessary. . . The implication
is that characteristics conmonly taken as factual or
descriptive such as that of intense pain, may en tail a
value characteristic such as goodness or badness.''
17. Blanshard (1961, p 2J0). Max Black also sees that the concept
of pain can be used in bridging the alleged fact-value (is-ought)
gap. He writes: "If I am not mistaken, the following argument from
factual premises to a moral conclusion is valid:
Doing A will produce pain.
Apart from producing the pain resulting from A, doing A
will have the same consequence that not doing A would
have had.
Therefore, A ou^it not to be done." (Black, 1964, p 180)
155
What Blanshard says of intense pain can be paralleled, with pleasure
and goodness. That someone is finding something pleasant or enjoying
himself is a fact about the person, yet, as I have argued, that
someone is experiencing pleasure entails that he is having an
13
experience 'agreeable' or good in quality.
Statements about pleasure and pain entail statements of value.
Are assertions about pleasure and pain also factual? Yes. Any
assertion that someone is or is not enjoying himself or suffering
pain is either true or false. It is possible to lie when saying
that you are enjoying yourself, and this is to say that there are
some psychological states that would be incompatible with enjoying
yourself. Prom a correct claim that someone, e.g., enjoys movies
or enjoys relaxing some inferences can be drawn about what he is or
is not feeling and about some sorts of behaviour or physical reactions
which might be likely. The claim that someone is in pain migjit
explain why the person is groaning or taking aspirins, and the
claim could explain nothing if it were not factual.
18. Even if someone were not convinced that pleasure is always
good and that pain is always bad, The Fact-Value Distinction remains
challenged by certain pleasures and pains. Suppose someone argued
that there is nothing bad in pain when it is inflicted as just
punishment or that there is nothing good in the experience of
malicious pleasure. To provide trouble for the Fact-Value theorist
it is sufficient to introduce just one case where the good of the
pleasant experience and the bad in the pain is beyond reasonable
dispute. Should one simply admit that it is beyond reasonable dispute
that there is something bad in the intense pain that a baby suffers,
we have a solid challenge to the theories who rests his case on an
alleged disputable character of value judgements. This value judge¬
ment is not a subject for serious, indeed, irresolvable, dispute.
Indeed, it is not difficult to find particular value judgements
that do not allow room for open, irresolvable dispute. Is it not
beyond serious, rational dispute that killing a healthy child out of
the motive of pure curiosity is bad? Is there room for serious
dispute over whether or not a Rolls Royce is a good car? Though
one could, no doubt, reasonably claim that the car is bad in some
respects, this would not be the same think as holding that it is
a bad car (as a whole).
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A defender of The Pact-Value Distinction might attempt to
escape embarrassment over pleasure and pain by attempting to explain
away the near-indisputableness of the values of pleasure and pain in
the following manner: "There are two strains of meaning connected
with the words 'pleasure' and 'pain', a factual strain and an
evaluative strain. By calling an experience a 'pain' we imply both
that the experience is of a certain quality and that the quality is
bad. The factual (•descriptive') strain of meaning is distinct from
the evaluative strain. It is not that the badness of certain
states of affairs is indisputable but merely that by calling an
experience 'painful' we already are judging that state of affairs
to be bad." This is the sort of thing philosophers sometimes say
of the badness of 'murder'. Though being an act of 'murder'
entails being an act that is bad or wrong, this does not, they
argue, show that certain actions are necessarily wrong. To call
an action a 'murder', they argue, is to do two things; it is to say
that the action is of a certain sort (taking the life of another)
and that the action is morally wrcng. The action can be described
in 'morally neutral' language where its badness is not already
implied; by saying that 'Joe has taken the life of another' instead
of saying that he has 'murdered' the man we leave open the
question of whether or not Joe acted wronglyo So it is argued.
For this defence to be successful, the defender of the
distinction needs to hold that once we consider the 'pure facts'
of the situation the goodness or badness of the experience will
emerge as an open, irresolvable issue. But this position cannot be
maintained. Even if we drop the terms 'pleasure' and 'pain' as
being loaded terms and consider the experiences themselves - the
'pure facts' of the situation - the goodness or badness of these
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experiences does not become any more controversial. Consider the
sort of experience which we migjit call 'excruciating pain'. That
there is something had in the feeling does not become any more
debatable if we directly consider the nature of the experience
itself while refraining from actually speaking of the sensations
as 'pain*. It is not merely that in calling the experience an
intense 'pain' that we are judging the value of the experience,
but that given the nature of the sensation it is obvious that the
sensation is bad. Of any feeling that we could properly call
'excruciating pain' it would simply be mistaken to say that there
is nothing bad about it.
Consider an experience which we migfrt properly call 'pleasurable'.
Consider, for instance, the experience of someone who is taking
great pleasure in eating a meal which,he finds, tastes delicious.
There is little room for seriously arguing that -there is nothing
•agreeable' or 'good' in this experience. Given the nature of
the experience it would be unreasonable and mistaken to call it
'intrinsically bad' or 'awful*. It is not only that in calling
the experience an intense 'pleasure' that we are' (already)
judging its value but that given the nature of any experience which
we migfrt properly call an intense 'pleasure' it would be mistaken
and unreasonable to argue that thi s ex per ien ce is intrinsically
bad or awful. Thus, even when we consider the 'pure facts' of
the experience, the value of the experience does not become a
subject for open, irresolvable dispute.
When discussing masochism in Chapter IV, I mentioned that the
oddity in the idea of 'wanting pain' is not located at the
linguistic level (being a contradiction in terms) but rather that
the idea presents a psychological oddity. What is odd is not that
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we should speak of a sensation as a 'pain' and then proceed to say
that the sensation was wanted but rather that one should have the
sort of sensation that we call 'pain' and want that sensation. The
sensations that we call 'pains' are sensations that we normally
cannot help (as a psychological fact) but dislike or wish to be
rid of. (These sensations are of such a nature that aversion is a
suitable or fitting reaction.) In a related way, the oddity in the
idea of 'pain being intrinsically good' or 'pain not being at all
bad' is not located entirely at the linguistic level. It is not
simply that someone is being inconsistent in his use of words if
he says that a sensation is a 'pair! but that it is not at all 'bad';
it is also the case that given the nature of sensations that are
called 'pains* it would be unreasonable and mistaken to think that
they are not at all bad. These sensations are of such a nature that
it is fitting and suitable that we call them 'bad'. Similarly,
though it is true that there is a conceptual connection between
'being pleasant' and 'being good in quality' it is also true that
the sorts of sensations and experiences that we properly call
'pleasant' are experiences for which it is suitable or fitting
that we speak of them an 'good' and unsuitable or unfitting that we
should call them (intrinsically) 'bad'.
Richard Hare appreciates that pain poses a problem for a
proponent of The Fact-Value Distinction, and in- his paper "Pain and
Evil" he attempts to argue that the distinction (or a distinction
between descriptive and evaluative meaning in words) does not
break down over pain sensation. Though there are different
dimensions to his argument, Hare commits himself to the dual-
strain view of the meaning of the word 'pain', and he consequently
is vulnerable to the problems which I have just outlined. Pain is
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worrying to proponents of the distinction just because its value
seems certain, yet essentially the same problem remains even after
one makes this distinction. Even if we consider 'the pure facts' of
the situation, i. e., the sensation that we call 'pain', its badness
continues to appear no less certain.
Hare sets out to defend the Fact-Value Distinction by trying
to show that pain is not necessarily bad. The question of whe tiier
or not pain is necessarily bad he views as much the same as the
question of whether or not pain is necessarily unpleasant.
Consequently, Hare tries to prove that pain is not necessarily
unpleasant. I have already dealt with his arguments and have
tried to show that pain necessarily is unpleasant. Hare is
concerned about the threat posed to the distinction by pain
sensation. He does not ask whether the distinction breaks down
over unpleasantness and suffering (or pleasure). Indeed, by
treating the question of whether pain is necessarily bad as much
the same as the question of whether pain is necessarily unpleasant
or necessarily involves suffering, Hare seems to be accepting the
quite reasonable assumption that unpleasantness and suffering are
necessarily bad. However, this quite reasonable assumption gives
rise to the same problem for the defender of the Fact-Value
Distinction which Hare is trying to protect himself from in the
case of pain. For it not only seems obvious that unpleasantness
and suffering are necessarily bad, but also seems obvious that
whether or not someone is experiencing unpleasantness or is
suffering is a straightforward psychological fact about him. On
any occasion there is a single correct answer as to whether or not
someone is suffering or experiencing unpleasantness, and in cases
when he is, it is certain and indisputable that he is experiencing
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something bad» Thus even if Hare could do what I say is impossible
to do and could establish that is only a contingent fact that pain
is intrinsically unpleasant and that intense pain is only contingently
associated with suffering, there would remain a serious problem
for a proponent of the alleged Fact-Value Distinction in
unpleasantness and suffering. The distinction also seems to break
down over these experiences.
I mentioned earlier that an important problem in Hare's
discussion is his treatment of suffering over something and of
finding something unpleasant or uncomfortable as parallel to having
an attitude of dislike for that thing or thinking of that thing
as bad. The way in which dislike and thinking something bad are
related to badness is different from the way in which unpleasantness,
discomfort, and suffering are related to badness. With dislike and
thinking something bad, it is not the dislike or the thought which
is bad but the object that is disliked or thought bad: in our dislike
of murder and our thinking it bad, it is the action o£ murder that is
bad and not our attitude of dislike or our thought of it as bad.
However, when we suffer over something or find it unpleasant or
uncomfortable it is not only the object of the suffering, etc.,
that is bad but the suffering, unpleasantness, and discomfort it¬
self . The question of whether pain is bad because it is disliked
or thought bad is thus quite different from the question of whether
19
it is bad because it entails unpleasantness or suffering. With
19* In his article, Hare is responding to an argument which Kurt
Baier produced in his paper "Pains" (Baier, 1962). Baier contends
that pains are characterized both by a special quality and by our
having a dislike for the sensation. Baier, basing his argument on
the claim that pain is always, and necessarily, disliked, goes on to
conclude that The Fact-Value Distinction breaks down over pain
(pages 5-6). The point that Hare makes, that it is possible not
to dislike these sensations, is effective against Baier1 s argument.
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the former question we are asking if pain is bad because of our
attitude toward it or our thoughts about it; with the latter
question we are asking if pain is bad because of a connection it
haa with something which is itself bad. The concepts of dislike
and thinking something bad do not themselves directly give rise to
the problems which the concept of pain raises for proponents of
The Fact-Value Distinction. But the concepts of unpleasantness,
discomfort, and suffering do present the same problems.
The alleged Fact-Value Distinction has been accepted by different
philosophers for different reasons, and I have not dealt with the
whole range of issues which have been raised in connection with the
alleged distinction. I have replied to some of the arguments which
have been used by proponents of the distinction and have outlined
and defended my own positive view of good and bad. According to
this view, to be an experience that is good in quality is, at least
in part, to be an experience that provides some reason (i.e., grounds
or justification) for wanting and seeking it. However, a philosopher
does not need to accept all that I say about the Fact-Value Distinction
in order to agree with the main thrust of my analysis of pleasure and
unpleasantness. For even if someone were not persuaded by my
account of the good in pleasure and the bad in unpleasantness he
would still be able to agree that an experience is pleasant or
unpleasant if and only if it has a quality that provides some
reason for seeking or avoiding that experience. It would be possible
j)9. contd.) However, for someone like myself who does not accept
the assumption that the question of whether pain is necessarily bad
is the same as the question of wheiher pain is necessarily disliked,
much of Hare's discussion will seem ill-focused or misdirected.
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for this to be the correct analysis of pleasure and unpleasantness
even if it were not the correct analysis of the good in pleasure
and the bad in unpleasantness.
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Chapter VI; Pleasure as a Social Experience
In the foregoing chapters I have argued that a 'pleasant' exper¬
ience is to be defined as an experience of agreeable or attractive
quality, that is, an experience that is good in quality. It can be
shown that it follows from this definition of 'pleasure' and a
parallel definition of 'unpleasantness* in terms of disagreeableness
and badness "that pleasure and unpleasantness are special experiences.
The view that emerges is important in the following two respects: In
the past, led by the philosophers of the Empiricist school, many
philosophers have held that, though psychological words such as
'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are names for special experiences,
these words are, and must be, indefinable. On the other hand, many
recent philosophers inspired by Wittgenstein's Private Language
Argument have argued that psychological words such as 'pleasure' and
'unpleasantness' are not, and could not be, names for special
experiences. In this chapter, after showing how it follows from my
definitions that the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' name kinds
of experiences, I discuss the reasoning of these two very different
schools of philosophy and show how their resistance to the different
parts of my thesis can be met and overcome. That is, I discuss the
reasons philosophers have had for thinking that words such as
'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are indefinable and try to point out
where they made mistakes in coming to this conclusion. I explain how
my view can avoid or overcome the problems which Wittgenstein saw in
the view that such words are names of special experiences.
In Chapter III, I discussed the anti-essentialist philosophers
who maintain that there is no single account of the concept of
pleasure that will apply to all 'pleasures'. They come to their
conclusion through stressing that different pleasure-idioms have
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different semantic nuances and through appealing to the great
differences that exist among various pleasant experiences. It is
possible to experience 'pleasure' when eating delicious ice-cream,
drinking fine champagne, watching a movie, or indulging in sexual
fantasies, yet the nature of one's feelings and experiences are very
different in each instance. What property of experience is common
to these diverse pleasures? In each case the experience is agreeable
or attractive in quality, i.e., the experience is good in quality.
In each case the experience is of a type which provides one with
reason for wanting and seeking it. When 'taking pleasure in' fine
company one finds the experience of being with these people agreeable,
i.e., one's experience is good in quality, one 'feels good', one's
experience is 'nice'. Similarly, when 'pleased over' receiving good
news, one 'feels good' about the news, and this is to say that one
has an experience agreeable or good in quality. When enjoying nice
ice-cream one's gustatory sensations are (intrinsically) nice or good.
When enjoying watching a movie one's experience is good in quality.1
Does it follow from my definitions of 'pleasure' and 'unpleas¬
antness' that pleasure and unpleasantness are special experiences?
1. R.S. Peters comes curiously close to saying what I say in this
paragraph. When speaking of a sweet taste he writes: "Surely to
describe it as pleasant or to say that it causes pleasure is to class
it with a whole lot of other things that seem worth experiencing or
doing for their own sakes. The pleasure of tasting sugar is 'specific
to tasting sugar; the pleasure of sexual activity is specific to
sexual activity; the pleasure of finding out things is specific to
finding out things. It is difficult to see what properties the alleged
hedonie states have in conmon if they are thought of as species under
a genus." (Peters, 1958, p 143). When writing the latter half of this
passage Peters seems to be not fully appreciative of the implications of
what he wrote in the first half of the passage. At the beginning of
the passage he confidently asserts that pleasant experiences farm a
single class by virtue of their intrinsic value yet he goes on to say
that 'it is difficult to see what properties the alleged hedonic
states have in comnon if they are thought of as species under a genus'.
Their intrinsic value is_ the property that pleasant experiences share.
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Yes. Earlier, in Chapter IV, when discussing the views whereby
'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are defined solely by the attitudes
had toward experiences, I criticised these views for putting no
limits on the sorts of experiences that could, in principle, be
'pleasant' or 'unpleasant'. That sensation which we call an 'intense
pain', I said, could not lose its painfulness or unpleasantness if one
could do what is logi-cally possible to do and change one's attitude
to the sensation. That is, if the sensation were to remain exactly
the same in the way it feels, and we could cause a creature to welcome
rather than shun the sensation, it would not thereby cease being
unpleasant and become intrinsically pleasant. These points do not in
themselves prove that pleasure and unpleasantness are special
experiences; but by putting limits on the experiences that can be
pleasant we edge ourselves closer to the view.
The class of experiences, or features of experience, that are
intrinsically pleasant is distinct from the class of features of
experience that are intrinsically unpleasant. That is, no experience
or feature of experience is, or can be, both intrinsically pleasant
and intrinsically unpleasant in the same respect.- If this does not
seem apparent in its own right, it can also be deduced from the fact
that pleasure is intrinsically good and pain and unpleasantness
intrinsically bad. Nothing can be both good and bad in the same
respect; good and bad are contraries. The truth of this proposition
could perhaps be doubted by someone who denied that pleasure's beirg
good or unpleasantness' being bad are properties of pleasure and
unpleasantness; but I have argued for the position that these values
are properties of pleasure and unpleasantness and thus take myself to
have shown that they are. That something is intrinsically good (in
some respect) entails that it is not intrinsically bad (in the same
respect). There must be some difference between an object that is
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good and one which is bad, and this applies to experiences no less
than it does to other objects. Thus, given my definitions of
'pleasure* and 'unpleasantness' it follows that no experience or
feature of experience can be both pleasant and unpleasant in the
same respect.
An object can contain sccie good features and other bad features.
Similarly, an experience can be intrinsically good in some respect
and intrinsically bad in another, that is, it is possible to have
'bitter-sweet' experiences - experiences that are pleasant in some
respect but unpleasant in another. Someone could experience pleasure
and unpleasantness at the same time if he were, for instance,
enjoying a concert while feeling uncomfortable in his chair or
feeling too warm. His experience in listening to the music would be
scmewhat good in quality, but he would also be experiencing a dis¬
comfort localized in the back area or the vaguely localized unpleasant
sensations that one speaks of as 'feeling too warm'. If I enjoy a
meal on the whole while finding it slightly too salty and thus
slightly unpleasant in this respect, the experience in eating the
meal is for the most part attractive or good but is unattractive or
bad in one respect - in the taste of saltiness. In all 'bitter-sweet'
experiences, experiences containing both pleasantness and unpleasant¬
ness, the pleasantness and unpleasantness are properties of dif ferent
aspects or features of the experience.
Thus, pleasant experiences must differ in some way from
unpleasant ones, yet all pleasant experiences have some property
in common, namely, their being good in quality, and all unpleasant
experiences have their being bad in quality as a shared property.
From these truths it follows that pleasure is 'a single class of
experience' and that unpleasant experiences form a second, distinct
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'class of experience'. To say this is the same as to say that
pleasure is 'a kind of experience' or 'a special experience' and that
unpleasantness is a different 'kind of experience' or a different
'special experience'.
But is pleasure a 'special experience' on my view? Some
philosophers might object to my saying that it is. Have I not
admitted that on my view there are a number of very different exper¬
iences that can be intrinsically pleasant? On my view any exper-
ience would be intrinsically pleasant if it were intrinsically good
in quality, and there are great differences among experiences that
are good. The agreeable gustatory sensations experienced when
enjoying eating good chocolate are very different from the
sensations experienced when one enjoys drinking fine champagne, yet
both are intrinsically pleasant since they are intrinsically good
in quality. Should we not say that on this view pleasure is not
a 'special experience' or 'a single kind of experience' but simply
any experience that is intrinsically good in quality or 'tone'?
To deal properly with this objection it is necessary to introduce
a distinction between two types of properties which an object can
have, namely, relational and non-relational properties. C.D. Broad
introduced this distinction in his discussion of pleasure:
Is it not possible that what we have called 'hedonic quality'
is really a relational property and not a quality at all?
Is it not possible that the statement: 'This experience of
mine is pleasant' just means: 'I like this experience for
its non-hedonic qualities'?
Though the word 'like' is not the best choice within the definition,
Broad is suggesting that an experience is pleasant if we have a
favourable attitude toward it. On this view, an experience's being
2. Broad (1930, p 237)
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pleasant is not a direct function of the feel or intrinsic quality
of the experience but of some relati on which the experience has to
something else, namely, the person's attitudes.
A. similar distinction is implicit in Sidgwick's analysis of
pleasure, a view that is much the same as my own:
Shall we say that there is a measurable quality of feeling
expressed by "the word 'pleasure', which is independent of
its relation to volition, and strictly indefinable from its
simplicity? . . . This seems to be the view of some writers:
but, for my own part, when I reflect on the notion of
pleasure - using the term in the comprehensive sense ...
to include the most refined and subtle intellectual
emotional gratification no less than the coarser and more
definite sensual enjoyments - the only common quality that
I can find in the feelings so designated seems to be that
relation to desire and volition expressed by the general
term 'desirable', in the sense previously expressed.
Like myself Sidgwick reaches the conclusion that it is their being
desirable (or good) which is the property that the variety of
pleasant experiences share. He speaks of the property of being
desirable as a certain relation to desire and volition, and he
denies that pleasure is 'simple' in some fundamental way or that the
word 'pleasure' in indefinable. For Sidgwick, as for Broad, an
experience is pleasant not by having some special unanalyzable
quality or non-relational, 'simple', property, but by existing in
a certain relation to one's attitudes, desires, or volition.
Like Sidgwick I hold that the presence of some quality that is
desirable or good is what unites the various experiences which are
pleasant into a single class, and, like Sidgwick, I think that
desirability is a relational property. Desirability is not a
'simple', unanalyzable property but some relational property. As
I argued in Chapters IV and V, and experience's being desirable
or good in quality is, at least in part, its property of having a
quality which provides one with reason for wanting or seeking that
3. Sirigwiok (1967, p 1?7)
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kind of experience. On this veiw, an experience is good in quality
by existing in a certain relation to desire and action, namely, that
relation of being such as to provide reason (grounds) for wanting
and seeking that kind of experience. Experiences are pleasant on
this view not by sharing some unanalysable quality, or some non¬
relational property, but by sharing some relation to desire and
action. In respect to their intrinsic properties, i.e., their
unanalyzable qualities or non-relatianal properties, pleasant
experiences are not necessarily the same but are very different.
It is in respect to some shared relational property that pleasant
experiences are the same. Similarly, the experience of intense
pain and feeling nausea differ in their intrinsic quality or feel
but they are the same in their intrinsic value. Both experiences
are disagreeable and bad in quality, i.e., both have the rela¬
tional property of being such as to provide some reason for
avoiding the experience, and it is in their sharing this relational
property that both experiences are unpleasant.
With this distinction we have a reasonably clear reply to the
objection that pleasure is not, on my view, a special experience
but any of a great variety of good experiences. Pleasant
experiences are a 'special kind of experience' or a 'single kind of
experience* in one respect but are 'different kinds of experiences'
in another respect. They are the same kind of experience in respect
to a certain relational property though not the same kind of
experience in respect to their intrinsic,. unanalyzable qualities.
Stephan Darvall, when discussing Sidgwick's view of pleasure,
writes:
Sidgwick does not hold a 'one feeling' theory of pleasure.
That is, he does not hold that pleasure is a particular
kind of feeling which may be produced by the feeling one
has lying on a waterbed or the experience of poring over a
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gripping tale of intrigue. Insofar as one experiences
pleasure in these cases one has different experiences.
What makes these different experiences or feelings pleasures
is the relation that they have to desire, viz., that they
are apprehended (explicitly or implicitly) as desirable.
And this apprehension need not involve a recognition of
the presence of a common, particular kind of experience
(called pleasure). . ."4
What Darwall should have said is that with respect to intrinsic,
unanalyzable qualities Sidgwick does not hold that pleasure is a
particular kind of experience but that he does hold that with
respect to a certain relational property pleasure is a particular
kind of experience. To share a certain relation to desire is not
to have nothing in coranon. To judge that every pleasant experience
is desirable is to judge that every pleasant experience has a
certain relation to desire.
When philosophers say that some psychological word does or
does not name 'a special experience' or 'a single kind of
experience1 they often seem to assume a classification of experiences
according to intrinsic, unanalyzable qualities. The assumption is
not universal though. Sidgwick thought that pleasures shared a
' common quality' yet he analyzed this common character in terms of a
relational property. (Herbert Spencer thought of pleasure as a
kind of feeling yet also analyzed pleasure by means of some
relational property.) However, if a philosopher were to assume, or
4. Darwall (1974, p 477). Though, as I mentioned previously,
Sidgwick does claim that what pleasant experiences have in caamon is
their being desirable, when he explicitly defines 'pleasure' he
does so in terms of experiences that are apprehended as desirable.
But to define 'pleasure' in terms of this apprehension of
desirability is just to take one step back from the heart of the
matter. Sidgwick acknowledges that pleasant experiences are
desirable; that they are also 'apprehended as desirable' would seem
to be simply a consequence of their being desirable. Their being
desirable is the more fundamental characteristic and the one that
therefore should appear in the definition.
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to claim, that the only proper way of classifying or distinguishing
experiences into different 'special kinds' is by appealing to
intrinsic, qualities or unanalyzable features his position would
rest on some confusion.
I see no greater impropriety in classifying experiences into
different kinds by appealing to relational properties than there is
in classifying physical objects into different kinds on the basis of
certain relational properties. Most of the classifications we use
for physical objects are based on an appeal to some relational
property(ies)o For instance, the members within the group of
household objects which we call 'ashtrays' are no less diverse in
intrinsic nature than are the experiences which we call 'pleasant'.
The objects come in widely differing materials (e.g., stone, glass,
clay . . .), shapes (round, square, oblong, irregular . . .),
colours (black, blue, magenta . . .), weights, sizes, and
proportions. What unites this assortment of objects and provides us
with reason for calling them by the same name - 'ashtrays' - is
their having a particular relational property, namely, -that of being
suitable for holding hot tobacco ashes. Few philosophers would say
that because it is only some relational property which these objects
have in conmon that they are not really 'a single kind of domestic
object'. One who would take this view on 'ashtrays' would be
forced to take a similar view on most words. The items which we
call forms of 'money' are no less diverse in intrinsic nature:
some are small and round, others large and rectangular; seme are
made of gold, others of silver, copper, paper, nickel - even stone;
they come in all different colours; etc. What gives us reason to
call such diverse objects by the same word - 'money' - is their
having a certain relational property, namely, that of having a
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certain use in the conmercial life of a society. Few philosophers
would insist that because these objects are grouped by a relational
property they are not in any important sense 'the same sort of
thing'. There is no additional reason for insisting that sensations
or experiences which are grouped according to relational properties
are not in any important sense 'the same kind of experience'.
Perhaps someone mi^it assume that if we group experiences or
objects according to relational properties then the intrinsic
nature of an experience or an object will be incidental to the
classification, and distinct accompaniments of the experience or
object will be the sole determinative of the classification.
Though this might be so for some relational properties it is not so
in the present case, that of the goodness or badness of an
experience. C.D. Broad suggested that we define a 'pleasant'
experience as one which is liked for its quality: on this view the
intrinsic nature of an experience is incidental to whether or not
the experience is pleasant, since whatever intrinsic quality an
experience has the experience would be 'pleasant' if we had the
right attitude toward it. It is a consequence of this view that
even the sensations which we presently speak of as 'intense pains'
would cease to be unpleasant and would become intrinsically pleasant
in a particular case if we merely did what is logically possible to
do and changed someone's attitude toward the sensation. With
C.D. Broad's suggested definition of pleasure it is exclusively
'outside factors' which determine whether, a particular experience is
pleasant. But this is not so on my proposed definition.
Not" always are the intrinsic features of something incidental to
its having some relational property. Though there are great differ¬
ences among objects that are 'ashtrays' not just any object could be
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an 'ashtray'. The lamp in front of me could not be an ashtray
(though, perhaps, one could 'use it as an ashtray' by putting out lit
cigarettes on its stem)0 Nor could a ball-bearing be_ an ashtray.
Nor could just any experience be intrinsically good in quality.
Those experiences which we call 'intense pains' or 'feeling nausea'
could not (logically) be intrinsically good in quality. When we
define an 'unpleasant' or a 'pleasant' experience by the intrinsic
goodness or badness of an experience we are saying something about
the intrinsic nature of pleasant or unpleasant experiences. With
these definitions the intrinsic nature of an experience is not
incidental to its being pleasant or unpleasant; indeed, the intrinsic
nature is crucial. Though it perhaps could be said that according
to Broad's (or Spencer's) proposed definition there is an important
sense in which pleasure wculd not be 'a special experience' (since
the intrinsic quality is incidental), this is not so of m£ definition
of 'pleasure'.
The View that the Word 'Pleasure' is Indefinable
I hold that it follows from my definitions of 'pleasure' and
'unpleasantness' that these words refer to special experiences.
But there have been many philosophers who have thought it odd that
words which name special experiences might also-be defined. Of
pleasure and pain John Locke wrote: "These, like other simple ideas,
cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing
them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by
5
experience." David Hume took a similar position when discussing
5. Locke (1690, Bk. II, Ch. XX )
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pride and humility and the 'passions' or emotions in general:
"The Passions of pride and humility, being simple and uniform
impressions, it is impossible we can ever, by a multitude of
words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the
,.6passions."
It is possible to distinguish the following different strains
of thinking in these passages. Firstly, an experience such as
pleasure or pain is simple and basic, it has no parts into which
it can be broken. There are no kinds of experiences more simple
or basic into whose terms it can be analyzed. Therefore pleasure
and pain are unanalyzable and the words 'pleasure' and 'pain'
are indefinable.
Secondly, to know what pleasure and pain are, and to under¬
stand the meanings of the words 'pleasure and 'pain', one must
experience pleasure and pain. No mere verbal description can
teach one what a pleasant or painful experience is like. Of my
definitions of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' in particular, Locke
might have responded that merely by saying that a pleasant experience
is good in quality one does not capture the special feel or
lusciousness of pleasure or the immediate texture of great distress.
These definitions are 'hollow', providing 'form without content', he
might have objected. Locke had a similar point in mind when he
wrote the following about the word 'scarlet':
A studious blind man, who had mistily beat his head about
visible objects, and made use of the explication of his
books and friends, to understand those names of light
and colours which often came in his way, bragged one day,
that he now understood what scarlet signified. Upon which,
6. Hume (1739, II, 1, 2)
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his friend demanding what scarlet was? The blind man
answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such
an understanding of the name of any other simple idea
will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition,
or other words made use of to explain it.?
Thirdly, Locke says that pleasure and pain cannot be 'described'.
I will look at this third claim first.
Why does Locke think that pleasure and pain cannot be 'described'?
He seems at least to be thinking that there are no psychological
concents more fundamental than those of pleasure and pain with
which one might 'describe' pleasure and pain, that is, that among the
various concepts that refer to kinds of experiences there are none
more fundamental or basic than the concepts of pleasure and pain.
But is it possible to 'describe' pleasure and pain by employing
concepts that do not themselves refer to kinds of experiences? I
suspect that the possibility of doing this has not occurred to
Locke. On the analysis of pleasure which I have given an experience
is pleasant by being good in quality. On this view 'pleasure' is
defined not by appealing to psychological concepts that are more
fundamental than that of pleasure, but by employing a concept that
is not itself psychological to distinguish pleasant experiences from
other experiences.
The suggestion that one might use non-psychological concepts
to describe one's experiences might at first seem very odd. Suppose
someone were to claim that it is not possible (logically) to
predicate some non-psychological term literally of sane experience..
This claim would rest on the assumption that it is not logically
possible for an experience to have any of the proper ties that an
object that is not an experience (e.g., a tree) might have. For
7. Locke (1690, Book III, Cft IV, Sect II)
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if an experience could have a property which a tree might also have,
why should it not be possible to say that one's experience has
this property, and in doing so to 'describe' one's experience?
The proposition that it is not possible to say anything
informative about one's experiences is not only false but neces- •
sarily false. The claim that something is an object which it is not
possible to say anything informative about is a claim that would
be, if true, very informative; to know that it is not possible to
use non-psychological words to convey information about our
experiences would be to know something important. But this claim
itself is made up of one's predicating non-psychological words of
experience, and one is doing so in a literal and informative way.
(The word 'non-psychological' is not itself a psychological word,
since it does not itself name some experience.) By being a literal
and informative sentence about experiences it provides a counter¬
example to the proposition it advocates. Thus the sentence is
necessarily false, since its being true would entail its being
false. Thus it must be at least logically possible to say informative
things about experiences by predicating words of an experience that
do not themselves name kinds of experiences.
What properties might experiences share with objects that are
not experiences? Experiences, like physical objects, can have
spatial and temporal properties, and one can refer to these properties
with normal spatial or temporal words. Thus, I can describe my
pain as being located in my back, as having begun ten minutes ago,
as being located in a small, well-defined area or as covering a
rather large area. We say that we have a sensation in our left leg
or that we are experiencing pain in two different -places (or that
we are experiencing two pains). We obviously are speaking literally
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when assigning the temporal properties. Some philosophers say that
when saying that a pain is in the left leg we are not speaking fully
literally since a pain is not 'in* our leg in the same sense in
which a bone or blood vessel is 'in' our leg. (The sensation is
not really where it seems to be.) However, even if this is true,
it is at least true that the sensation (literally) seems to be in
a certain place. If it is n<? t true that what distinguishes back¬
aches from headaches is the actual location of the sensation, then
it at least is true that what distinguishes headaches from back¬
aches is that the former are aches that seem to be in the head
while the latter are aches that seem to be in the back. Thus if
sensations do not literally have spatial properties they at least
literally seem to have certain spatial properties, and to say that
they seem to have certain spatial properties is to speak literally
and informatively.
"But," one might reply, "can one say anything about the way he
feels by predicating non-psychological concepts of his sensations
or feelings? Can one use non-psychological concepts to describe or
refer to some property of the very quality or feel that an experience
has?" Perhaps the best examples of concepts that can be used in this
way are the two which I am concentrating on throughout this chapter,
namely, 'good' and 'bad'. A person is speaking no less literally
and informatively if he is describing some sensation or experience
as 'good' or 'bad' than when he is speaking of seme physical object
such as a car or crop as 'good' or 'bad'. The following sentences
are clearly informative: "I feel terrible (great, bad . . .)";
"The pain'has become worse (better)"; "I feel good all over".
To say that a sensation or an experience is 'bad' in quality is,
at least in part, to say that it provides reason for avoiding it.
178
To say "that a sensation or experience has this property is certainly
to convey some information} indeed, the information conveyed is
quite important. By talking in this way of one's sensations one
is 'describing' them. Yet the words 'good' and 'bad' do not name
experiences of some sort. The words are non-psychological words
since they can be literally predicated of physical objects.
There are other examples of non-psychological words which can
be used to convey information about the feel or quality of an
experience. A sensation, like a light or sound, can be faint or
indistinct. A sensation, like a season of the year, can fade
and then reappear; like the sound of a chugging locomotive, a
sensation can fade and then reappear in a rhythmic fashion (we say
it 'throbs', but the slightly metaphorical term could be replaced by
non-metaphorical talk of rhythmic fading and reappearance of a
sensation). A sensation can be different from other sensations
and it can be strange or uncommon. (Of course, if I tell someone
I have just felt a strange sensation he may not know exactly what
it is like, but I am still telling him something about the way
it feels, namely, that I do not have a sensation like this
frequently.) If a man tells his doctor that the sensation in his
stomach area which he has been feeling all day is now fading, the
doctor mi^it not be able to imagine exactly what the sensation
feels like, for there are different sorts of sensations that could
fade. But the doctor knows some thin g about the way that the man
is feeling, namely, that his sensation is changing and changing
in a certain way.
For any non-psychological concept that can be used to refer to
a property of a sensation or an experience it is possible for there
to be a psychological term which dis tinguishes sensations or
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experiences according to the property in question. As it is possible
to assign a certain location to a sensation, so there are numerous
sensation-words for which it is part of their meaning that they
assign a certain location to the sensations which they name. Thus,
the words 'headache', 'backache', 'toothache', 'earache' are words
which distinguish pain-sensations according to their location
(apparent location). No one can have a toothache in his shoulders.
Sensations, like physical states of affairs, are sometimes
classified, in part, according to their causal origin. A reference
to the causal origin of a skin condition is contained within the
concept of sunburn; when one has sunburn his skin is in a certain
damaged state that is caused by exposure to sun-rays. Similarly,
to have 'angina' is to have pain located in the chest that is
caused by a diseased heart.
Experiences, like physical objects, have temporal properties,
and, consequently, there are some psychological words whose meaning
is such that an experience's having a certain temporal duration is
implied by the use of the word. By speaking of a sensation as an
'ache' we not only are calling it a pain but are also attributing a
certain temporal duration. A pain in the head or back that lasted
only a moment would not be a 'headache' or 'backache', though it
would still be a 'pain'. Wittgenstein is noticing that a certain
temporal duration is implied by the use of the .words 'deep grief'
when he writes: "Why does it sound queer to say: 'For a second he
g
felt deep grief'? Only because it so seldom happens?" A
8. Wittgenstein (1967, p 174). Wittgenstein may be thinking that the
fact that grief has this temporal duration shows that grief is not a
sensation or special experience. For, after noting that deep grief
cannot be had for only a second he goes on to write: "But don't you
feel grief now? (But aren't you playing chess now?) The answer may
be affirmative, but that does not make the concept of grief any more
like the concept of a sensation." But sensation concepts sometimes d£
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psychological state must have a certain duration before it can be
'deep grief* or 'sorrow'.
The concept of 'being on one side' of an object can apply both
to physical objects and sensations. As there can be a dent 'on
one side' of a car so a person can feel a sensation 'on one side' of
his body. The concept of something recurring is not specifically
psychological. As sounds and number patterns can be recurring, so
a certain sensation or feeling can be recurring. To say that
someone 'has migraine' is not only to say that he suffers a head¬
ache ( a pain located in the head) but is also to suggest that the
sensation is felt on one side of the head or that it is a recurring
paino
As a sensation or an experience can be described as being good
or bad in quality or feel, so it is possible to have words that
refer to experiences in virtue of their good or bad quality. My
contention is merely that we do have words that do this, and the
words are 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'. To say that a person is
experiencing 'pleasure' is to say that he is having an experience
good in quality, i.e., an experience which has a quality which
provides reason for seeking such an experience.
Whenever the meaning of a psychological term is such that the
word refers to an experience by distinguishing that experience
from others solely according to properties that are not peculiarly
psychological (e.g., bodily location, temporal duration, value, etc.)
8. (cont'd.) have these temporal properties. Like grief, an ache
cannot be had for only a moment, but it does not follow that an
ache is not a sensation. Grief, as I will argue in a later chapter,
does entail a special experience (an unpleasant one), but for the
experience to be part of 'grief' it mus t have a certain duration.
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that word will be definable, and the concept which it represents will
be analyzable. If I am right and an experience is distinguished as
pleasant or unpleasant according to the goodness or badness of the
quality of the experience, then the words 'pleasure' and 'un¬
pleasantness' will be definable and along the lines that I have
prescribed.
Locke believed that the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' are
indefinable, and he based his view, in part, on the claim that
pleasure and pain are simpie♦ In a similar way, Hume appealed to an
alleged simplicity of pride, humility, and the other passions to
support a claim that the names of the passicns are indefinable .
In what way, then, might pleasure and pain be simple, and why should
this simplicity be a reason for supposing that the words 'pleasure'
and 'unpleasantness' are indefinable and the corresponding concepts
unanalyzab le ?
There perhaps is one respect in which pleasure and pain are
'simple', for there seems to be a sense in which each does not
'have parts'. A pleasant experience is not 'complex' in the way
that 'mixed feelings' is a complex psychological state; 'having
mixed feelings' entails having two or more distinguishable feelings,
whereas 'having a pleasant experience' does not. A state of
'mixed feelings* is composed (in a logical sense) of two or more
feelings in a way in which pleasure and pain are not; a reference to
more than one feeling enters into the definition of 'mixed feelings'.
According to Aristotle's definition of 'fear', a definition which I
will be looking at more closely in a later chapter, 'fear' is to be
defined as 'a pain due to a mental picture of some destructive evil
in the future'. According to this definition fear is 'complex' in
that it contains two mental phenomena, pain and a certain mental
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picture (i.e., a cognition) of a future evil. Pleasure and pain
are not themselves complex in this manner, and thus seem to be
'simple' in this respect. If 'analysis' is understood as breaking
down an object into its parts in the way that Aristotle breaks
down fear into part cognition and part pain, then pleasure is
'unanalyzable' or 'simple' in this sense.
However, defining a word is not the same thing as examining
the objects named by the word, 'breaking them down into their
parts' and then constructing a definition from the names of the
parts in the way that Aristotle breaks down fear into its parts and
then defines 'fear' by reference to the names for these parts. That
is, defining the word 'pleasure' is not the same thing as examining
the experience of pleasure and breaking down the experience into
parts or different feelings. Some definitions, but not all. are
like Aristotle's definition of 'fear'. The word 'bachelor' is
definable as ''unmarried man', but to say this is not to do what
would normally be understood as breaking down a bachelor (the man)
into 'his parts'. A bachelor is not part man and part unmarried
creature.
A "thing does not have to 'have parts' in this sense for it to
be possible to give the word which names that thing a definition.
The geometer's 'point' is something that is certainly 'simple' in
this sense, since it 'lacks parts' if anything does, yet one can
give a non-circular, informative definition of the word 'point'
as "that which has position but lacks magnitude" (The Concise
Oxford Dictionary). The words 'particle' and 'atom' in one of
their senses mean 'that portion of matter which is smallest and
indivisible'. What these words in this sense of the words would
refer to would be something that is necessarily 'simple' or
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•lacking parts', yet, nevertheless, the words clearly are definable
(i have just defined them), and the corresponding concepts are
9
analyzable.
Perhaps philosophers have, at times, assumed that when they
were giving what they called a philosophical 'analysis' of some¬
thing they have been 'breaking that thing down into its parts'.
But what in practice is presented under the title of philosophical
'analysis' is simply any sort of definition of words or any study
of the basic features of some type of thing. That a type of thing
is 'simple' or 'lacking parts' in the way in which a point is
simple does not entail that there are no fundamental, distinctive
features of that type of thing; that a word (e.g. 'point') refers
to something 'simple' or 'lacking parts' does not entail that it
is indefinable. Suppose I were right in saying that an experience
is 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' solely by virtue of being good or
bad in quality. The-words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' would then be
definable or analyzable yet they would also refer to something which
is in one sense 'simple' or 'without parts'. For, on this definition,
'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are not defined by reference to
two or more distinguishable feelings or experiences that are
'ingredients' necessary for pleasure.
There is a second way to interpret the claim that pleasure is
'simple' and therefore unanalyzable. By saying that pleasure is
9« The word 'atom' as it is most commonly understood today refers
to some small portion of matter which was once thought indivisible
but which has been found to be divisible and thus not 'simple'.
The word 'atom' when used in this way is being used in a second
(derivative.) sense since in these contexts it does not connote
indivisibility or simplicity.
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'simple' one might mean that there are no concepts more fundamental
than the concept of pleasure in terms of which one might describe
a pleasant experience or analyze the concept of 'pleasure'. From
the premise that pleasure is 'simple' in this way it follows
immediately that the concept of 'pleasure' is unanalyzable (in a
non-circular way) and that the pleasantness of an experience cannot
be 'described' in any useful way. But if one appeals to such
'simplicity* in order to prove that the concept of 'pleasure' is
unanalyzable the 'argument' is circular. If by saying that
pleasure is 'simple' we mean that there are no concepts more basic
than the concept of 'pleasure' into which terms one might analyze
the concept of 'pleasure', then our conclusion that the concept of
pleasure is unanalyzable is little more than a restatement of the
premise. If this is what the word 'simple' in the premise means
then the real question becomes whether or not the concept of
'pleasure' is 'simple' in this way. The assertion that pleasure is
'simple' only seems obvious if we think that one is claiming that
the experience of pleasure is something very 'simple' or 'having no
parts' in the sense previously elucidated. But, as we have shown,
it does not follow from the fact that a pleasant experience is
'simple' in this way that the ward 'pleasant' ('pleasure') is
indefinable or that the concept of 'pleasure' is unanalyzable.
Locke claimed that a person must experience pleasure and pain
to know what they are, and he seemed to think that this claim
supported the contention that the words 'pleasure' and 'pain'
are indefinable. Perhaps, of my claim that a 'pleasant' or
'unpleasant' experience can be defined as an experience of good or
bad quality, he might have objected that even with these 'definitions'
one does not know what pleasure and unpleasantness feel like and
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that my 'definition' supplies at best 'form without content'. This
would be a way of objecting that my account fails as a definition
or at least that the definition is therefore shown to be incomplete
and necessarily so. Locke would have contended that any attempt
at defining 'pleasure' must fail because in the end it will be
necessary to experience pleasure to know what it is and to know
what the word 'pleasure' means.
A philosopher who would object that my definition does not
tell one 'what pleasure feels like' would seem to be assuming that
there is, in addition to the characteristic of having a good quality,
some other respect in which all pleasures have a feel or exper¬
iential quality in common. But _is there such an additional
respect in which all pleasures are alike? I do not think there is.
When we think of a particular pleasant experience it may be
correct to say that a person would not know what is peculiar to
that particular kind of experience unless he had felt that sort of
experience. It might be true that a person cannot know what is
distinctive of the pleasant experience in eating fine chocolate
candy unless he has experienced the agreeable gustatory sensations
of eating good chocolate. But someone who has tasted and enjoyed
fine chocolate does not thereby know what is distinctive of the
agreeable sensations experienced when drinking fine champagne.
Someone who has experienced the agreeable gustatory sensations
had when eating various good foods does not thereby know what
is distinctive of the peculiar agreeable.sensations one has when
enjoying sexual intercourse. Similarly, one who has felt the
disagreeableness of a sharp headache does not thereby know what is
distinctive of the unpleasant experience of nausea, nor does he
know precisely what the unpleasantness of smelling a rotten chicken
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is like. There is no single pleasant experience that can teach
one what is distinctive of each pleasant experience nor a single
unpleasant experience that can teach one what is distinctive of
each of various unpleasant experiences. I have concluded that the
only thing which is comnon to all pleasures is the intrinsic good¬
ness of the experience. It is not necessary to experience the
pleasure of drinking champagne, having sex, or any other pleasure in
•rder to know what the word 'pleasure' means. To know what the word
'pleasure' means is to know that an experience is pleasant when it
is good in quality, and once one knows this one can recognize those
experiences which are pleasant by recognizing those which are good
10
in quality.
10. Possibly Locke would have objected to defining 'pleasure' and
'pain' in terms of good and bad by replying that 'good' and 'bad'
themselves need to be analyzed in terms of pleasure and pain. For
he does write: "Things then are good or evil, only in reference to
pleasure or pain." But he goes on to write: "That we call good,
which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain is us;
or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good
or absence of any evil." (1690, Bk II, Ch XX). In this latter
passage he seems to acknowledge that there are things other than
pleasure and pain that are good and bad, while in the preceding
sentence he says that things are good or evil 'only in reference to
pleasure or pain.'
To someone who would claim that good and evil themselves need
to be analyzed in terms of pleasure and pain we find a reply in the
work of Aristotle. In arguing that pleasure is not the sole good
Aristotle writes: "And no one would choose to live with the intellect
of a child throughout his life, however much he were to be pleased
at the things children are pleased at, nor to get enjoyment by
some most disgraceful deed, though he were never to feel any pain in
consequence. And there are many other things we should be keen about
even if they brought no pleasure, e.g. seeing, remembering, knowing,
possessing the virtues. . . We should choose them even if no pleasure
resulted ..." (Aristotle, 1174a 0 - 10). Knowledge has intrinsic
value, and it is good independently of its tendency to please. There¬
fore, its being good or having intrinsic value is no t to be analyzed
in terms of whatever tendency to please which it may have. Thus the
character of 'being good' is not to be equated with 'having a
tendency to please'.
The claim that pleasure is good is not empty, though it would be
if 'good' meant 'pleasant1. To say that pleasure is (intrinsically)
good is, at least in part, to say that pleasant experiences provide
us with some (intrinsic) reason for wanting and seeking them. And
this statement is clearly more informative than the statement 'plea-
ure is pleasant'.
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The Private Language Argument
Partly because of Wittgenstein's style of writing in the
Philosophical Investigations his discussion in what is called The
Private Language Argument gives rise to different interpretations
of what position he is taking at a particular point. The following
reading of Wittgenstein is not a particularly esoteric one, and
it includes most of the points that philosophers have thought to
be damaging to someone claiming that certain words are names of
special experiences.
Wittgenstein introduces his discussion as follows:
How do wards refer to sensations? — There doesn't seem to
be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every
day, and give them names? But how is the connexion between
the name and the thing named set up? This question is
the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning
of the names of sensations? — of the word 'pain' for
example.
(paragraph 244)
If words such as 'pleasure' and 'pain' were names for special
experiences problems would arise over how people could teach or
learn these words. The words 'pleasure' and 'pain' are part of
the English language. They are not intelligible to me alone but
have a meaning which is shared by different people. I can under¬
stand other people when they talk of 'pleasure' and 'pain', and they
can understand me when I use these words. How then does one teach
these words to other people? When trying to teach the words, we
cannot point to another person's sensations or experiences as we
can point to something physical such as his leg. When we teach
the word 'leg' it is possible to point to the object the word
'leg' names, but we are not able directly to point to someone's
sensations or experiences when we teach the words 'pain'and 'pleasure'.
If the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' name special experiences, how
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could one be sure, when teaching the word, that the person being
taught the words hooks-up the words with the right sensations or
experiences? How could one be sure that another person applies the
word to the same sensations or experiences that I apply it to and
that he therefore has given it the same meaning that I give it?
Certainly the Empiricist philosophers were not sensitive to
the problems which arise in accounting for how it is possible to
teach and learn psychological words. David Hume, for instance,
introduces his discussion of pride, humility, and the passions in
general, in the following way:
The passions of pride and humility, being simple and
uniform impressions, it is impossible we can ever, by a
multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or
indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend
to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such
circumstances as attend them: but as these words, pride
and humility, are of general use, and the impressions
they represent the most common of any, every one, of
himself, will be able to form a just idea of them,
without any danger of mistake.^
Here, after arguing that the names of passions are indefinable,
Hume tries to explain how he can comfortably assume that he and
his readers nevertheless correctly understand the meaning of 'pride'
and 'humility' and therefore how they in practice mean the same
thing by these words. Though Hume is not here directly trying to
produce a general thesis about how the names of the passions are
taught or how we all come to mean the same thing by the words
'pride' and 'humility', one may, nevertheless, ask whether Hume
succeeds in explaining how everyone is able to form a 'just idea'
of the meanings of 'pride' and 'humility' and to do so 'without
any danger of mistake'. Here Hume seems to be arguing that it is
11. Hume (1739, Bk II, Part 1, Sect II)
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because the words 'pride' and 'humility' are of general use and
because the feelings of pride and humility are very comnon, that
we are all able correctly to understand the words 'pride' and
'humility' and to be safe from erring on this matter. But one needs
to say more than this.
The fact that the wards 'pride' and 'humility' are in general
use at most tells us that they have a meaning, but this fact does
not help us to learn what that meaning is. The fact that the
feelings of pride and humility are very common would not in itself
provide us with any clue to which feeling the word 'pride' is
supposed to refer. Indeed, for Hume, pride and humility are
merely two among many passions. How then does one know which of
the many passions which he is subject to is the one which he is
supposed to call 'pride'? Is there not a danger that different
persons might come to use the word 'pride' to refer to different
passions? What would prevent the emerging of a linguistic chaos
in our language of the passions - a chaos where the names of
passions are in practice hooked-up with individual passions in a
random fashion?
Hume holds that we cannot define the words 'pride' and
'humility' or directly describe the feelings named and that "the
utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an
enumeration of such circumstances as attend them". This statement
hints at a position to which Wittgenstein gives much attention:
for Wittgenstein, the words 'pride' or 'pain' are understood and
taught in relation to 'such circumstances as attend' someone's
'feeling pride' or 'feeling pain*. Wittgenstein argues that the
words 'pride' and 'pain' have a conceptual connection to the
circumstances in which these feelings are said to arise, and for
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Wittgenstein, the 'circumstances' are the behaviour and physical
surroundings of the person said to be 'proud' or 'in pain'. This
view of Wittgenstein's I will return to shortly.
In his discussion of the view that psychological words name
special experiences, Wittgenstein does not ask whether the words
might be given verbal definitions and thus be taught or learned in
this way. He does not ask whether one might distinguish some types
of experiences from others by employing concepts which are not
themselves psychological concepts; he does not ask, for instance,
whether 'pleasant' experiences might be distinguished from
•unpleasant' experiences by employirg the non-psychological
concepts of good and bad. Perhaps the reason for this is that in
the history of philosophy the view that psychological words name
special experiences has often in fact been conjoined to the further
12
claim that these words are, and must be, indefinable. Perhaps,
Wittgenstein was sufficiently persuaded by the Empiricist way of
thinking to be convinced that if a word named a special ('simple')
experience it would not be possible to define that word. In any
case, Wittgenstein did not in fact think of separating the view
that psychological words name special experiences from the view that
these words were indefinable. In consequence, .the only way of
teaching psychological words to which Wittgenstein gives serious
12. As I mentioned, Sidgwick is a significant exception to this
general rule, since Sidgwick explicitly rejects the view that
'pleasure' is simple and unanalyzable; instead he provides a defin¬
ition of 'pleasure' and does so in terms of a property that he
explicitly says is relational.
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attention is that of ostensive definition, that is, teaching the
word by pointing to someone who can correctly be said to be
•feeling pleasure' or 'feeling pain'.
Given his assumption that we teach a child the words 'pain'
and 'pleasure' by pointing to someone in the appropriate state,
the visiblej physic al behaviour 'expressive of' a particular
psychological state comes to have, for Wittgenstein, a crucial
role in the analysis of psychological concepts. The wards 'pain'
and 'pleasure' are taught in connection with the behaviour
associated with states of 'being in pain' or 'feeling pleasure'.
For instance, we see a child fall to the ground landing on his knee.
The child begins to cry, rubs his leg, moans, or behaves in any of
the various ways that people in pain behave. We tell him that he
is suffering 'pain', and the child thus learns the word. The
meaning of the word becomes tied to such behaviour.
The major role which Wittgenstein gives to behaviour in the
identification of psychological states is evidenced in the
following passages:
What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward
signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it
would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word
'tooth-ache'. (paragraph 257)
Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that
it has pains.
(paragraph 283)
'But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no
pain, for example, without pain-behaviour? — It come
to this: only of a living human being and what resembles
(behaves like) a living human can one say: It has
sensations. . .
(paragraph 281)
These remarks taken on their own are probably consistent with an
interpretation whereby Wittgenstein is making an epistemological
point, namely, that unless we had behaviour as evidence of pain or
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of any sensation we would not be able to know that someone else
was in pain and therefore would not be able to say with confidence
that another person is in pain. But this epistemological thesis
would not be particularly controversial, and there are many remarks,
which I will be quoting in the following pages, which suggest that
Wittgenstein's thesis is not the epistemological one but the thesis
that a part of, or the whole of, being in pain is behaving, or
Weing disposed to behave, in a certain fashion.
In one of the foregoing quotations Wittgenstein speaks of the
behaviour as an 'outward sign' of the pain, and at other points he
speaks of the behaviour as 'expressive' of one's sensation. One
way of interpreting the relation of the sensation to the behaviour
which is 'expressive of it' or its 'outward sign' is the one which
Kurt Baier takes where the sensation is the cause of the behaviour.
Thus, Baier takes the view that "'X has a pain' means 'X has a
sensation which causes him to have a disposition to manifest pain
13
behaviour'."
If we accept the Wittgenstein or Baier view where pain is
identified by pain behaviour does it follow that 'being in pain'
entails having a special sensation? Baier, I think, believes it
14
does follow from his account. Wittgenstein, it will be shown,
resists accepting such a conclusion, and he is right to do so.
For, if pain is tied analytically to pain behaviour in Baier's
way it does not follow that pain is a special sensation. There
are no apriori limits on the sorts of sensations which might be
correlated with, or the cause of, sane particular type of behaviour.
13. Baier (1962, p 18)
14. At one point in his paper, Baier writes: "'I have a pain', in
other words, says two things: 'I have a sensation of a certain sort'
and 'I dislike this sort of sensation'." (1962, p 5)
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It is logically possible for any sort of sensation to cause someone
to wince, groan, or rub his knee. There is no logical necessity
for a sensation to have a particular feel to it in order for it
to cause someone to behave in these ways. It is logically possible
that the sensations that would cause me to groan feel different from
the sensations that would cause you to groan. It is logically
possible that the sensations that cause me to groan and therefore
are 'pains' to me are sensations that would cause you to smile and
15
'look pleased'.
In the case of other physical reactions there is often a broad
range of things that can cause a certain reaction. There is, for
instance, a broad range of substances that can cause people to
sneeze. The presence of cats causes some people to sneeze ( and to
manifest other allergy symptoms) but leaves others unaffected;
for another person the presence of pollen and not cats causes him
to sneeze; for others it is dust, but not cats or pollen; etc..
It is logically possible for there to be as much variation in the
sorts of sensations which cause people to grimace, groan, or cry.
Thus, since it is logically possible for any sensation to cause
subjects to wince or behave in any of the ways that people in
pain behave then, on the view that a sensation is a 'pain' if
it causes one to wince, etc., it follows that a sensation does
16 17
not have to have a special feel to it to be a 'pain'. '
The following passage shows Wittgenstein coming to much the
same view, namely, that crucial to being in pain is behaving in a
certain fashion and not having a special sensation:
15« Norman Malcolm makes much the same point in Malcolm (1965,
PP 98 - 99)
16. & 17» footnotes: see next page.
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16. There have been other philosophers who have taken the route which
Baier takes. They attempt to reach the conclusion that the psycho¬
logical term refers both to something public (i.e. behavioural) and
to something private (i.e., a special experience) but do so while
putting the stress solely on the public (behaviour) in their definition
of the psychological term. They will fail for the same reason that
Baier failed. In his paper "Peeling and Expression", Stuart Hampshire
takes the following position: "We must first have distinguished certain
patterns of behaviour in certain standard circumstances, actual or
notional; and then, on the basis of this kind of classification, we
can distinguish the various inner sentiments as controlled inclina-
- tions to behave in these ways in these standard circumstances. We
arrive at the distinctions between the different feelings and
sentiments by abstracting from the manifesting behaviour. In our
classification we move, as it were, inwards from the expressive
behaviour to inner feeling." (Hampshire, 1960, p 81). Taking a
particular case - the emotion of anger - he writes: "In explaining
what anger is, as opposed to some other emotion, I wuld refer to a
disposition to attack when the subject has been, or believes that he
has been, in some way harmed or hurt." (p 73). Now, I suspect that
in the way that Baier wanted to say that pain is a special kind of
sensation, namely, that one which causes us to display pain-behaviour,
so Hampshire wants to say that anger is a special kind of feeling,
namely, the one which one feels when disposed to attack. However, if
only a particular behavioural disposition is mentioned as the distinct¬
ive feature of the psychological state, then being in the psychological
state will not necessitate having sane special feeling or experience.
If 'feeling angry' is defined as 'feeling as one feels who is disposed
to attack' then it is in principle possible for any kind of feeling or
experience to be one of anger, for there are no logical limitations oh
the sorts of feelings and experiences one can have when disposed to
attack as there are no logical limitations on the sorts of sensations
which could cause one to groan. Thus the lesson to be learned is that
if someone wishes to hold that some special sensation, feeling, or
experience is a part of, or the whole of, being in the psychological
state named by a particular term, one will not be able to define that
psychological state by making the behavioural disposition the sole
distinctive feature of that psychological state.
17« At other points in his paper Baier seys things that put him in
a position similar to the one which I am defending. In elucidating
the nature of pain behaviour, Baier writes: "Pains are by nature
feelings of a kind which incline us, urge us, prompt us to do what
promises relief. . . A person's having a pain, or his expecting that
some possible occurrence would cause him pain, is one of the paradigms
of his having a reason for doing something, namely, for doing what
promises relief, or what promises avoidance of the possible occurrence."
(1962, p 15)o Though Baier actually defines 'pain' by reference to a
sensation's being such as to cause someaie to manifest pain behaviour,
he does, in the passage just quoted, probe one level below that of
pain behaviour. In this passage he shows that pain behaviour is
merely a consequence of a mare fundamental feature of pain, namely,
that pain is the sort of sensation which provides us with reason for
trying to avoid or be rid of it or seek relief. The correct way to
define 'pain', then, is not by appealing to the consequences of
pain's having the nature which it has but by referring to that
feature of pain which leads to pain's having such (behavioural)
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"Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the
word 'pain' meant - so that he constantly called different
things by that name - but nevertheless used the word in
a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presupposi¬
tions of pain" - in short he uses it as we all do. Here
I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though
nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.
(paragraph 271)
Here Wittgenstein seems to be saying that if someone speaks of
himself as being in pain when he is in the right physical setting,
that is, when he is behaving in the right way in the right
physical surroundings (e.g., he has fallen and has begun to cry,
etc.) then he is using the word 'pain' correctly and therefore is_
in pain, and this is true independently of what sensation he might
happen to be experiencing.
Wittgenstein finds further problems in the view that the
words 'pain' or 'pleasure' name special experiences. If the word
'pleasure' were used to name a special experience, what guarantee
could there be that a person would continue to apply the word to
the same experience each time he used the word? How could someone
be sure on some occasion that he was using the word for the same
experience which he used it for on previous occasions? No one else
can verify for him that he is being consistent, since no one else
is directly aware of his experiences. The person might try to
imagine the sort of sensation or experience he called 'pleasant'
on previous occasions, and he might compare his present experience
to his recollection of the previous experience. But what guarantee
(|7. contd.) consequences, namely, the fact that pain is something
evil, something which provides one with reason for avoiding it.
That people in fact try to avoid or minimize pain is, so I have
argued in Chapter IV, also a consequence of the fact that they are
rational. It is, I argued, logically possible for there to be
creatures not disposed to avoid pain; creatures devoid of reason
might have this characteristic.
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would there be that the person's present experience correctly
represents the previous sensation? There is no objective,
independent 'criterion' of being correct, Wittgenstein argues. If
there can be no objective or independent criterion of being right
in applying the word 'pleasant' to the same kind of experience,
there can be little sense in saying that someone is 'right' or
'wrong' in applying the word 'pleasant' to a certain experience,
Wittgenstein would reason. Wittgenstein writes:
In the present case I have no criterion of correctness.
One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right
to me is right. And that only means that here we can't
talk about 'right'.
(paragraph 258)
If this is so, then the correct use of the word 'pleasant' does not
depend on someone's applying the word to a special sort of
experience, Wittgenstein would conclude.
Thus the view which emerges from Wittgenstein's argument is
that the correct use of psychological terms is no t contingent
upon one's referring to special experiences, and this is to say
that psychological words are not names of special experiences.
This view also appears as the central theme of Wittgenstein's famous
"Beetle in the Box" argument:
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we
call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone
else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle
is only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would be
quite possible for everyone to have something different
in his box. One might even imagine such a thing con¬
stantly changing. - But suppose the word 'beetle' had
a use in these people's language? - If so it would not
be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box
has no place in the language-game at all; not even as
a something: for the box might even be empty. - No
one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it
cancels out, whatever it is.
(paragraph 293)
The 'thing in the box' represents people's experiences and sensations.
The word 'beetle' represents psychological words such as 'pleasure'
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and 'pain'. The conclusion is that though the words 'pleasure'
and 'pain' have a use in our language it is not as names of
special sensations or experiences.
Earlier I quoted passages where Wittgenstein is assigning
special behaviour a central part in the identification of part¬
icular psychological states. He wrote, for instance, "What would
it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did
not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach
a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'." Taken on its own this
claim could be interpreted as an epistemological claim, I
mentioned earlier. However, given that there are many other
passages where it seems clear that Wittgenstein wants to deny that
words such as 'pain' and 'pleasure' name special experiences, it
seems that these claims are not epistemological ones. He is not
merely saying that groaning and grimacing are evidence of pain and
that pain is a special sensation, for he goes on to deny that pain
requires having a special sensation. If pain behaviour is only
evidence of pain, and pain itself is not a special sensation, then
what is pain? It seems that for Wittgenstein to talk of pain is
to talk of special behaviour and that a reference to someone's
18
pain is a reference to his behaviour.
I have taken the view that pleasure and unpleasantness are
special experiences. How then do I avoid or overcome the problems
that Wittgenstein finds in this view? As I mentioned earlier, when
18. Wittgenstein treats first-person psychological sentences as
different from third-person sentences. The claim 'he is in pain'
would be, it seems, directly about someone's behaviour or behav¬
ioural dispositions for Wittgenstein. (The sentence 'I am in pain'
Wittgenstein would say is not a factual assertion about one's pain
but merely a non-fact-asserting exclamation ' expressive'of pain.)
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Wittgenstein attacks the view that psychological terms are names
of special experiences, he is assuming that the terms, if they
would name kinds of experiences, are indefinable. The problems
he finds in the view are problems for someone like Locke who also
believes that the words are indefinable. As Wittgenstein writes:
'And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that
the sensation itself is a nothing.' - Not at all. It
is not a some"thing. but not a nothing either! The
conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as
well as a something about which nothing could be said.
(paragraph 304)
The Private Language problems arise not simply if one holds that
psychological words name sensations but if one holds this and
holds that nothing can be said about them. Having the above
passage of Wittgenstein's in mind, George Pitcher writes:
The point is not that private sensations are nothing,
or do not exist, or are not important, or anything
of the sort; the point is rather that nothing can be
said about them, and hence they play no part in our
language game. "
The claim that 'nothing can be said about sensations' has a
crucial role in the view Wittgenstein attacks. (interestingly,
Pitcher is not merely speaking for the Empiricist but speaking
for himself when he writes, of sensations, "the point is rather
that nothing can be said about them". Pitcher offers us a fine
example of a sentence which the Logic teacher knows is rarely
found in actual usage, a necessarily false sentence. If the
sentence were true it would be veiy informative' about sensations
and thus would provide a counter-example to the proposition being
asserted.)
The situation changes dramatically when one shifts away
19* Pitcher (1964, p 291)
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from Locke and holds that the words are definable. The problems
Wittgenstein sees become avoidable. Though a great number of
philosophers have discussed and tried to refute Wittgenstein's
argument, none that I know of have tried to overcome the problems
by adopting this shift from the classical Empiricist position.
If one holds that the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness'
are definable the situation with respect to teaching and learning
the words changes considerably. If a word is indefinable it would
seem that the main way of teaching the word is by ostensive
definition, i.e., displaying or pointing to the object named by
the word. The assumption that psychological words are taught by
ostensive definition holds much of the responsibility for
Wittgenstein's concentrating on the behaviour of the person in a
certain psychological state as the defining feature of that state.
What we see when we point to someone in pain is his physical
reaction and not his sensations.
The importance of the assumption that psychological words
are taught by ostensive definition is seen in the following passage
of Wittgenstein's?
"What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward
signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it
would be impossible to teach a child the use of the
word 'tooth-ache'."
(paragraph 257)
Why does Wittgenstein feel so certain that to teach the meaning
of a psychological term such as 'tooth-ache' it is necessary for
there to be behavioural 'outward signs' of pains? Wittgenstein
is assuming that a word such as 'pain' is taught by ostensive
definition. If we were going to teach the word 'pain' or
'pleasure' by pointing to someone experiencing pain or pleasure
there would be nothing relevant for the learner of the word to see
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unless there were some 'outward sign', some behaviour, associated
with the psychological state.
Pitcher, in defending Wittgenstein's discussion of pain,
writes:
One thing, to begin with, seems perfectly certain: if
there were no overt manifestations or expressions of
pain - i.e., if people just inwardly had pains, but
did not cry or groan or grimace or plead for help -
then there is no conceivable way that anyone could
learn the use of the word 'pain'. But then 'pain'
could not be a word in any language. And so it must be
granted by anyone that there is at least this connection
between pain and pain behaviour: pain behaviour plays an
indispensable part in the teaching and learning of the
word 'pain'.
That Pitcher is assuming that psychological words are taught by
ostensive definition is explicit in what he says a few sentences
later:
When a word is the name of something, I learn what it
means by having other people point out examples of it
to me or by observing what they apply it to . . .
In this passage Pitcher not only assumes that psychological words
are taught by ostensive definition but asserts that all names are
taught in this way. (This assumption would be more sensible if
Pitcher were using the word 'name' in a way that 'being a name'
entails being a word that is indefinable. Pitcher does not say
that he is doing so however.)
Not all words are taught or learned by giving or receiving
an ostensive definition. If a word is definable one way of
teaching it is by giving a (verbal) definition. An ostensive
definition is not necessary. If my definition of 'pleasure' were
correct one could teach the word 'pleasure' simply by explicitly
defining it as an experience of good quality. Speaking with less
20. Pitcher (1964, p 291)
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precision, one could define 'pleasure' as 'feeling good' or
'experiencing good sensations'. (Loose definitions often have a
helpful role in teaching people words. It is rare to receive a
definition in everyday life that would stand up to philosophical
scrutiny in such a way that it would be non-circular, 100^ accurate,
and totally sufficient for teaching someone the word. Indeed few
dictionary definitions fail to be to some degree loose or circular.)
One could teach the words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' by telling
someone that pleasant experiences are distinguished from unpleasant
ones by the intrinsic good or bad of the experience. Coming to
understand the words 'good' and 'bad' does not itself raise special
private language problems since these words are not themselves
psychological ones, that is, the words are not themselves names of
special experiences.
Though people could learn the words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'
by receiving explicit verbal definitions, I expect that people do
not often in fact learn the meaning of these words in this way. It
is a relatively small percentage of one's words that a person learns
by receiving verbal definitions, and even when one does receive
definitions, the verbal accounts given of the words in question
will often be at best approximate and loose. In such cases a
supplementary method for fully learning the word would be relied
upon.
Nor is ostensive definition the only alternative. Adult
human beings in the Western World normally know a great deal more
than ten thousand words, and it is a minority of these that one
learns by receiving a verbal or an ostensive definition. Most
of the words we come to understand are words which no one inten¬
tionally attempted to teach us. Most of an adult's vocabulary is
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gained through what might be called 'Linguistic Inference' , that is,
by his making conceptual inferences - often 'unconsciously' - about
the meaning of a word through having heard or seen the word used in
various linguistic contexts. When, being spoken to, when overhearing
the conversations of others as a child, when hearing television
or radio, and when reading books, magazines, or signs, one is able
to draw inferences about the meaning that a word has.
There are many words that could not be taught exclusively by
ostensive definition. One could not teach the words 'afternoon',
'yesterday*, 'time', 'billion', or 'philosophy' exclusively by
pointing; there are a great number of words that would be so
difficult to teach by ostensive definition that doing so could be
ruled out on practical grounds. Though someone might be able to
teach a child the word 'apple' by handing the child apples on
various occasions and calling the object an 'apple' on each occasion,
he would be much less successful if he tried to teach the child the
word 'bachelor' by pointing to unmarried men in various settings.
The child might not notice anything peculiar about these people.
Maybe he will thinl? that being a bachelor is not wearing a ring.
Nor could one hope to be successful in trying to teach the words
'married' and 'unmarried' by pointing to married and unmarried
people. One. needs to tie the use of these words to the concept of
a legal institution, and one cannot hope to succeed in doing so
merely by pointing to various people. Nor would the word 'university'
easily be taught by pointing to a series of buildings with teachers
in than. Merely by seeing the group of buildings one could take
any number of features to be the distinctive features. What if one
did not even know what a'teacher' is or what 'learning' and
'education' are?; what would lead one to make the proper distinction
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between a 'university' and a 'primary school'?
Nor will such words always be learned by one's receiving a
direct verbal definition. Probably, the most common way in which
people learn the word 'university' is by their hearing, perhaps on
various occasions scattered over a period of time, such claims as
the following: "John is planning on going to university after
high-school"; "Johnson is a student at the University; he is
studying to be a doctor". Prom claims such as these one can infer
a connection between the meaning of the word 'university' and a
concept of advanced education. One can learn the meaning of the
word 'bachelor' by hearing sentences like the following: "He's not
yet married; I'm beginning to suspect he will be a bachelor his
whole life," or "The party tonight is for bachelors; no married men
will be admitted."
Similarly, one can learn the connection of 'pleasantness' and
'unpleasantness' to good and bad experiences by making inferences
about the meanings of these words when hearing them used in various
linguistic contexts. (Normally, such inferences about meaning
will be 'unconscious', and there would be a cumulative effect upon
hearing the words used in different contexts.) Pleasure is spoken
of as something good and unpleasantness is spoken of as something
in itself bad. That unpleasantness is bad is apparent, and thus
inferable, from the following sentences: "I find their company very
unpleasant, and that is why I do not visit them anymore" or "This
has been an unpleasant day; tomorrow will be better". From the
following sentences one could infer that 'pleasantness' is thought
of as good: "It was good to see him; I found the occasion very
pleasant", or "I find the atmosphere here very pleasant; so I will
return when I have time."
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When learning the meaning of a word, through Linguistic
Inference one will need, to hear the word in more than one context
in order to gain an accurate understanding of its meaning. From
hearing the following remark one would gain some idea of the meaning
of 'bachelor': "He is nolonger a bachelor. He got married today."
One could infer a connection between being a 'bachelor' and being
unmarried. However, from just these sentences and no other ones,
one would not know, for instance, that females cannot be 'bachelors'
in the ordinary sense of the word. Similarly, it would be necessary
to hear the words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' on various occasions
in order to gain an accurate understanding of their meaning.
Learning words by Linguistic Inference requires, of course,
already knowing the meaning of other words. If one is to learn the
meanings of the words 'university', 'bachelor', and 'pleasant'
from hearing them used in various contexts, one must already be able
to understand the general meaning of the sentences in which they
appear. Not all words could be learned in this manner.
A comprehensive account of what is involved in coming to learn
words by inferring their meaning through hearing them used would be
very complicated as would be a comprehensive account of what is
required in order to learn words accurately and fully through
ostensive definition. However, it is clear that we can learn words
in this way. Some words could not be learned exclusively from
ostensive definition. Clearly, we do not learn all words by either
ostensive or verbal definition.
If the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' name special
experiences, how can we be sure that someone who is trying to learn
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the meaning of the word has learned to apply the word to the right
experience, i.e., to the same kind of experience to which other
people apply the word? An implicit claim within the Private
Language Argument is that one problem in the view that psychological
words name kinds of experiences is that there would be no way to
be sure, when teaching the word, that a person learning the meaning
of the word is applying it to the same kind, of experience. The
problem arises because we have no 'direct access* to, or direct
awareness or knowledge of, other people's experiences. Part of the
process in learning the meaning of a word, Pitcher writes in his
elucidation of Wittgenstein's argument, is that one applies the
word to the sorts of things he thinks it refers to. Pitcher continues:
In this latter process, what determines whether I have
gotten it right or not is whether I apply the word to
appropriate or to inappropriate things, and the only
possible way of telling which is the case is for other
people to confirm my application when it is correct and
to rebut it when it is not correct. But nothing of this
sort can happen in the case of private sensations: I
might continually apply the word 'pain' to the wrong
sensations and no one would ever be able to tell me that
I was doing so.^
I hold that the word 'pleasure' names a special experience. How do
I overcome these problems? How can someone teaching the word
'pleasure' know that the person to whom he is teaching the word
has come to apply the word to the same sorts of experiences to
which the teacher is applying it?
It is necessary to distinguish two questions here: 1) How do
we know when someone has correctly understood the meaning of the
word 'pleasure' and that he therefore has given it the same meaning
which others give to it?, and 2) Assuming that someone does under-
21. Pitcher (1964, p 291)
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stand the meaning of the word 'pleasure' (he knows that it means
'experience good in quality'), how do we know that the experiences
of his which he calls pleasant are in fact pleasant (good in
quality) ?
To gain evidence that someone correctly understands the
meaning of a word it is not necessary to check his use of the word
against those objects to which it refers. To gain evidence of
whether someone correctly understands the word 'university', for
instance, it is not necessary to visit a university campus and
observe whether he calls this a 'university'. (Such evidence would
be inconclusive, in any case. For it is possible for someone to
call a set of buildings a 'university' when it is not and for him
still to know the meaning of the word. He simply could make a
mistake.) The assumptions which people hold about the meaning of
words are manifested in the things they say when using the word.
Someone's uttering the following sentences give good evidence that
he does not correctly understand the meaning of the word 'university':
"Joe has bought a new university and is about to drive it to work",
or "The university is made up of many stars and planets and is
millions of light years across". There are other sentences which
would provide evidence that someone does correctly understand the
meaning of the word 'university's A person's statement that "Joe
is going to university to study to become a doctor" provides good
evidence that the speaker has connected 'university' with advanced
study of some subject.
Similarly, to gain evidence of whether a child correctly
understands the words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' it would not be
necessary to do the impossible and directly check his words against
his experiences. Since the words are definable we could if we wish
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to check someone's understanding of the words simply ask him what
the words mean. (The answer would be helpful though inconclusive
since he would likely give a vague reply as most people do when
asked to define words.) We also can observe the assumptions a
person has about the meanings of the words he uses when he foims
sentences with these words. A child's saying "I'm not going to
school anymore, I find school unpleasant" provides some confir¬
mation that he understands the word 'unpleasant' since this shows
that he thinks of unpleasantness as bad. "This food is too pleasant;
take it away," would provide evidence that someone does not under¬
stand 'pleasant'. "The car has a new pleasure joint" or "He
dropped the bottle and spilled pleasure all over the floor"
provides strong evidence that someone does not understand the
word 'pleasure'. (A person's saying these things would not
entail that he does not understand the word 'pleasure'. It is
conceivable that the mechanics at the corner have taken up
calling a certain part a 'pleasure joint', and there are other
possible events that would make the evidence logically con¬
sistent with someone's correctly understanding the word
'pleasure'.)
If the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are names
of special experiences, how does someone know that other people
are applying these words to the same sorts of experiences which
he is applying them to? How can we know that other people
mean the 3ame things as we mean by these words? What makes
this problem worrying for Wittgenstein is the presumption that
the words are indefinable. Given the view that the words can
be defined, and the further claim that the concept which is
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central in distinguishing the 'pleasant' from the 'unpleasant' is
the concept 'good' - a concept which is not itself a psychological
one - the questions have straightforward answers. As the word
'bachelor' has the same meaning and definition for you as it does
for me, so the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' have the same
meaning and definition for you as they do for me. The distinguish¬
ing feature of the class of experiences we call 'pleasant' is their
being of good quality, and this link of the word 'pleasant' to
the concept of goodness can be established 'publicly' because the
concept of goodness is a 'public' one, that is, the concept of
goodness is not a psychological one. That pleasant experiences
are distinguished by their (intrinsic) worth can be conveyed in
public discourse. How this is in fact done has already been out¬
lined in the preceding discussion of how people are able to learn
the meanings of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' from hearing the
sentences in which other people use these words.
I have already discussed the sort of verbal evidence we can
gain that other people have correctly understood the words 'pleasure'
and 'unpleasantness'. That evidence which confirms that another
person correctly understands these words also confirms that he has
given them the same meaning which I have given them. If we both
understand the words correctly, then we both have given them the
same meaning.
One might ask the further question: Given that we have, in
a particular case, evidence that another- person correctly understands
the meanings of the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness', how do
we know that those experiences of his which he calls 'pleasurable'
or 'unpleasant' are in fact pleasant or unpleasant, i.e. good or
bad in quality? Though this question is of some interest in its own
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right, it is not necessary to deal with this question in order to
handle the central concerns of The Private Language Argument. The
central concerns in Wittgenstein's argument are with how psychological
words could both have a public, conmunicable meaning yet also name
special experiences. This I have already explained. It is not
necessary to know whether the experiences which Joe calls pleasant
are in fact pleasant to know if Joe correctly understands the word
'pleasant'.
Given that someone's understanding of the meaning of a word can
be checked at the linguistic level, the above question seems to
reduce to the following question: How do we know in a case where
someone says that his experiences is pleasant that he is not mistaken
or lying? To attempt to answer this question by holding that we
always know when someone is mistaken or lying when talking about his
pleasures would be to prove too much, for we do not always know about
another's mistakes or lies about his experience any more than we
always know about his mistakes or lies concerning public states of
affairs. (Even if someone maintained that in some or all occasions
it is logically impossible to know with complete certainty whether
a person is mistaken or lying when calling an experience of his
'pleasant', this would not affect my claim that we can have good
evidence of whether or not someone understands the meaning of the
word 'pleasant'.) When someone finds value in-doing something he
has some reason to do it; thus if someone finds some activity
pleasant (his experience is good in quality) then he has some
reason for engaging in that activity. If someone's behaviour
suggests that he is avoiding some activity which he claims to find
pleasant this would be some evidence - though inconclusive evidence -
that he does not find it pleasant. For instance, if someone claims
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to find opera pleasant, but in fact never goes to operas even when
he has the chance, this would provide some evidence that he is
perhaps trying to deceive us when he says that he enjoys it.
Central to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument was the
following problem: If a ward such as 'pleasure' were the name of a
special sort of experience, how could a person be sure that he is
applying the word to the same kind of experience each time he uses
the word? ("In the present case I have no criterion of correctness.
One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is
right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'.")
On my view there is a 'criterion of correctness' when one calls an
experience 'pleasant', namely, that experience's being good in
quality. On my view what makes one pleasant experience 'the sane'
as the last one is its being good in quality. To apply the word
'pleasant' correctly to the present experience it is not necessary
for me to try to recall whether this experience is just like the
other ones which I have considered 'pleasant'. All that is needed
is that I now think that this experience is a good one (intrin¬
sically). If it is a good one then it necessarily is like other
pleasant experiences in the relevant respect.
In this respect, the situation when judging an experience
'pleasant' is like the situation when judging on non-psychological
matters. When judging that the set of buildings in front of me is
a 'university' it is not necessary for me to attempt to remember
the set of buildings which I last called a 'university' and then to
compare the present set to them. Merely by judging this set of
buildings to be the site of an institution of higher learning of
the proper sort I will be able to judge whether or not this is a
'university'. If I am right in judging this to be a 'university'
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then it will follow that this set of "buildings is, in the relevant
respects, like previous sites of buildings which I have correctly-
judged to be 'universities' .
One can, of course, go on to ask, "What evidence do people lave that
a person has correctly remembered the meaning of the word 'pleasant'?"
(it might be supposed that for psychological words to have a
reliable role within our language it must be in principle possible to check
on forgetfulness in meaning.) A person's erring in his remembering
the meaning of the ward 'pleasant' is checkable or noticable in the
same way in which his erring when learning the word 'pleasant'
would be checkable. The sentences in which he uses the word would
provide evidence of his forgetting the meaning of the word.
Sentences which would suggest that he does not think of pleasure as
intrinsically good or that he does not think of pleasure as a
feature of experience would provide evidence that he is not correctly
remembering the meaning of the word 'pleasure'. Sentences which
suggest that he thinks of pleasure as good and as a feature of
experience (and not, say,- of a box) provide evidence that he
correctly remembers the meaning of 'pleasure'. Needless to say,
forgetfulness in the meaning of words is not a canmon occurrence.
\
Earlier I mentioned, in passing, that Wittgenstein, in arguing
against the view -that psychological words name special experiences,
does not distinguish the view whereby 'special experiences' are
classified according to relational properties from a view where they
are distinguished exclusively by non-relaticnal, inherent features
of an experience. Someone might suggest that in attacking the view
that psychological words name 'special experiences', Wittgenstein
is thinking of 'special experiences' in the latter way. If we
interpret Wittgenstein this way it might appear that there is a
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certain compatibility between my views and. Wittgenstein's arguments,
since I am thinking of 'special experiences' in a different way when
I argue that pleasure is a special experience. Given this
interpretation of Wittgenstein, precisely where am I in disagreement
with him?
Even on this interpretation of Wittgenstein there remain
very important and fundamental ways in whi ch I am disagreeing with
him. Wittgenstein does not distinguish the two ways of classifying
'special experiences', and in attacking the view that psychological
words are names of special experiences he does not restrict his
attack to one particular way of classifying special experiences.
The conclusion he arrives at is a much more dramatic one, namely,
that we are misconstruing the meaning of psychological words if
we think that their meaning is such that they are used to convey
information about the nature of our experiences. Wittgenstein does
not see any way in which psychological words could be names of
special experiences, so his conclusion is that their meaning is
such that they do not refer to experiences at alio When psychological
words are used for fact stating they are not used to refer to 'the
inner life' of man but refer to some"thing public. and the only
public meaning or reference Wittgenstein recognizes as possible is
that the words refer to certain kinds of behaviour, perhaps in
certain physical surroundings. Earlier in this chapter I quoted a
passage where Wittgenstein seemed to be saying that even if someone
applied the word 'pain' randomly to sensations, he would nevertheless
be using the word correctly and therefore would be 'in pain' if he
used the word "in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and
presuppositions of pain". This I took to mean that if someone is
behaving in the appropriate manner, perhaps in appropriate
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surroundings, then he is in pain, and this is so independently
of whatever he might be feeling. This striking position is also
the one which Wittgenstein is taking in his Beetle in the Box
Argument: here his conclusion is that "the thing in the box has no
place in the language-game at all; not even as a something ..."
Applied to pleasure and pain, this would be to say that one's
correct ascription of pleasure or pain to someone is completely
independent of whatever experiences that person might be having.
The only manner of teaching psychological words which
Wittgenstein considers is that of ostensive definition, that is,
displaying or pointing to someone in the psychological state in
question. The only way of giving a psychological word a publicly
comnunicable meaning which Wittgenstein considers is that of tying
the meaning of the word to the physical behaviour or physical
circumstances associated with some psychological state. This
tendency to concentrate on the behaviour and circumstances
associated with psychological states is perhaps partly reinforced by
the assumption that we teach these words by ostensive definition,
(if I were going to teach a child the word 'misery' by pointing to
someone who is miserable, I would have to rely on the person's
behaviour or physical circumstances to indicate whether or not he
was miserable.) Wittgenstein does not limit himself to saying that
it might be behaviour which is the public defining property of
psychological states. He does not see any other way of a
psychological word gaining a public meaning, so consequently he
holds that the behaviour is_ the defining property of individual
psychological states. As George Pitcher writes when presenting
Wittgenstein's view: "What does play a part in pain language-
games is pain behaviour (e.g., groaning, crying, clutching the
un¬
affected part) and pain-comforting behaviour (e.g., saying soothing
words, administering sedatives, applying bandages, fixing pillows)
- in short, the external circumstances in which tiie word 'pain' is
used. The private sensations, whatever they may be, play no part
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at all."
Thus, central in Wittgenstein's account of what is involved
in 'feeling pain' or 'feeling pleasure' is behaving in certain
ways in certain circumstances; what someone is experiencing is
incidental. On my account of pleasantness and unpleasantness the
reverse holds. The words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness', on my
view, name special experiences, those intrinsically good and
intrinsically bad in quality respectively; they do not name
special kinds of behaviour in certain physical surroundings.
What makes someone's life pleasant or unpleasant is what he feels.
not what he does.
I have not given a complete account of pain in the sense in
which the word names a special sensation. However, I did argue,
in Chapter 7, that it is analytic that pain is unpleasant
(intrinsically). If this is so, pain is a special kind of sensa¬
tion for it is one which is bad in quality. (i have not said hew
pain sensations differ from other unpleasant sensations, e.g.,
itches.) Even Wittgenstein at times comes close to recognizing
that the value of pain - its badness - is a fundamental feature of
pain, but he does not notice that this badness is analytically
tied to 'pain' and that it thereby places apriori limits and guide¬
lines on the sorts of sensations that reed to be felt by people in
pain. He presents an objector as saying to himself: "Yes, but there
22. Pitcher (1964, p 299)
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is something there all the same accompanying my cry of pain. And it
is on account of that that I utter it. And this something is what
is important - and frightful." Wittgenstein's reply to this useful
point is merely: "Only whom are we informing of this? And on
what occasion?" (paragraph 296). This character of being important
and 'frightful' is what I am focusing upon in calling pain 'bad'
or 'evil'. Pitcher writes:
One possible misunderstanding must be avoided at all
costs. Wittgenstein is not denying that when a
person is in pain, he very often and perhaps always feels
seme "tiling frightful, nor even that this something is __
terribly important to the person himself and to others.
In this argument on Wittgenstein's behalf, Pitcher acknowledges
that someone in pain 'often and perhaps always' feels something
frightful, and Pitcher thinks that it is extremely important not
to think that Wittgenstein denies this. But is it not more than a
contingent fact that people feel this way when in pain? And, are
there not apriori limits on the sorts of sensations that could be
properly called 'frightful' (or bad)? How then can one hold that
'the private sensations, whatever they may be, play no part at all'?
Who then are we informing by calling pain 'frightful' (or
bad)? With this statement - one which Wittgenstein senses is a
truism - we are replying to someone who says that the sorts of
sensations one has are incidental to being in pain. Not just any
sensation could be 'frightful' or bad.
25- Pitcher (1964, p 298)
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Chapter VII: Cognitive Pleasure and Distress
His mein and his language were so noble and fearless in
the hour of his death that to me he appeared blessed. . .
I was pleased and I was also pained because I knew that
he was soon to die. . . We were laughing and weeping
in turns.
(Plato, writing about Socrates)
In this passage from the Phaedo' Plato is describing his
feelings at the time of Socrates' death. The pleasure and pain
that Plato felt might be called 'cognitive' since they were tied
to certain states of belief or knowledge of Plato's. Plato reports
that he was pleased over Socrates' courage in facing death. In
order for Plato to be pleased over Socrates' courage it was
necessary for him to be aware of that courage. A person cannot
be pleased about some state of affairs that he does not know
exists. Plato's pleasure was in some way tied to his knowledge.
Plato said that he was pained 'because he knew that Socrates was
soon to die', and this is to say that his pain was somehow
related to his knowledge that Socrates was about to die.
Being pleased (distressed) about seme state of affairs is
something complex. Two phenomena are involved, pleasure (distress)
and cognition. The relationship between the two phenomena is
causal. To be pleased or distressed about some state of affairs
is to be pleased or distressed in consequence of knowing of,
or believing in that state of affairs. When Plato was pained
'because he knew that Socrates would soon die', Plato's knowing
this fact was a cause of his pain. It was not simply that Plato
felt distressed while knowing that Socrates would die soon, since
being distressed while knowing something is not a sufficient
1. Plato (56e - 59a)
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condition for being distressed about that thing. There are many-
things that Plato knew while he was distressed, yet he was
distressed about Socrates' approaching death and not necessarily
about the other things. What accounts for Plato's being distressed
about this thing is that it was his knowledge and thinking of this
2
thing that was causing him to be distressed.
This view of the relationship between the pleasure (distress)
and the mentioned cognitions also provides the basis for an account
of the relationship of the pleasure (distress) to the object of the
pleasure (distress). The object of Plato's pleasure - that thing
that he was pleased about - was the noble and fearless bearing of
Socrates. The noble and fearless bearing of Socrates was the
object of the thought or knew ledge which caused Plato to feel
pleased. To be distressed by Socrates' approaching death is to
be distressed by the thought or knowledge that Socrates was about
to die. The object of the pleasure (distress) is the object of
the thought or knowledge which causes the pleasure (distress).
One could, of course, ask the further question, 'What is the
2. The distinction that is commonly drawn between 'mental' and
'physical' pleasures and pains closely parallels the distinction
between cognitive and non-cognitive pleasures and pains. (Non-
cognitive pleasures and pains are pleasures and pains that are
not contingent upon some thought or belief.) Roger Trigg, for
instance, writes: "When we suffer mental pain or distress, we do
not just feel something. We must be thinking of some situation
we dislike. When we feel physical pain, however, we do not have
to be aware of anything besides the sensation. If we forget what
is distressing us, our distress will go. Apart from the sensation,
there is nothing which we can try to forget when we are in phys¬
ical pain. A sensation does not require, the thought of anything
else. As a result, argument cannot affect the sensations I feel."
Thinking of 'mental pain' as an emotion, Trigg continues, "Unlike
emotion (sensations) do not depend on beliefs which can be changed."
(Trigg, 1970, p 19). The emotion of 'mental pain' is tied to some
thought and is contingent upon that thought Trigg notes. The
'mental pain' depends on certain beliefs, and if the thought or
belief that it depends on changes the distress will end. 'Physical
pain' or 'non-cognitive pain' is not directly dependent on some
belief for its existence.
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relation of a belief or thought to the object of the belief or
thought? However, I am not presently concerned about this
question. My point is that it is through its connection with
some cognition that the pleasure or distress being discussed
can be said to 'have an object'.
Some recent philosophers have denied that the person's
cognition is the cause of his pleasure in a case such as this.
I will devote the rest of this chapter to examining their arguments.
Thinking of a person who is 'pleased because' he believes
that he has won the Irish Sweepstakes, Irving Thai berg produced
the following argument to support his view that the belief in
question is not the cause of the pleasure:
It always makes sense to ask how soon after the causal
event (believing) the effect (pleasure) occurred and
how the events stood to each other in space; however,
could Jones honestly say whether he was pleased right
away or only after thinking about his triumph? And
how near to the pleasure was the belief that allegedly
caused the pleasure? The etiological (i.e, causal)
analysis of 'pleased because' breaks down in the face
of these queries.
What is the temporal relation between someone's feeling
pleased over a piece of news and his hearing or thinking of that
news? When someone feels pleased over a piece of news there may
be no perceptible time lapse between his hearing or thinking of
the news and his feeling pleased; he may hear the news and
'immediately' feel pleased. However, that a gap in time is not
always perceptible cannot be taken to rule out a causal relation.
It might have been that upon first hearing of the news that
Socrates was to die Plato 'immediately' felt a terrible (very
disagreeable) sinking sensation in the stomach. let it is clear
3. Thaiberg (1962, p 67)
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that the hearing of the sews would have been the cause of his
feeling this sensation. The sensation was not abait to occur even
without his hearing the news. When a man kicks me in the shin
I may not notice a gap in time between his foot's contacting my
leg and the onset of pain, yet clearly the kick nevertheless was
the cause of the pain. Anyone who believes that there must be a
time lapse between the occurrence of a cause and the occurrence
•f its effect can simply say that in these cases the lapse is
so small that it normally is not, and perhaps could not be,
noticed by the person in question.
Thai berg seemed to think that the temporal duration of the
person's pleasure is not distinguishable from the temporal duration
of his thoughts and that the thoughts could not be the cause of
the pleasure for this reason. However, when someone is pleased
about something the duration of his pleasure will normally differ
from the duration of his thoughts, and the duration of the
pleasure can be distinguished from that of the thoughts. The
pleasure in being pleased about some event will be felt even at
times when one is not thinking about the subject he is pleased
about. J.C.B. Gosling makes this point:
Take the case of someone who is so pleased at having
pulled off a deal that he throws a party. The
pleasure he feels is shown in hi s interest in
amusing his guests and his generosity with the
champagne bottle. It is not a necessary part of
being pleased about the deal that he .should
contemporaneously be aware of the deal even to the
one removed extent of thinking about it.
When someone is 'pleased at having pulled off a deal' his
experience is more agreeable for a period after he learns of
his success, and it is more agreeable even at times when he is
4. Gosling (1969, pp 62 - 3)
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not thinking about his achievement. Yet this pleasure is a
constituent of his being pleased about the good news.
Within the passage of Thalberg's which was quoted, Thalberg
argued that in the case of pleasure and belief it does not make
sense to ask 'how near to the pleasure the belief was which
allegedly caused the pleasure', and Thalberg interpreted this
as supporting his claim that the belief could not be the cause
of the pleasure. When arguing in this manner Thalberg is
assuming that far two things to be related as cause and effect
they must have positions in space. The argument raises difficult
questions. Must a mental occurrence have a precise location in
(physical) space in order to be either a cause or an effect? If
so, how do we go about locating a mental occurrence in space?
(For instance, is the experience of a pain in the leg itself
in one's leg or in the brain, and if it is in the brain could
one say precisely where?) Do thoughts and beliefs have locations
in the head? These questions are very difficult and profound, and
I will not directly try to deal with them.
Rather, my reply to Thalberg here is that if his argument
were sound it would prove too much. If Thalberg is suggesting,
as he seems to be doing, that a belief cannot be a cause of
pleasure because it lacks physical location, he is committed
to holding that it cannot, for the same reason,- be a cause of
anything. If he is holding that pleasure cannot be an effect of
a belief because it lacks physical location, he is committed to
holding that it cannot be an effect of anything. Thus, if Thalberg
is suggesting both that causes and effects must have physical
locations and that pleasure and beliefs lack spatial location,
it would follow from his position that pleasure and beliefs can
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never be either a cause or an effect. But this is a position that
cannot seriously be maintained.
There are many instances in which it seems undeniable that
beliefs and pleasure enter into causal relations. A man's
belief that his boss will fire him can be a cause of his getting
ulcers. A person's belief that he is being watched can cause him
to stutter or stumble. A drug or a good meal may be a cause of
someone's feeling pleased. Lack of food or sleep can cause
someone to take less pleasure than he usually does in his normal
activities. Admittedly, the Epiphenomenalist holds that pleasure,
beliefs, and mental phenomena in general are never causes of
anything, but he still holds that they are effects (of physical
processes). Furthermore, his view that beliefs, emotions, and
other mental events never have the least causal influence on
physical events or other mental events will be one of the main
problems in his view, and this is precisely because it makes him
deny many propositions that seem obviously true (that a man's
believing something may be a cause of his getting ulcers, that
his being in pain may be thecause of his behaving in certain ways,
etc.). Even the Identity Theorist would not deny that mental
events can be causes and effects. Since a mental event for him is
a physical event, it can enter into any of the causal relation¬
ships into which the corresponding physical event could enter.
Thus the position that Thai berg is committing himself to in his
argument, that pleasure and belief by their very nature can never
enter into any causal relations whatsoever, is unacceptable. It
has much to be said against it and little to be said in favour of
it. I conclude then that pleasure and belief are at least the
sorts of things that can and do enter into causal relationships.
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And given this general view, I see no special problems in holding
that they can enter into causal relationships with each other.
Bernard Williams has provided additional argument against the
causal analysis which I am proposing. One of his arguments he
bases on an alleged incorrigibility of someone's judgements about
the object of his pleasure and the belief to which the pleasure
is connected. If the belief were the cause of the pleasure in
these cases it would be possible for someone to be mistaken in
judging that he is pleased because he believes such and such or
pleased about such and such. If the belief were the cause,
Williams argues, "it would make sense to say that I had just been
mistaken in thinking that it was a certain belief that caused my
pleasure; but in general no sense can be attached to this." If
the object of one's pleasure in these cases were the object of
the thought or belief causing the pleasure it would be possible to
err in judging what one is pleased about, for it would be possible
to err in judging which thought or belief is causing the pleasure.
"But," Williams argues, "I cannot be mistaken in saying 'I am
pleased because I have inherited a fortune' in the same way as I
can in saying, for instance, 'I have a stomach-ache because I
5
ate some bad fruit'." Gilbert Ryle was arguing for a similar
conclusion when he wrote: "When I have been amused by a particular
joke, the question 'What gave me that pleasure?' does not await
an answer. For of course I already know that it was that joke, if
it was that joke that had amused me."^ Ryle is arguing that the
joke or the hearing of the joke is not the cause of the pleasure,
5. Williams (1959, p 227)
6. Ryle (1954a, p 59)
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for if it were one could not know incorribibly what 'gave him'
the pleasure.
But are these judgements incorrigible? Suppose a person is
already feeling pleased or in a good mood when he hears good news
or hears various jokes. In this situation it would not necessarily
be obvious to him what was giving him pleasure. Someone at a
party might be unsure whether it is the good news, the jokes, the
music, or the wine that has been pleasing him. It is not unconnon
for people not to know why they are 'happy' or what they are
'happy about'. So, too, it would not be odd for someone to say
'I feel great, though I do not know what I'm so pleased about'.
If it is possible for someone to be unsure what is pleasing him,
then it also must be possible for him to judge and be mistaken.
The person might, for instance, assume that the jokes were pleasing
him but realize later, after reflection, that the jokes were bad
and that he had not really enjoyed them but that it was really the
warmth of friendship, the good news, the music, and the sense of
occasion which had caused him to feel so pleased. (it would also
be possible for these circumstances to cause someone to be
pleased by jokes that are bad. But my point is that even if the
person were not pleased by the jokes he might, in such a
situation, falsely believe that he had been pleased by them.
This would be a natural mistake, since people do not often
carefully analyze the sources of their pleasures.) Similarly, a
person at a concert might think that he is being pleased by the
music when it is really his companion, the elegant plush theater,
the stimulation of being out of the house, and the anticipation
of the coming meal that is pleasing him.
There are some cases where a person would be in little doubt
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what is pleasing him, and it may be such cases that Ryle and
Williams have in mind. If a person is not already in a particular
pleased mood and he feels more pleased immediately upon hearing a
piece of good news (or a good joke), he would have convincing
evidence that the hearing of the news (or the joke) caused the
pleasure. But the fact that sometimes the question 'What gave me
the pleasure?' does not 'await an answer' does not prove that the
claim is not causal. For causal clains are not always difficult,
and it is not always easy for a rational creature to err when
making a causal judgement. When I see a man kick me in the leg
and immediately feel pain in that leg, there is little chance
that I would be wrong if I judged that the kick was the cause of
the pain.
Williams provides other reasons for denying that the belief
is the cause of the pleasure in the case he discusses. If the
statement 'I am pleased because I have inherited a fortune' means
'I am pleased because I believe I have inherited a fortune' then
"it is impossible to see what evidence I could have for the (causal)
hypothesis, or how I could set about collecting evidence," Williams
7
argues.
What evidence might someone have for thinking that his belief
in an inheritance, or even his hearing of a joke, is the cause of
his pleasure? The direct evidence is the temporal conjunction of
the hearing or thinking of the inheritance, or the hearing of the
joke, and one's feeling pleasure. That a person feels more
pleased immediately upon hearing or thinking of the inheritance, or
hearing the joke, provides good evidence that the cognition is a
cause of the pleasure. He has the same kind of evidence for
7. Williams (1959, p 227)
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connecting his pleasure to his thought as a child has for
connecting the pain in his knee with his just having fallen on
it. The child's evidence is the fact that the onset of the pain
begins with his falling on the knee.
Probably, additional indirect evidence of the presence of a
causal relation in a particular case is contained in background
knowledge which the person has of similar conjunctions in the
past, and this knowledge aids him in making a reliable judgement in
a particular case. The child is aided in making an intelligent
causal inference in a particular case by already knowing that
pains do not often arise randomly and by knowing that physical
injuries are often followed by pain, (indeed, he will probably
learn from his parents the general causal law that pain may be
caused by physical injury.) Similarly, someone will gain from
experience the background information that pleasure and distress
do not often suddenly come and go at random, but that the hearing
of good news or of good jokes is often immediately followed by
the experiencing of pleasure and that the bearing of bad news is
often followed by increased unpleasantness and distress. (We
also gain evidence of a regular conjunction when we see or hear
of another person's coming to feel miserable when he hears bad
news.) This knowledge aids one in judging causal connections in
specific cases by providing evidence of a general causal law.
What evidence might someone have for thinking that some
belief or hearing of a joke was not the cause of his pleasure in
a particular instance? That the two events are not conjoined in
time in the proper manner would indicate that they are not
related causally. If someone realizes that he was already
pleased before hearing of his inheritance, or hearing the joke, he
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has solid evidence that it is not the inheritance or the joke that
he is pleased about. If I feel good but do not feel more pleased
upon thinking of the inheritance, and did not feel more pleased
when I learned of the inheritance, I have strong evidence that I
am not pleased specifically about the inheritance. Another kind
of evidence would be gained if the removal of the circumstance
believed to be the cause were not followed by a change in the
state of affairs believed to be its effect. We then would have
good evidence that the presence of the farmer circumstance was
not the cause of the latter's being the way it was. For instance,
suppose the person finds out that there has been a mistake and
that it is not he who is to receive the inheritance but someone
else. Suppose he feels no less good after learning of this fact.
He would then have evidence that though he felt generally good he
had not been pleased about the inheritance in particular. (That
a person would be genuinely unconcerned about an inheritance would
not be odd if, for instance, the inheritance is a small one or the
person is already quite wealthy and thus expecting to have
little use for an inheritance.) The person might conclude that he
had not been pleased about any specific thing but that he simply
had been in a good mood. He might realize that the cause of his
feeling pleased was not his believing in the inheritance but simply
his having had a good sleep the previous night and his being
greeted in the morning with a beautiful, sunny day.
When Williams says that it is impossible to see how someone
could 'go about collecting evidence' for the 'hypothesis' that a
particular belief has caused him to feel pleased, Williams is in
danger of assuming that in order to recognize causal connections it
is necessary to be a trained scientist with a laboratory where one
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might make a •hypothesis' and then 'go about collecting evidence'.
But a man does not need to be a trained scientist to be able to
conclude, with good probability of being right, that the headache
he is presently suffering was caused by the clout in the head which
he received earlier in the day from his wife. No greater scientific
training is needed for one to be able to conclude, with good
probability of being right, that the pleasure or distress which he
has just begun to feel was caused by his recent hearing of good or
bad news.
Making sound and reliable causal inferences is a normal part
of the life of adult human beings and is frequent among children
and even animals. No great intellectual sophistication is
necessary. A man learns that the presence of cats causes him to
sneeze or that twisting his back in a certain way causes him to
feel a sharp pain; a young child learns that turning a certain
knob causes a picture to appear on the television screen; a
pigeon learns that tapping a certain bar produces a food pellet (i.e.,
causes a food pellet to appear). The pigeon, of course, dees not
have a sophisticated theoretical understanding of the nature of
causality, but the same is true of most adult human beings. Apart
from philosophers and some scientists few people give any thought
whatsoever to what a causal relation is. That the pigeon lacks
formal training in philosophy should not lead us to conclude that
he cannot recognize one thing's being a cause of another.
I conclude, then, that when a person is pleased or distressed
over some state of affairs, his thoughts or belief in that state of
affairs is the cause of his pleasure or distress. The object of
his pleasure or distress is the object of the thought or belief
which is pleasing or distressing him.
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Chapter VIII: Emotion
I_. There is a tradition in Philosophy and Psychology within which
a number of psychological concepts are analyzed by reference to
particular kinds of pleasure or distress. Aristotle, for instance,
wrote:
By passions I mean appetite, anger, confidence, envy,
joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity,
and in gereral the feelings that are accompanied by
pleasure or pain.1
Among the definitions which Aristotle offers for the names of
individual emotions are the following:
Shamer A pain or disturbance in regard to bad things,
whether present, past, or future, which seem
likely to involve us in discredit.^
Pity: A feeling of pain caused by the sight of some
evil destructive or painful, which befalls one
who does not deserve it...
Fear: A pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of
some destructive or painful evil in the future.4
Locke also presents a number of analyses. Among them are the
following:
Sorrow: Uneasiness in the mind, upon the thought of a
good lost...
Anger: Uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon
the receipt of any injury, with a present
purpose of revenge.
Envy;: Uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration
of a good we desire obtained by one we think
should not have had it before us.
Joy: A delight of the mind, from the consideration of
the present or assured approaching possession of
a good.
1. Aristotle (1105b 20)
2. Aristotle-b (1385b 14)
3. Aristotle-b (1385b)
4. Aristotle-b (1382a 21)
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Hope; That pleasure in the mind, which everyone finds
in himself, upon the thought of a probable
future enjoyment.^
David Hume spoke of the 'sensations' of pleasure and pain as the
'very being and essence' of the passions. Of pride and humility.
in particular, he wrote: "Thus pride is a pleasant sensation and
humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain,
there is in reality no pride nor humility."^ Spinoza and other
philosophers as well as many psychologists have given similar
hedonic analyses for various emotions.
The definitions mentioned here are for terms that are within
the vocabulary of the 'emotions'. Many definitions in terms of
pleasure or distress have also been given for psychological
words outside the category of emotion (e.g., for names of
sensations, moods, and character traits). However, in this chapter
my interest will be primarily with what has been said about names
for emotions.
The emotion-names mentioned in the opening paragraph were
defined not just by reference to pleasure and unpleasantness but
by reference.to cognitive pleasure and cognitive distress. Though
there were minor terminological variations within the different
definitions, some reference to the cognitive and the hedonic was
central in each case. Where these philosophers speak of 'pain',
'disturbance', 'discomposure', or 'uneasiness', I" speak of 'distress'
or 'unpleasantness'. Disagreeableness or unpleasantness seems
fundamental to the description which -they offer, and it is in this
way that I will be interpreting these definitions. In most of the
5. Locke (1690, Vol I, Bk II, Ch XX)
6. Hume (1739, Bk II, pt. i)
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cases some cognition was explicitly mentioned within the definition.
However, in defining 'anger' Locke said, that it was unpleasantness
'upon the receipt of injury'. It would be more precise to define
'anger' in terms of the cogniti on of a received injury. It is not
logically possible for someone to be angry over receiving an injury
unless he knows of his ill-treatment. Indeed, to be argry it is
not necessary actually to be treated badly but only to think that
one is being treated badly. Even when people treat me well I can
be angry at them; it is only necessary that I perceive them as
treating me badly or unfairly.
Within most of the definitions an explicit reference is made
to the pleasure or distress being caused by the mentioned cognition.
When Locke writes that sorrow is distress (uneasiness) upon the
thought of a good lost, the word 'upon' could be replaced by
•caused by'. A person feeling sorrow or grief over the death of a
relative feels distressed when he learns or thinks of that death, but
the distress must be caused by this knowledge in order for him to
be feeling sorrow over the death. Suppose a son feels distressed
upon learning that his father has killed himself by smashing the
sone's new car into a tree. If it is the thought of the car being
smashed and not the thought of his father being killed that is
causing the son to feel distressed, then the son feels sorrow for
the loss of the car and not for the death of his father. Feeling
distress while thinking of the father's death is not sufficient
for feeling sorrow over his death. The distress must be caused
by that knowledge or thought for the emotion to be sorrow over the
death# .
The claim that some cognition is a constituent of the various
'feelings' and emotions discussed will not meet much resistance from
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contemporary philosophers. That individual emotions entail specific
thoughts or beliefs is commonly asserted by philosophers these
days, and no one has seriously disputed the claim. Irving Thalberg
explicitly argues that cognition is a component or 'constituent'
7
of an emotion. Kenny writes that "only something thought to be
good can be envied. . . only something thought to be bad can be
8
regretted." Echoing Aristotle's account of pity and Locke's of
sorrow O.H. Green writes: "If a man does not believe that another
has suffered some undeserved misfortune, he cannot feel pity for
him. . . and if a man does not believe that he has suffered some
9
loss, he cannot feel grief."
The description which the earlier philosophers offer of the
cognition involved in a particular emotion are usually similar to,
or compatible with, those which present-day philosophers offer. One
could argue a bit about the precise details of a correct account of
the cognition, but this will not be my concern here. The accounts
which have been offered seem at least roughly correct.
Where the hedonic accounts differ importantly from contem¬
porary views is in giving pleasure and unpleasantness a central
role in the analysis of the emotions in question. As has been the
case in the discussion of pleasure and pain, Wittgenstein's Private
Language Argument has had considerable influence on the discussion
of emotion concepts. In recent years, philosophers have tended to
shy away from or reject the view that some special experiaice is
central to an emotion. In relation to the contemporary outlook, a
7. Thalberg (1973)
8. Kenny (1963, p 193)
9- Green (1972, p 36)
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defense of the hedonic approach takes on a heightened importance.
For I have argued that pleasure and unpleasantness are special
experiences, and I have devoted considerable attention to clarifying
and understanding what is involved in this claim. Given this view,
it follows that any emotion which has pleasure or unpleasantness as
a component thereby has a special experience of the sort discussed
as a component. For instance, if Aristotle was basically correct in
saying that the word 'shame' is to be defined as 'a pain or dis¬
turbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future,
which seem likely to involve us in discredit', it follows that shame
is, in part, a special experience, namely an unpleasant one.
In recent years, when philosophers have raised the question
whether emotions are special experiences they have tended to have
a view other than Aristotle's in mind. Errol Bedford, far instance,
writes:
What evidence is there for the existence of a multitude
of feelings corresponding to the extensive and subtle
linguistic differentiation of our vocabulary for dis¬
cussing emotions? The assumption gains no support from
experience. Indignation and annoyance are two different
emotions; but, to judge from my own case, the feelings
that accompany indignation appear to differ little, if at
all, from those that accompany annoyance. I certainly
find no feeling, or class of feelings, that marks off
indignation from annoyance, and enables me to distinguish
them from one another.^
Bedford goes on to quote a psychologist who has cane to the same
opinion as his. The psychologist writes that "there is little
evidence that a peculiar, unique type of consciousness accompanies
and identifies the different emotions."^
The view that Bedford has in mind is that each emotion has a
10. Bedford (1956, pp 78-79)
11. Boring, Langfeld, and Weld (1948, p 100)
233
unique experiential feel or quality to it and that each emotion is
distinguished from the others by its peculiar, individual intrinsic
quality. Bedford is right that the emotions are not distinguished
from each other in this fashion, and it is important to recognize this.
Hume at times seemed to slip into this 'colour spectrum1 view of
12
emotions, and William James, C.D. Broad, ad other philosophers
also seem' to have held the view that Bedford rightly criticizes.
George Pitcher also has this 'colour spectrum' view of
emotions in mind when he sets out to criticize what he calls 'the
traditional view' of emotiais. The view he attacks is that "to
have an emotion is just to have a certain unique feeling or group
13
of inner feelings, to undergo a special inner experience."
Pitcher does not mention the views of Aristotle, Descartes,
12. Hume writes: "The passions of pride and humility, being simple
and uniform impressions, it is impossible we can ever, by a
multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any
of the passions." (Hume, 1939, Bk II, Part I, Sect. 2. See also
Part II, Sect. I and Part III, Sect. 9 of Bk II.) Here, Hume seems
to think that there is some unique feel to each emotion. However,
Hume also says that pleasure and unpleasantness are 'the very
essence' of the passions and, in the case of pride and humility,
'upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no
pride nor humility'. And Hume also notes "that pride has a special
connection with the idea of oneself. Yet, at least when writing
the above passage, Hume fails to recognize that these other claims
do provide the basis for 'a just and useful' definition of the words
•pride' and 'humility'. With observations such as Hume's, the
authors of The Concise Oxford Dictionary define 'pride', in one
sense, as a "feeling of elation and pleasure due to (an) action or
circumstance that does one credit".
Hume does not need to hold that there is some unique feel to
the experience of pride or that the ward 'pride' is indefinable.
The experience of pride does not necessarily feel different from
other pleasant experiences. Being pleased with some circumstance
which one thinks of as being to his credit does not necessarily
feel different from being pleased to see the heme team win, being
pleased when hearing from the doctor that one's heart is sound, or
taking pleasure in a movie. Locke does not share this inconsistency
or near-inconsistency of Hume's. Locke thinks of the passions as
'modes' of pleasure and pain and does not also say that the nsmes of
the passions are indefinable or that each passion is a'simple'
impression.
13. Pitcher (1965, p 326)
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Spinoza, or Locke. He nowhere directly mentions the view of the
emotions whereby the different names for the emotions are defined
in terms of different forms of cognitive pleasure or cognitive
distress, and most of what he says has little relevance to these
theories.
The view of the emotions which has predominated in the history
of philosophy is not the 'colour spectrum' view where each
emotion is distinguished from the others by having some special
unique feel or experiential quality but one such as Aristotle's
where the emotions are identified as particular kinds of cognitive
pleasure or cognitive distress. For Aristotle, the emotions of
fear and pity are, at least in part, special experiences, namely,
disagreeable ones. What distinguishes fear from pity is the
cognitive component of the emotion. When someone's distress is
due to the sight of sane evil coming to a person not deserving it
his emotion is pity, but when his distress is due to the -thought
of a future evil his emotion is fear. (A more detailed and precise
account of the necessary cognition could be sought.) The experiences
of pity and fear do not necessarily differ from each other in
intrinsic feel. What differs in the two cases is the cognition
that produces the disagreeable tone of the experience.
Few contemporary philosophers show any interest in the hedonic
theories of the emotions; indeed, few even seem- to be aware of the
existence of this tradition. The approach is rarely defended,
attacked, or even mentioned by contemporary philosophers. In his
book Action, Emotion, and Will, Anthony Kenny does discuss the views
of Locke and Hume and the way in which these philosophers give
14
pleasure and pain a central role in the analyses of the emotions.
14. Kenny (1963, Chapter i)
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However, without arguing that Locke and Hume are wrong in concen¬
trating on pleasure and pain in the analysis, Kenny proceeds to
develop his own account of the emotions in a direction in which
pleasure and pain are given no role in the analysis. In his own
account, the stress is put on the behaviour, involuntary physio¬
logical changes, and physical environment associated with par¬
ticular emotions. (Kenny shows a degree of sympathy with
15
Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, and this probably
influenced him into shying away from special experiences and
concentrating on physical factors in his analysis of the emotions.)
Perhaps, Kenny saw no plausibility or importance in the hedonic
analyses.
Stuart Hampshire, in his book Freedom of the Individual,, in
passings shows a degree of sympathy for Spinoza's hedonic analyses of
the emotions. Of someone afraid of the dark, Hampshire writes that
"the fear is the thought of the danger, together with the pertur¬
bation, the disagreeable affect, associated with it." Anger,
Hampshire writes, "is the thought of the wrong or bad thing done,
togeiher with the perturbation, the disagreeable affect, associated
with the thought."^ (Though Hampshire thinks of the unpleasant¬
ness as part of fear and anger in normal cases, he thinks it is
possible far fear and anger not to be unpleasant in some cases. I
will discuss this view in the coming pages.) However, the sympathy
Hampshire has for Spinoza's view is limited to remarks he makes in
passing, whereas, when Hampshire does discuss the emotions at
greater length in another essay he does not mention Spinoza's view
15. Kenny (1963, pp 13-14)
16. Hampshire (1975, p 97)
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and develops his account along distinct, semi-behaviouris tic
17
lines. In this paper, a sympathy with Wittgenstein's Private
Language Argument influences Hampshire, as it influenced Kenny,
into giving behavioural dispositions a central role in the
analysis.
Gosling, in his book Pleasure and Desire, gives some attention
to Aristotle's view of the emotions and acknowledges that there is
some truth in the theciy. He writes:
Feeling angry is very different from feeling sorry or
feeling jealous - yet each may be called a case of
feeling distressed about something... An angry person
is displeased with something conceived as an injury to
himself; a person who feels sorry is displeased at some
misdemeanor of his own as a cause of displeasure to
someone else; a jealous person is displeased at some one
else's success as putting himself in a relatively poor
light.
My pleasure on one occasion may be pleasure at someone's
doing me a kindness, and so be a part of my gratitude.
A person in love, or who feels grateful or triumphant may
be said to feel pleased.
Though Gosling admits that there is some truth in Aristotle's
theory, he does not seem to think there is much importance it it.
He writes:
There is no harm in considering various passions as
forms of pleasure and its opposite so long as one
does not expect too much consequent homogeneity.18
The analysis of various emotions in terms of 'pleasure' and
'distress' would decline in importance if one were to admit that
there is no homogeneity entailed by the claim that, e.g., both
anger and jealousy are 'unpleasant' experiences and that both joy
17. Hampshire (i960). I discussed Hampshire's semi-behaviourist
view in Chapter VT, footnote 16.
18. All quotations of Gosling here are from Gosling (1969,
PP 153-154).
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and pride are 'pleasant' experiences. However, I have criticized
in detail the thinking which lies behind the anti-essentialist
view of pleasure which Gosling and other philosophers have, and I
have provided my own positive, homogeneous account of pleasure. To
say that both anger and jealousy are 'unpleasant' is to assign
them the conmon characteristic of being disagreeable or unattractive
experiences, i.e., experiences that are bad in quality and which
provide reason for shunning them. To say that anger and jealousy
are 'unpleasant' is to say that both are, in part, the same kind
of (special) experience.
The resiliency and importance of the hedonic approach to
analyzing psychological concepts is evidenced in a number of
scattered remarks found in the writings of recent philosophers.
Gilbert Ryle, we noted earlier, warned that pleasure could not be
analyzed by reference to a mood such as cheerfulness. "On the
contrary," he wrote, "the notion of being cheerful has to be
explained in terms of the nation of pleasure, since to be cheerful
is to be easy to please." As cheerfulness seems to entail pleasure,
so moods that are opposites to cheerfulness - e.g., gloom, despair,
and depression - seem to entail unpleasantness. As the cheerful
person is easily pleased so the depressed or despairing person tends
to find his thoughts and normal activities unpleasant or distressing.
Ryle also speaks of a tickle as a "certain sort of distressing
1 a
feeling or sensation". A tickle's being unpleasant is, as I
argued in Chapter V, what explains the squirming or fleeing
behaviour characteristic of someone being tickled. The hedonic
approach is useful for analyzing a mood such as cheerfulness or a
19. Ryle (1950-1, P 195)
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sensati on such as a tickle (or pain) as it is for analyzing an
emotion such as anger.
William Alston writes: "What is it like to feel homesick? Well,
nothing seems very enjoyable, one often has a sinking sensaticaa in
20
one's stomach, and one often thinks of home with pangs of regret."
(The Concise Oxford Dictionary provides a similar hedonic analysis:
to be homesick is to be "depressed by longing for heme during
absence from it".) A reference to the unpleasantness of being
homesick accounts for the 'sickness' in feeling homesick. There is
something wrong, some problem, something which we need to do something
about, when homesick.
In the recent discussion of pleasure, many philosophers have
tended to concentrate on 'enjoyment' and 'being pleased*. It is,
however, somewhat arbitrary to concentrate on these terms. No
philosopher would claim that these are the only terms which entail
pleasure. Irving Thalberg, introduces a broader range of wards in
his discussion of pleasure, and he confidently assumes that he is
referring to a kind of pleasure when he speaks of someone being
'thrilled', 'overjoyed', 'satisfied', 'delighted', or 'content'.
The phrases in which these words appear he speaks of as a "family
21
of phrases about pleasure". In a similar manner, words that are
opposites to these, e.g., 'dejected', 'dissatisfied', and related
terms, seem to be names for kinds of unpleasant- conditions.
It is not only philosophers who think that various psycho¬
logical concepts need to be analyzed hedonically. Titchener, Wundt,
and other psychologists have thought of pleasure and unpleasantness
20o Alston (1969, p 11)
21. Thalberg (1962)
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as the sole or primary dimension of feeling and emotion. The
authors of The Concise Oxford Dicticnary define 'fear' as "a
painful emotion caused by impending danger or alarm", being 'glad'
as being "pleased", an 'itch' as a special "irritation", 'amusement'
as a "pleasant diversion", and 'hunger' as an "uneasy or painful
sensation, exhausted condition, caused by lack of food."
Though contemporary philosophers have offered interesting and
illuminating hedonic proposals, what is lacking in contemporary
philosophy is the recognition of a trend here. It is not recog¬
nized that it is not simply this or that concept that may be
analyzed by reference to pleasure or unpleasantness, but that a
great number and wide range of concepts may be analyzed by reference
to the agreeable or disagreeable in experience.
II. Not all of the hedonic proposals mentioned in the previous
section will seem obviously true to all philosophers. To some
philosophers sane of these proposals may seem obviously false.
David Hume, we may recall, wrote the following about pride and
humility*
Pride is a pleasant sensation and humility a painful;
and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is
in reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very
feeling convinces us; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here
in vain to reason or dispute.
To Hume it seemed obvious that pride is pleasant and humility
unpleasant, and he seemed to think that this would also seem
obvious to anyone else who introspectively examines these feelings.
However, these judgements will not in fact seem obvious to all
philosophers. In a recent paper Donald Davidson discussed Hume's
view of pride, and he gave considerable attention to certain
cognitions which Hume linked to pride. However, Hume's suggestion
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that pride was always and necessarily pleasant Davidson thought
obviously false. Indeed, Davidson thought it so obvious that pride
is not always pleasant that he dismissed Hume's suggestion without
argument. "Though there are sometimes characteristic frissons of
pleasure that accompany prideful thoughts, such experiences are not
necessary or typical," was about all that Davidson says on the
22
matter. Since a hedanic analysis of pride will not appear
obvious to all philosophers, one who would define 'pride' by refe¬
rence to pleasure will be obliged to provide some argument to
support this definiti on.
Hume seemed to think that the pleasantness of pride was to
be established by introspection rather than by argument. That
pride is pleasant and humility unpleasant "our very feeling
convinces us; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here in vain to
reason or dispute," he wrote. Argument is not merely unnecessary
but useless Hume thought.
However, Hume believed not merely that pride is in fact
pleasant but that it is necessarily pleasant. "Upon the removal
of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility,"
he wrote. But if someone were to confirm by introspective,
empirical judgement that a feeling of pride is always pleasant, it
would not thereby be shown that pride is necessarily pleasant but
merely that it in fact always is. Prom someone's introspective judge¬
ment that pride is always pleasant for him it would not follow that
pride will always be pleasant for everyone, that pride must be
pleasant in all possible worlds, or that pride is_ in part feeling
22. Davidson (1976, p 745)
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pleased. To show that pride is necessarily pleasant one will need
more than empirical observation. To prove that the c oncepts of pride
and pleasure are interlocked, some sort of argument will be both
appropriate and necessary.
Though there have been, since the tire of Aristotle, many
proponents of hedonic analyses for emotions, what has been missing
is argument to support the proposals. Those philosophers who
presented hedonic definitions provided no argument to support
their views. Like Hume the o tiier proponents seem to have thought
that their analyses were obvious. No doubt this complacency was
encouraged by the fact that little serious criticism of the view
has appeared in print; the complacency was perhaps also partly
due to the fact that throughout the periods during which hedonic
theories were common there were no developed alternative positions
to compete with their own views. I will now take a closer look at
some hedonic proposals. I will elucidate and argue for these
proposals and defend them from possible objections.
There are sane emotions for which it will appear obvious to
most or all philosophers that the emotions have an analytic
connection to pleasure or unpleasantness. That jubilation ('joy'),
blissfulness, and delight are nedessarily pleasant, and extremely
so, and that despair, grief ('sorrow'), misery, and distress
('suffering', 'agony') are necessarily unpleasant few philosophers
would seriously dispute. More likely, a philosopher would claim
that these statements are trite and are truisms. He might object
that being joyous or jubilant just is being highly pleased and that
the problem in explaining what agony or grief is just is the
problem of explaining what extreme unpleasantness is.
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The claim that these statements are truisms is one with which
I agree. Indeed, this is just what I am claiming (though some
cognitive content needs to he added to 'grief' and 'jubilation',
e.g., the thought or belief that one has lost or gained something
good). However, in the context of having given a detailed account
of pleasure and unpleasantness these truisms are not empty or
uninformative. If one applies to grief, jubilation, and the other
menti cried emotions the accounts of pleasure and unpleasantness which
I have given it would follow that these emotions are, in part,
special experiences, i.e., experiences of good or bad quality.
Furthermore, the discussion of Cognitive Pleasure and
Cognitive Distress in Chapter VII supplies us with an account of
the relation of these emotions to their 'objects'. How j.s a person's
grief related to the object of his grief, e.g., the person whose
death he is grieving over? According to Locke's analysis, grief
('sorrow') is distress at the thought of a good lost. The object
of the grief is the object of the thought which is causing ore
distress, i.e., the person or thing which is considered good and
believed to be no longer present. When someone is grieving over
the death of a friend, the friend is the object of the thought
which is distressing the grieving person. How is soneone's
jubilation related to the object of his emotion, e.g., the signing
of a peace treaty between his country and its main enemy? According
to Locke's definition the object of the jubilation ('joy'), the
peace treaty, is the object of the thought which is causing one
pleasure. The object of the jubilation is that state of affairs
which is considered good and whose existence is believed to be
present or assured.
But are there not people who enjoy suffering or grieving, or
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find these emotions satisfying, and does this not show that these
emotions are not necessarily fully unpleasant? When we describe
something as 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' we often mean that it
biings or causes pleasure or unpleasantness. Even things that
are themselves unpleasant can be 'pleasant' in this sense, since
even unpleasantness can be a means to pleasure. For instance,
someone who suffers unpleasantness might feel pleased when
recognizing that his suffering is coming to an end. A student who
suffers stress when studying for exams may feel highly pleased
upon finishing his last exam, and the suffering may actually be a
stimulant or cause of the pleasure. We might even describe the
situation as one in which there was a certain pleasure to his
suffering. More paradoxically, we might say that his suffering
was not wholly unpleasant or that it was to some extent pleasant.
However, it is only in the sense of being a means to pleasure that
suffering can be 'pleasant'. It can never be intrinsically
pleasant. Similarly, if we talk of someone (e.g., a masochist)
enjoying his suffering or grief our meaning is that he is enjoying
something unpleasant. (it is just because his suffering is
unpleasant and therefore bad that the masochist views it as
punishment and thereby gains satisfaction from it.) Suffering
23
cannot be intrinsically pleasant.
Moritz Schlick once wrote the following passage:
The word 'suffering' in its significant sense, is always
23. There may be times when we speak of someone as enjoying
'suffering' when we are not thinking that he is really suffering
but that he is pretending that he is suffering or that he is still
suffering. In these cases, we are, so to speak, talking in
inverted comnas, since we do not think that he is 'suffering'
in the literal sense of the word.
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used only for mixed states, for complicated experiences
whose feeling tones are never wholly and purely pain...
Emotions of wholly unmixed pain are rare... Most farms of
disagreeable things tend to have a hidden pleasure com¬
ponent, as it were, and this holds even of anger, fear,
care, and of mourning. Even the profound grief with
which we stand at the deathbed of a loved one is
permeated by a peculiar remote sweetness.
Experiences of 'suffering' are not wholly disagreeable,
not altogether painful. ^
Part of what Schlick is saying here is that people rarely experience
unpleasantness without experiencing pleasure at the same time.
Even when experiencing great unpleasantness there may still be 3ome
pleasure being felt at the time. I doubt that this is as common
as Schlick thinks it is, but it is possible for people to feel this way.
It would be, however, misleading to say, as Schlick is close
to doing, that the word 'suffering' may refer to elements within
experience that are not fully unpleasant. To say that someone
is 'suffering' is to say that he is experiencing extreme unpleasant¬
ness. A person could experience pleasure while he is experiencing
unpleasantness, but we are not referring to that pleasure when we
speak of the person as 'suffering'. When we say that someone is
'suffering', the word 'suffering' in itself is being used to refer
only to unpleasantness. No pleasure is entailed by the claim that
someone is 'suffering' or experiencing 'grief'; however, unpleasant¬
ness is entailed by the claim that someone is 'sufferirg' or
experiencing 'grief'. Schlick wrote that a disagreeable experience
can have a pleasure 'component'. However, pleasure cannot be a
'component' of suffering or grief in the sense in which unpleasant¬
ness is a 'component' of suffering or grief. When Schlick says that
pleasure may be a 'component' of suffering, this is merely a mis-
24. Schlick (1939, pp 137-138)
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leading way of saying that someone may experience pleasure while
suffering and that the suffering may actually be a cause or a
source of the pleasure. Schlick worded his claim by saying that
"most forms of disagreeable things tend to have a hidden pleasure
component, as it were, and this holds even of anger, fear..®" The
•as it were* indicates that Schlick senses that he is not speaking
fully literally. He refers to suffering, grief, etc., as 'disag¬
reeable things* and in doing so he seems to be acknowledging that
these states are disagreeable - not 'partly disagreeable', not
'agreeable' - in some fundamental way.
That suffering and grief are related analytically to unpleasant¬
ness and jubilation and delight to pleasantness will appear obvious
to most philosophers. However, the suggestion that fear is always
unpleasant or that pride is always pleasant may seem less obvious.
George Pitcher writes that "part of being afraid that some¬
thing will happen is that one considers that thing bad or un-
25
fortunate." Pitcher says that this cognition is part of fear; it
is not all of fear and is not a sufficient condition far fear. Any
thought or belief can be had dispassionately or unemotionally. A
soldier might realize that he is in danger and that his life is
threatened, yet he might feel brave and unafraid. Two people might
go to the dentist each knowing that they are about to experience
something bad and extremely distasteful, yet only one might feel
frightened at the prospect. A prisoner sentenced to be hung might,
after being afraid for weeks, resign himself to his fate and cease
to be frightened. His cognitive outlook need not have changed,
since he might continue to view death as extremely undesirable.
25. Pitcher (1965, p 343)
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Religious martyrs are often portrayed as facing pain or death
without being afraid, and there does not seem to be any logical
impossibility in this idea. Any evil could be faced with despair
or courage instead of fear.
A person could believe that he is about to die and think of
death as a bad thing yet not be afraid. Whatmore is necessary?
The person must also be disturbed or bothered by the prospect of
his death. He must find the prospect of his death unsettling;
the thought of death must be the source of an uneasy, uncomfortable
feeling. To say these things is to say that he must find the
prospect of his death distressing and unpleasant. The more dis¬
tressing the thought of death is the more frightened the person
is. The unpleasantness a frightened person experiences might be
limited to his feeling an unpleasant 'sinking sensation' in the
stomach region upon the thought of himself dangling in the air
with the rope tied tightly round his neck. Or the unpleasantness
might be more vaguely located and associated wi th a general
physical tenseness throughout the chest region of his body. This
unpleasantness is the non-cognitive, feeling,'affect', or 'special
experience' needed for fear. This is the analysis Aristotle is
giving when he defines 'fear' as a 'pain or disturbance due to
a mental picture of some future evil' .
The claim that fear is at least normal!y unpleasant few
philosophers would doubt. Nor would many philosophers query a
claim that terror, or intense fear, is always unpleasant.
Philosophers sometimes mention cases of fear which they say are
not unpleasant, but it is usually cases of mild fear or
'nervousness' that they have in mind. However, one who would
hold that there is no analytic tie between fear and unpleasantness
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must hold that it is at least logically possible to have the most
intense of fears ('terror') without feeling any unpleasantness
whatsoever. Yet, this does not seem to be a logical possibility.
Ryle at one point mentions that the fact that people volun¬
tarily do things that frighten them, such as rock-climbing, shows
26
that fear is not always unpleasant. Does not the fact that
people go to horror movies show that they sometimes enjoy being
frightened?
To go to 'horror movies' is not necessarily to feel horror,
nor do all people who do 'frightening' things such as rock-
climbing feel frightened. Probably, many people do not feel at all
nervous or frightened by many of the movies that are called 'horror
movies'. To me, Frankenstein movies are more charming or quaint than
frightening. And, as there will be some people who go climbing
who feel nervous and do not enjoy themselves, so there will be some
people who enjoy themselves without feeling frightened. These
cases do not threaten the thesis presently being examined.
Still, there are people who enjoy watching movies that
genuinely frighten them and people who enjoy rock-climbing yet do
feel frightened while they are climbing. Indeed, it might even
be claimed that the fear might even be a source of stimulant of the
pleasure. However, the admission that people might enjoy themselves
while frightened, or that they might even find fear 'pleasant' in
the sense of being a stimulant or cause of pleasure is not incon¬
sistent with the claim that the fear is. in itself unpleasant. As
will be clear by now, it is quite possible to experience pleasure
and unpleasantness at the same time.
26. Ryle (1949, p 95)
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There is, I think, a tendency to exaggerate the degree of fear
that people feel in some activities which they do for pleasure.
Someone who enjoys rock-climbing or horror movies while
'frightened' is likely to be nervous or mildly frightened and not
extremely frightened °r literally 'terrified'. (A better example
of someone likely to be literally 'terrified' is the father in the
doctor's reception room who is waiting to hear if his daughter
is going to live.) Though some movies make us genuinely nervous
or frightened, it is only in rare moments that one feels extreme
fear (e.g., when shocked by the sudden, unexpected sight of the
grey, contorted corpse). And one will not find these moments
intrinsically pleasant, though perhaps they may generate or lead to
a feeling of pleasuarable relief afterwards.
The fact that people voluntarily do these things and that they
take pleasure in doing them does not show that the fear is not
itself unpleasant. If people found these activities for the most
part pleasurable, this would give them sufficient reason for
engaging in the pastimes even if the fear or nervousness were it¬
self unpleasant. People are often keen to be tickled, yet as Ryle
himself notes, a tickle in itself is an unpleasant sensation. The
fact that a young lady takes delight in being tickled by her
boyfriend does not show that she thinks of the sensation of being
tickled as intrinsically nice but that she finds the occasion to
be for the most part amusing and pleasant. The sensation a person
feels when being'tickled is not intrinsically attractive but merely,
in the context, is a source of pleasure. It is quite consistent to
say that fear, under certain conditions, stimulates or causes
pleasurable excitement but that it is nevertheless in itself
unpleasant.
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The question for us is not whether the frightened rock-
climber or movie-goer finds the occasion as a whole unpleasant but
whether he finds a certain aspect of the situation unpleasant. The
answer is that the rock-climber who is nervous about falling has
thoughts of falling, and these thoughts cause him some distress.
He finds the thought of falling to some degree upsetting or
unpleasant. The greater the distress at the thought of falling,
the greater is tie nervousness or fear. The movie-viewer who is
frightened by the threat of the 'murderer's' presence is, to that
extent, bothered, uncomfortable, or distressed by his preserce.
Why, then, if fear is intrinsically unpleasant are people
often eager to do things that make them nervous or frightened?
Their experiences are mixtures of unpleasantness and pleasure, and
the pleasure is the greater part in the mixture.
Stuart Hampshire produces another example of a case of fear
which, he says, need not be accompanied by unpleasantness. Though
Hampshire felt a sympathy for Spinoza's hedonic analysis of the
emotions he felt obliged to admit that it is possible to have an
emotion without the hedonic element that would 'normally' be
present. He writes:
When I truthfully say that I am sad about something, or
that I am frightened of something (e.g., of German
nationalism), I am not always reporting an inner pertur
bation, an affect, in addition to the thought of the
object as an appropriate object of sadness or fear.
Just because the thought is in the normal case an element
in the state of mind, together with the affect, one can
intelligibly speak of being frightened of German
nationalism, when the thought of danger is present,
without the associated disagreeable affect.
Hampshire is right that someone can truthfully say that he is
27. Hampshire (1975, pp 95-97)
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afraid of German nationalism without feeling discomfort at the
moment in which he is uttering the words. What a person feels when
he is reporting that he is afraid of German nationalism - i.e.,
what he feels while uttering the words - is not crucial to the fear
being reported. But this is not because fear is not necessarily
unpleasant but because someone who is reporting a fear of German
nationalism is not necessarily reporting a present, momentary
emotion but is reporting a long-standing emotional disposition. He
is saying that he tends, at times, to feel nervous or frightened of
German nationalism.
A person who says that he is a clumsy person can be speaking
truthfully without behaving clumsily at the time he is uttering
these words, but it does not follow that one can be a clumsy
person without ever behaving in a certain (clumsy) manner.
Similarly, when someone truthfully says that he is afraid of mice,
what he feels at the time of saying this is not necessarily
crucial to the fear he is reporting. He might tell me of his
fear while driving down the road when there is no danger of mice
and when he does not feel the least bit nervous. He is reporting
a tendency to feel nervous or frightened on certain occasions,
e.g., when he sees a mouse, when he walks near the place where he
last saw the mouse, or when he walks through- the house at
night in the dark. At times such as these the the thought of mice
appearing occurs to him, and he finds the thought disturbing and
unpleasant.
In a like manner, if someone is afraid of German nationalism,
he at times feels nervous or perturbed at the thought, e.g.,
when he reads some newspaper heading about Germany, sees a German
car on the road, or falls into conversation about Germanyo If there
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were no such discomforts felt, it would follow that the man is not
bothered or disturbed by the thought of German nationalism, and if
he is not disturbed by the thought, he is not frightened of German
nationalism.
Pear comes in different degrees. Both extreme fright (terror)
and mild fright (nervousness) are cases of 'fear'. A person
extremely afraid and a person only mildly afraid can both correctly
be described as 'being afraid'. One 'frightened' person mig^it be
far less distressed by the thought of the feared object than is
another 'frightened' person, but this does not show thatthe
discomfort felt is incidental to fear. The less distressed a person
is by the thought of approaching danger, the less frightened he is.
It is possible to be afraid even when one is experiencing only
minor discomfort, but then the fear is mild or low in intensity.
Both a Belgian in 1938 and an American in 1970 might have
correctly said that they were 'afraid of German nationalism',
yet we might expect that the former would have been far more
frightened than the latter. When Hampshire writes that a fear of
German nationalism is not necessarily accompanied by a 'disa¬
greeable affect' he probably is thinking of someone like the
contemporary American rather than of someone like the pre-war
Belgian. That is, he is thinking of someone who is only mildly
frightened by the thought of German nationalism. However, even
to be mildly afraid it is necessary to be at least mildly
'unsettled' or bothered by the thought, that is, one must find the
thought at least mildly unpleasant or disagreeable.
Some people exaggerate with their words for rhetorical
purposes. They say that they 'hate' when they dislike, that they
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'love' when they like, that they are 'terrified' when they are
afraid; they say that they think something is 'fantastic' when
they think it is good or 'horrible' when they think it is bad.
Some people try to contribute to an impression of their being
worldly, informed, and sensitive by exaggerating with their
words when describing their thoughts and feelings on international
affairs. When such a person says that he is frightened' of
some situation in another country (e.g., German nationalism)
he may in fact be little or not at all distressed or bothered by
the situation, but this is not because fear need not be unpleasant
but because the person does not feel what his words, taken lite¬
rally, imply that he feels.
Hampshire said that a person might say that he was afraid of
German nationalism when in fact he is not distressed by the
thought of it but merely thinks of German nationalism as 'an
appropriate object of fear'. This is to say that a person might
say that he is afraid of something when he is not afraid but merely
thinking that it would be anpropriate to be afraid of this.
Suppose a man told us 'I'm afraid that dad is going to die soon'
but we knew that the speaker was not in fact the least distressed
at the prospect of his father's death. In this case the speaker
is not genuinely afraid of his father's dying but is either
insincere or speaking figuratively rather than literally.
Similarly, if someone said that he is afraid of German nationalism
but he was not in fact the least bit bothered or distressed by
the thought of it but only thought that this was 'an appropriate
object of fear', then he is speaking either insincerely or
figuratively.
When he denied that unpleasantness is necessary for fear
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Hampshire in effect adopted the position that thinking that some¬
thing is dangerous is in itself a sufficient condition for 'fear'.
Hampshire, we may recall, explained the semantic situation as
follows:
Just because the thought is in the normal case an element
in the state of mind, together with the affect, one can
intelligibly speak of being frightened of German
nationalism, when the thought of danger is present,
without the associated disagreeable affect.
This seems to be a way of saying that sometimes when I claim that
I am (literally) frightened of something I am not claiming that I
am bothered by the thought of that thing but only that I think
that this thing is dangerous. By holding this Hampshire seems to
be committing himself to the view that to think of something as
dangerous _is 'being afraid' of that thing in some (literal) sense
of the phrase. This seems to imply that any time someone thinks
that something is dangerous he is 'afraid' of that thing in some
literal sense of the word 'afraid'. (How could fear sometimes be
the thought of danger if there were times when the thought of
danger was not fear?)
However, I have already provided solid argument against this
position to which Hampshire seems to commit himself. Earlier I
argued that the thought or belief that one is in danger is not a
sufficient condition for fear. To say that the thought of danger
is not a sufficient condition for 'fear' is to. say that there is
no literal sense for which 'being afraid' is simply having the
thought that something is dangerous. When someone believes that
he is in danger it is possible for him to be brave, apathetic, or
despairing, and in such cases he would not necessarily be afraid
in any literal sense of the term. It is possible for someone to
believe that German nationalism is dangerous yet be totally apathetic
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and unconcerned about it, and in such a case he would not be
'afraid' in any literal sense of the word. Consequently, when
someone claims that he is (literally) afraid of German nationalism
he would never be claiming only that he thinks it is dangerous.
It may in fact be_ that the person thinks it is dangerous but is not
bothered by the thought, but in claiming that he is literally
afraid he would be claiming that he is bothered by the thought of
if.
Some philosophers think that there is an important distinction
between 'being afraid' and 'feeling afraid', and such a philosopher
might object that unpleasantness is part of 'feeling afraid' but
not necessarily of ' being afraid'. However, the preceding
argument applies as much to the latter expression as to the former.
The thought or belief that one is in danger is not sufficient
for being afraid. To 'be afraid' as well as 'feel afraid' it
isnecessary to be bothered, unsettled, and thus distressed by
the thought of the danger. A man could not be afraid of mice or
of heights without at times being disturbed and distressed when
seeing or thinking of mice or when gazing from heights.
There is no sharp distinction in meaning of the sort these
philosophers suppose between 'being afraid' and 'feeling afraid'.
Perhaps the former expression more often than the latter is used
to refer to an emotional disposition, i.e., a-disposition to feel
the emotion on various occasions. Philosophers have, I suspect,
been misled by the fact that the distinction echoes a distinction
between, e.g., being intelligent or strong and feeling intelligent
or strong. Someone can be intelligent without feeling intel¬
ligent and can feel intelligent without being intelligent.
However, one could also formulate a distinction between 'being in
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pain' and 'feeling pain', yet this latter distinction comes to
nothing. The fact that we can make this linguistic distinction
does not show that one can Ije in pain' without ever 'feeling pain*
or that 'being in pain' is not having a kind of unpleasant sensationo
Is pride intrinsically pleasant and necessarily so? The
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 'pride' in one sense as a
"feeling of elation and pleasure due to action or circumstance
that does one credit". More precisely, we may say that pride is
pleasure due to the cognition of some action or state of affairs
which is thought of as being to one's credit. We can take pride
in what we think does us credit even if the thing does not in
fact do us credit.
Is pleasure necessary for pride? Donald Davidson in a
recent discussion of Hume's view of pride took the position that a
certain cognition, without pleasure, is sufficient for pride:
What is needed to account for pride is the attitude
of approval, or thinking well of, rather than being
pleased.2°
On Davidson's view, a person's being proud that he has won the
long distance competition in the Olympic Games would be his
anproving of himself because of his win, and this would be the same
as his judging himself to be praiseworthy because of his
29
achievement.
Thou^i the approval or cognition which Davidson mentions is
necessary for pride it is not sufficient. This attempted reduc-
28. Davidson (1976, p 748)
29. Davidson (1976, p 755)
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tion of emotion or 'feeling' to cognition will not succeed. As
was mentioned earlier, any thought or cognition can be had
unemotionally or dispassionately. There is no thought towards
which it is not in principle possible for someone to be
indifferent; any thought could, in principle, leave a person
'unmoved'. Consider, for instance, a man very bothered by some
personal problem. He plays his weekly tennis game with an old
friend of his, and he plays very well. On other occasions he
would have taken greater 'self-satisfaction' in playing so well
but today, because he is feeling miserable, he does not take
pride in his agility. On this day the thought of his having
played very skillfully leaves him totally 'unmoved'. The cog¬
nition that he has played very well on its own is not sufficient
for his being proud of his performance.
If pride or any other emotion were simply some thought it
would be possible for people to feel pride or any other emotion
at will. Most people could sit down at any time of day and
think of things which they have done very well or circumstances
which they believe are to their credit. Most of us think that we
have done at least some praiseworthy things in our lives, and we
could recall these events if we wanted to do so. However,
people cannot feel pride or any other emotion at will. (Historically,
the word 'passion' is connected with the idea of 'passivity'.
•Passions' overcome us and are not taken on voluntarily whereas
'actions' are voluntary and for the most part under an agent's
control.) The reason for this is that feeling proud is not simply
thinking of something which does one credit but is also feeling
pleased by this thought, and though one can think about some
subject at will, normally a person cannot at will be pleased by
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thinking of some subject.
Normally it is recent actions or achievements and not actions
of the distant past in which people take pride. Consider, for
instance, a man who has just won a competition at the Olympic
Games. His chest 'swells with pride' as he steps up to receive
his award. Likely, for many hours after the event, he will, as
the thought of his achievement occurs to him at various times,
feel great pride in his victory. However, as the event recedes
further and further into the past, the thought of his victory
will leave him less "moved' and so he is less overcome with pride.
After a number of years have passed the thought of his earlier
success might be associated with no pride at all. However, there
need not be, during this passage of time , some corresponding
change in the person's opinion or evaluation of his achievement.
The person has little reason to think less of an achievement a
few days or a few weeks after the achievement. The decrease in
pride felt is not attributable to some cognitive change. Ten
years after the event he might continue to believe and might
readily acknowledge that he had rim a very praiseworthy race cxi
the earlier occasion, and yet might nevertheless have long since
ceased to be proud of himself for that achievement.
What has changed in these cases is not the person's evaluation
of his accomplishment but the degree to which -the man is able to
feel pleased over his earlier accomplishment. In the first hours
and days after the event he felt pleased (delighted) at his
success, and it is this pleasure which is the 'feeling' component
in his being proud of his success. As the event recedes further
into the past, the thought of his success loses its impact,
i.e., it loses its power to please. (As a psychological fact,
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thoughts which please or pain us at one time lose their power to
do so as time passes. This fact about painful emotions underlies
the saying 'Time heals all wounds'. The idea is not simply that
people's thoughts or beliefs about a situation change over time
but that thoughts which pain us at one time lose their power to do
so as time passes.) As the thought of his success comes to be a less
potent source of pleasure so he comes, in proportion, to feel less
pride over his achievement. (it is not logically impossible, to
take pride in events of the distant past. It is logically possible
for one's chest to 'swell with pride' when he thinks of an
achievement of twenty years ago.)
That a person is proud of his looks entails that he is
pleased with his looks. A man's being proud of his skill in
playing the banjo entails his being pleased with his skill. A
mother's being proud of her family entails her being pleased with
it: she thinks that the qualities in her family reflect an
achievement on her part, and she takes pleasure in the thought
that they do so.
Descriptions of pride, like descriptions ctf other emoticzis,
sometimes refer to specific occurrences of the emotion and at
other times refer to a disposition to feel the emotion on various
occasions. When saying 'Ann is proud of her looks' we may be
thinking that at the present moment, now that.she has finished
dressing for the dance, she feels proud. Alternatively, in saying
this we may be claiming that it is a trait of her personality or
character that she is proud of her looks. Pride as a character
trait is simply a disposition to feel pride on various occasions.
That 'Ann was proud of her looks for most of her youth' entails
that 'Joan was pleased with her looks for most of her youth'.
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This latter statement entails that 'at various times in her youth
the thought of her looks being good occurred to Ann and brou^it
her pleasure'. (Perhaps the phrase 'being proud' would more
frequently be used for emotional dispositions than would the
phrase 'feeling proud'. However, 'being proud' like 'feeling
proud' entails 'being pleased'.)
There are various pride-idioms which deserve some mention and
explanation. That a carpenter 'takes pride in' his carpentry
entails that he is proud of the work he does, i.e., that when
working on or completing a piece he, at various times, tends to
feel proud of his work. That a man takes pride inhis mind but not
in his looks entails that he is proud of his mind but not of his
looks. The description of someone as 'taking pride in' his
carpentry or his mind has the additional connotation that he
devotes special attention or carefulness to his work or mental
activity. To say that a carpenter 'takes pride in' his work is
to suggest that his manner of working is motivated, at least in
part, by a desire to produce a piece that he can be proud of, i.e.,
a piece that would warrant his feeling proud of it.
What is it to suffer 'hurt pride' or 'loss of pride'? A
person who normally is proud of himself suffers hurt pride or
loss of pride when an event occurs which he perceives as
discreditable to himself and which causes him.to be less proud
for a period. To feel 'hurt pride' is not in itself to feel pride
at all but is to feel, e.g., shame or anger at the event or
circumstance perceived to be discrediting.
To say that someone has 'regained his pride' is to say that
after suffering a period of hurt pride or loss of pride - i.e.,
a period in which he felt little pride in himself - he has come to
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be proud of himself to the degree that he previously had been.
A young man whose girlfriend has dropped him in favour of someone
better looking normally suffers, among other emotions, hurt pride.
The event, for a time, 'destroys his self-confidence and pride' :
his thou^its become dominated with an event that seems to indicate
that he is a comparatively unattractive person. As time passes,
his opinion of his own merits rises as his perspective on events
changes and becomes less distorted; he again becomes able to take
pride in his good qualities and merits.
A man who is proud of his skill in tennis would often be more
distressed by playing badly than would someone less proud of his
skill in tennis. A man who takes pride in his self-sufficiency
and in his ability to provide for his family may be more distressed
than would someone who did not pride himself in this ability if
he became unemployed and were forced to request public aid. These
facts show that pride is sometimes a source of pain and that it
can be 'painful' in the sense of being a cause of pain. Should we
conclude from this that pain is as closely connected to pride or
as much 'a part of' pride as is pleasure? No. ' The pain men¬
tioned here is an effect of pride whereas the pleasure is a
constituent. That a man takes pride in his ability to provide
for his family entails that he takes pleasure in this achievement;
that he is distressed by being forced to request public assistance
is at most an effect of his previously having been proud of his
ability to support his family. It is logically possible for some¬
one to take pride in his ability to support his family without
being distressed when he loses the ability. If, for instance, a
number of good things happen to the person at the time he loses
his job his thoughts might become occupied with his gains rather
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than his losses. In this situation a person who had been proud
of his ability to support his family might not be distressed when
losing the ability. However, it is not logically possible for
someone to be proud of an ability without being pleased that he
has it.
We sometimes describe a person as being proud, simpliciter.
without explicitly claiming that he is proud of some particular
achievement or ability. To say this is at least to say that he
has a high opinion of his merits and attributes and that he is
pleased with them. It may be possible to be proud of oneself
without being proud of some particular merits or accomplishments,
but normally a proud disposition will be composed of pride in
various personal achievements and qualities. Normally, when
someone is correctly described as being 'a proud person1, sim¬
pliciter, he will be a person who is proud of various particular
circumstances, e.g., his being a self-made man, his having raised
healthy and happy children, his having been successful in his
career, etc.
Vanity is excessive or unwarranted pride. A person who is
vain is excessively pleased with himself - he is pleased with
himself for attainments or qualities that do not warrant the
degree of enthusiasm he feels. In judging that someone is
vain we not only are saying that he is pleased with himself
but are also making a moral or value judgement that his feelings
are excessive or unwarranted to the extent that his feeling this
way is a fault in him. It is this moral or value judgement
implicit in judgements of vanity that Errol Bedford is thinking
of when he writes:
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There are certain cases in which a third-person state¬
ment gives the speaker's verdict on that person; a
factor which certainly complicates discussions of
character. Such terms as 'vain', 'enviais', and
'resentful' are terms of censure.^
Gilbert Ryle, when defending the claim that vanity is not a
special experience, argued as follows::
There is no special thrill or pang which we call a
'feeling of vanity'. Indeed, if there were such
a recognizable specific feeling, and the vain man
was constantly experiencing it, he would be the first
instead of the last person to recognize how vain he
was. ^
There are two points that need to be made in replying to this
argument. Firstly, by speaking of someone as 'a vain man' we
often would be attributing not merely a present emotion but some
character-trait to him. To have a vain character-trait or
disposition is to be disposed to feel vain on various occasions.
The vain man is not 'constantly experiencing vanity' any more
than the clumsy man is constantly being clumsy, i.e., being
clumsy every moment of the day. But, nevertheless, the vain
man does have special feelings on various occasions. Secondly,
recognizing vanity in ourselves is not simply recognizing that we
30. Bedford (1956, pp 89-90). Vanity is always and necessarily
a fault and thus is a 'term of censure'. The terms 'envious' and
'resentful' are in a slightly different category. Unlike vanity,
envy and resentment are not always faults. That a philosopher
should envy the brain-power of Aristotle seems no fault, nor is it
a fault for a mistreated person to be resentful of his treatment.
When thought of as a character-trait and not merely as a
particular emotional occurrence, being an 'envious' or a 'resent¬
ful' person would normally be undesirable. However, these traits
would, I think, differ from vanity in that it is at least possible
to have these character-traits without some fault or undesirability
being involved. If a person lived among far more talented people
or among people who regularly mistreated him, it is doubtful whether
his having a character-trait of being an envious or a resentful
person would be a fault. (This is so especially if he were other¬
wise a harpy, congenial person.)
31- Ryle* (1949, pp 84-85)
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are pleased with ourselves but recognizing that we are not
warranted in being pleased in some instance. A person's slowness
in recognizing his own vanity therefore is but a single instance of
the general human trait of being slow to recognize one's own
faults and excesses. (Most of us are much quicker to see
faults in others than we are to see them in ourselves.) That
people are slow or unable to recognize vanity in themselves is not
due to vanity's not being a special experience (or a disposition
to have special experiences) but is due largely to a low capacity
in people for recognizing one's own excesses and faults.
Conclusion
The hedonic approach to the analysis of psychological concepts
is important for various reasons. For emotions a hedonic analysis
provides, firstly, a clear description of the components of an
emotion and of their relationships to each other and, secondly,
it provides an explanation of the relation of an emotion to its
'object'. The hedonic approach counters the tendency in recent
Philosophical Psychology for philosophers to avoid assigning a
role to special experiences in the analysis of psychological
concepts. To show that a psychological concept entails pleasure
or unpleasantness is to show that it entails a kind of
experience of the sort outlined in earlier chapters. Hedonic
analyses explain what the emotion or sensation feels like; they
describe the 'subjective character' of the emotion or sensation.
I have defended hedonic analyses for little more than a
handful of psychological concepts. As is suggested by the number
and variety of hedonic proposals mentioned in the early part of
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this chapter, there are probably a number of additional psycho¬
logical concepts which would be susceptible to hedonic analyses.
The various proposals would benefit from closer examination and
from argument offered in defense. I rest content to point in the
direction of a type of philosophical analysis whd ch appears promising
and important. In this direction will be found a useful appli¬
cation for the insights gained in the foregoing detailed examination
of the pleasant and the unpleasant.
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